A case study of collaborative disaster management in Malaysia. by Lee, Khiam Jin
 
 





A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Management  
at the 
University of Canterbury 
by 
Khiam Jin LEE 
Primary Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Sanna Malinen 





Department of Management, Marketing and Entrepreneurship 






For Gaik Sock (Fiona), my wife, and Han, my son, 
without whose love, companionship, and understanding 




For Lee Eng Oo (李荣有）and Lim Kooi Huah (林桂花), my parents,  
without whose love, kindness and sacrifice 







Cross-sector collaboration is often cited as an effective tool to mitigate and manage disasters 
(James, 2011; Power, 2017). However, research in non-disaster settings suggests that 
collaboration is difficult to develop and is problematic (Connelly, Zhang, & Faerman, 2008; 
Uhr, 2017). Simultaneous cooperation and competition between organisations (Bengtsson, 
Raza-Ullah, & Vanyushyn, 2016; Stentoft, Mikkelsen, & Ingstrup, 2018) can also hinder 
collaboration. Thus, though collaboration between agencies during disasters is considered 
necessary, it can be challenging in practice. This study examines the barriers to cross-sector 
collaboration during disasters by investigating collaborative disaster management of floods in 
Malaysia. 
The study employs a qualitative methodology using a case study approach. The case involved 
the management of disasters caused by floods. The Malaysia National Disaster Management 
Agency (NADMA), a nodal agency for managing disasters, is the focal organisation. Semi-
structured interviews were used for data collection. The research participants were 24 strategic 
and operational decision makers in 12 different disaster management organisations. In addition, 
six disaster aid recipients were interviewed. Secondary data from government documents and 
news reports complemented interview data. Data analysis techniques used included two cycles 
of coding, memoing, constant comparisons and theoretical saturation (Charmaz, 2008, 2014; 
Saldaña, 2016). 
The thesis identifies three barriers to cross-sector collaboration between stakeholders during 
disasters: a) perceived organisational status and hierarchy; b) different levels of motivation to 
collaborate; and, c) organisations lack the ability to collaborate in disasters. Based on the 
motivation to collaborate and the perceptions of one’s and others’ ability to collaborate, the 
thesis proposes four types of collaboration: (1) enthusiastic, (2) mandate-driven, (3) reluctant, 
and (4) non-collaborative. For practitioners, this study suggests integrating collaborative 
approaches within a command and control framework for effective disaster management. 
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Chapter 1:  




In all natural disasters through time, 
man needs to attach meaning to tragedy, 
no matter how random and inexplicable the event is. 
   
--- Nataniel Philbrick, writer, USA (1956-) 
1.1. Introduction 
Contrary to popular perception that natural disasters rarely happen, data from the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) shows that natural disasters are ubiquitous 
(Guha Sapir, 2019a). For instance, between 2014 and 2018, 1,790 disasters claimed 82,125 
lives, injured approximately 1 million, affected 953 million, and the global cost of the damage 
was US$785 million (Guha Sapir, 2019a). In the past five years, an average of 358 natural 
disasters were annually recorded; these frequent disasters trigger ripples of vulnerabilities in 
social, economic and political processes that rely on the disaster magnitudes and intensities 
(Guha Sapir, 2019a; Wisner, 2004). In 2018, Malaysia experienced 26 major storms, 23 floods, 
and 10 forest fires, in which over 39,000 people were affected (Lee, 2019) including two 
fatalities (Guha Sapir, 2019a). In 2004, Malaysia was affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami 
(Horton et al., 2008; Ismail et al., 2012). Occasionally, Malaysia also suffers from a trans-
boundary haze (Gorbiano, 2019) as a result of slash-and-burn activities in a neighbouring 
country (“South East Asia haze”, 2013).  
Given that disasters are frequent, disaster management has recently emerged as a significant 
discipline (Aitsi-Selmi, Egawa, Sasaki, Wannous, & Murray, 2015; ASEAN Secretariat, 2016; 
Bennett, 2012; Coppola, 2015; Hermansson, 2016). Disaster management focuses on effective 
ways to manage and mitigate disasters. The conventional disaster management approach 
heavily emphasises the command and control model, where a central agency, usually 
governments, co-ordinates and controls all disaster management activities through a legislative 
mandate (Adams, Owen, Scott, & Parsons, 2017; Drabek & McEntire, 2003; Guo & Kapucu, 
2015a). However, recently, questions have been raised about the efficacy of this approach; 
collaboration is one way to address these limitations (Kaniewski, 2011; Schneider, 2005). This 
study, thus, investigates the barriers to cross-sector collaboration in disaster management and 
attempts to understand the ways it can improve the predominant command and control model 
for effective disaster management. 
The literature suggests that collaborative arrangements are increasingly applied in disaster 
management (Djalante, 2012; Gray, 1989; Moshtari & Gonçalves, 2017; Osei, 2011; Waugh 
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Jr & Streib, 2006). However, in practice, collaboration is difficult to develop, maintain and 
problematic (Connelly et al., 2008; Huxham, 1996; Uhr, 2017); the barriers to collaboration 
for disaster risk reduction (DRR) are recognised (Takara, 2018). However, research about the 
barriers to collaboration in disasters is scarce. This study seeks answers to why collaboration 
in disaster management is so challenging. 
1.2. Background to the research problem 
The public and private sectors widely practise collaboration in their daily non-disaster 
operations (Gray, 1985, 1989; Jing & Besharov, 2014; Kamensky & Burlin, 2004; M. M. Shaw, 
2003). However, collaboration between organisations in disasters is less frequent (Bush, 2015; 
Kapucu, 2008; Mathbor, 2007). Recent catastrophic events in the USA (Comfort, 2005; Levitt 
& Whitaker, 2009), Japan (Aoki, 2015a), Indonesia (Karan, Subbiah, & Gilbreath, 2011), 
China (Y. Chen & Booth, 2011; Cui et al., 2011) and Haiti (Piotrowski, 2010; Rahill, Ganapati, 
Clérismé, & Mukherji, 2014) highlight that both developed and developing countries are not 
spared from natural disasters. In fact, countries that were previously deemed not disaster-prone 
are now experiencing an increased intensity and frequency of natural disasters; Malaysia is one 
such country (Mohd Yassin, 2015; Sulaiman et al., 2019).  
During disasters, public agencies are regarded as the most appropriate organisations to provide 
the necessary leadership to initiate a disaster response and mobilise resources across different 
levels of jurisdiction (Boin, 2005b; Cornall, 2005; Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997; Waugh Jr & 
Streib, 2006). Public disaster agencies are named differently in different regions1. They can 
exist as committees, networks or councils consisting of multiple agencies across bureaucracies, 
and legislatures at national, state and local levels (Ansell & Gash, 2008). To support the 
government, public agencies exercise given mandates by delivering swift, effective relief to 
affected populations (Renn, Klinke, & Asselt, 2011; Shi, 2012). To enable a more effective 
response and facilitate subsequent recovery, public agencies engage and coordinate with civil 
organisations, citizens and other actors to complement government and community resources 
(Comerio, 2014a, 2014b; Vakis, 2006; Wisner, 2004).  
                                              
1 Public agencies responsible for disaster management are referred to as the National Disaster Management 
Authority in India, National Emergency Management Authorities (NEMAs) in the USA (S. L. Cutter, Ash, & 
Emrich, 2014; Proy, Tinel, & Fontannaz, 2013) and Disaster Emergency Management Organisations (DEMOs) 
in the Caribbean (Osei, 2011). 
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During routine times, the collaborative approach is generally deemed an effective, innovative 
approach to resolving problems and strengthening community relationships in the public 
service (B. Chen, 2010; Clegg, 2008; Gazley & Brudney, 2007; O’Leary & Vij, 2012). In a 
non-crisis context, a convenor often has no time pressure to access the necessary information 
and make decisions in consensus involving multiple stakeholders. However, the situation is 
different during disasters; there is a time pressure to make decisions with limited information 
(Buchanan & O Connell, 2006; Danielsson & Ohlsson, 1999). Some extreme cases show that 
failing to collaborate across various sectors in disasters has led to severe adverse consequences, 
e.g., during the responses to Hurricane Katrina in the USA in 2005 (Farazmand, 2007; Sobel 
& Leeson, 2006) and in the 2011 eastern Japan earthquake and tsunami (Aoki, 2016; Norio, 
Ye, Kajitani, Shi, & Tatano, 2011). With Turkey, failings in multi-agency collaboration in 
responding to the series of earthquakes between 1999 and 2011 led to the reorganisation of the 
national disaster management system (Hermansson, 2016, 2017; Unlu, Kapucu, & Sahin, 
2010). Crowe (2013) argues that collaboration is needed within disaster management by 
highlighting the gap between need and practice. On one hand, disaster management inherently 
coordinates with other parties in resource mobilisation and relief response; coordination is a 
form of collaboration. On the other hand, disaster management actors are often on their own 
and under-prepared to respond to a disaster. Collaboration, irrespective of its definition, 
application and limitations, is necessary in disaster management. 
In Southeast Asia, public agencies are the predominant authority for disaster response. These 
public disaster agencies are mandated to access the necessary resources in disasters (as sponsor 
of the disaster management institution), and are expected to focus on on-going collaboration 
and use appropriate skills to help attain its goals through collaboration (as champion of the 
disaster management institution) (J. N. Hood, Logsdon, & Thompson, 1993; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003). Public disaster agencies may not necessarily possess all resources, especially in a large-
scale disaster (Aoki, 2015b; Blanco, 2015; Comfort, 2005). As a result, the public agencies 
increasingly use collaboration to handle the ‘wicked problems’ of a disaster’s consequences (T. 
Christensen, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2013; Kapucu & Garayev, 2011; Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006). 
Distributing timely relief to an often dispersed population after a disaster, given limited 
information, time, high uncertainty and threats, is an example of a disaster aftermath ‘wicked 
problem’ (Boin, 2005b; Lai, 2011). Collaborating partners in disaster management typically 
include (but are not limited to): (1) public agencies or line ministries with mandated roles in 
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disaster management; (2) non-governmental organisations (NGOs); (3) regional and 
international organisations; (4) private sector organisations; and (5) the general public.  
Natural disaster management typically involves four interconnected stages: mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2011; Khan, Khan, & 
Vasilescu, 2008; Vakis, 2006). Janssen et al. (2010) categorise the mitigation and preparedness 
stages as the ‘prior to disaster’ phase; the stage from early signals to the immediate onset of a 
disaster as ‘during the disaster’ phase and the work of recovery through reconstruction and 
subsequent evaluation as the ‘post-disaster’ phase. This study combines ‘during the disaster’ 
and ‘post-disaster’ phases; hereafter this combined stage is the post-disaster response phase 
(Janssen et al., 2010). Because the post-disaster response phase is life-threatening, high-stakes 
and time-sensitive (Comfort, 2007; ECOSOC, 2019), this study focuses on the interactions and 
collaboration between public disaster agencies and their partners in this disaster management 
phase. Even when combining what has been studied on collaboration and disaster management, 
little is known about the barriers to collaboration during a disaster aftermath (Gray, 1989; Jing 
& Besharov, 2014; Wamsley & Wolf, 1996).   
1.3. Purpose of the study and the research questions 
My study aims to address the under-researched area of cross-sector collaboration in disasters. 
The acute disaster response phase involves various stakeholders, thus collaboration between 
public- and non-public actors in such an upheaval is challenging. By examining cross-sector 
barriers to collaboration during the acute disaster response phase involving organisations, 
networks or individuals, this study aims to clarify a social phenomenon (Yin, 2014). This 
phenomenon highlights that there are differences between collaboration during routine times 
and disasters, and asks what factors hinder stakeholders from collaborating in disasters to 
achieve the mutual goals that are unachievable working alone. This study aims to contribute to 
the theory on collaboration in disaster management and provide guiding principles for disaster 
academics, policy makers, and practitioners to implement a more effective collaborative 
disaster management. 
1.4. Overview of the research design 
Earlier sections show that, in failing to effectively respond to disasters, societies risk increasing 
fatalities, injuries and environmental degradation that lead to severe disruption of livelihoods, 
social order, and property damage (Rodríguez, Quarantelli, & Dynes, 2006). Comerio (2014a) 
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also argues that a disaster prompts a new normal, advances re-thinking and planning. 
Understanding a disaster’s consequences and a desire to collaborate in disasters give rise to 
this study's research design. This study uses a case study approach (Yin, 2014) to examine the 
barriers to cross-sector collaboration in disaster management. The Malaysia National Disaster 
Management Agency, NADMA2, the central agency mandated to coordinate and manage all 
matters related to disaster management, is the focal organisation. The case used in the present 
research is the disaster management of floods in Malaysia. The participants interviewed include 
strategic and operational decision makers of the Malaysian public disaster agencies and their 
collaborating partners, and the aid recipients. Semi-structured interviews were used as the 
primary data source, complemented by government documents, organisations and news 
reports. Multiple data sources strengthen the findings through triangulation of evidence 
obtained from the Malaysian public agencies, regional bodies, UN agencies and disaster 
management databases. Qualitative research tools of coding, memoing, constant comparisons, 
and theoretical saturation were used to analyse the data (Charmaz, 2014; Saldaña, 2016).  
Malaysia, the context of the study, is increasingly exposed to a range of climate-related 
disasters such as intensified floods, cyclonic storms, landslides and earthquakes (Gupta, 2010; 
Middleton, 2015); hydro-meteorological natural disasters, i.e., floods and storms, are the most 
frequent. Floods often occur during the year-end monsoon season that brings torrential rains, 
particularly to the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia (Mohamed Shaluf & Ahmadun, 2006; 
Pereira, Tan, & Komoo, 2010). Landslides, as a result of environmental degradation and 
economic development (N. W. Chan, 1998), are other common disasters in Malaysia. In 
addition to the prevalence of disasters, another reason for selecting Malaysia as the context for 
this research was that there has been a strong government-led initiative to improve the national 
disaster management ability (“Flood woes”, 2017) and an increasing multi-stakeholder 
approach to learn best practice at regional (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005; Wijayanti, 2012) and 
national level (“Disaster preparedness”, 2017; “Flood woes”, 2017). This government-led 
initiative was inspired by the concept of DRR and the international initiative: the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015-2030 (Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2015; UNISDR, 2015). 
DRR is a proactive approach, an “investment for the future” (UNISDR, 2007b, p. 5) and an 
integral part of all levels of sustainable development. Focusing on Malaysia’s experience in 
responding to natural disasters based on desired DRR principles and the current system to 
                                              
2 NADMA gave consent in written in July 2017 to use its organisation name in this thesis and future publications. 
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advance multi-hazard disaster management, this study investigates the barriers to collaboration 
in disasters. 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis comprises seven chapters: 
• Chapter 2 reviews the relevant collaboration and disaster management literature. It 
begins by defining collaboration and associated terms in the collaboration and disaster 
management domains. This chapter discusses collaboration’s advantages and 
disadvantages, and the challenges to collaboration in natural disaster management. The 
chapter also examines the known barriers to cross-sector collaboration in disasters.  
• Chapter 3 presents the research methodology and methods used in the study. It begins 
with the researcher’s ontological and epistemological considerations, followed by a 
discussion of the research design and the selection of the case for this study. The 
engagement strategies with the research participants and the data collection techniques 
are then discussed. Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the sampling, theoretical 
saturation and addresses concerns about the study’s reliability and validity. 
• Chapters 4 and 5 discuss how the data were analysed.  
o Chapter 4 explains the data analytical techniques and processes to organise and 
categorise participants’ quotes and codes from the interview transcripts. The 
initial (or open) coding of the interview data led to numerous open codes that 
are reduced to two levels of focused coding. 
o Chapter 5 continues the data reduction from Chapter 4 and discusses how the 
salient first- and second-level focused codes are identified from the open codes. 
This chapter discusses how the focused codes are reduced to three key themes.  
• Chapter 6 discusses the study’s results: three barriers to collaboration in disasters. 
Following this, the four types of collaboration in disasters are discussed and, together, 
how these barriers and collaboration typologies shape decision making by disaster 
actors to achieve common goals through cross-sector collaboration. 
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. It begins with an elaboration of approaches to disaster 
management, follows by the academic and practical contributions and discusses the 









Truth can be found only through the negation of all thoughts about it. 
---Upanishads, India philosophy 
Approximately 3 millennia ago (ca. 800 B.C.E – 500 B.C.E) 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter first defines and discusses the concepts used in this study. These concepts include 
various collaborative arrangements related to disaster management. The forms of collaboration 
and the differences in their use in routine and non-emergency times compared with during 
disasters are discussed. The advantages and disadvantages of collaboration in different contexts 
are then presented. The challenges to collaboration in disasters, the roles of public agencies in 
disasters, and disaster management as a knowledge body are also discussed.  
Apart from the already known factors that constrain collaboration, this chapter explores 
alternative perspectives on collaboration, changing organisation management structures and 
the volatile environments that hinder collaboration in disasters. Finally, I present examples 
from the literature of past disaster response failures from both developed and developing 
countries. The lessons learnt from these events can inform how increasing cross-sector 
collaboration in disaster management could have resulted in more positive outcomes.  
2.2. Defining collaboration  
Collaboration is generally perceived as a voluntary, interactive, evolving process (Graham & 
Barter, 1999; Gray, 1989; Wood & Gray, 1991) between two or more entities, be they 
individuals, organisations, groups, units or communities, to solve common problems (Agranoff 
& McGuire, 2003; Damanpour & Schneider, 2006). The importance and effectiveness of 
collaboration are widely cited in management research (McGuire, 2006; Nohrstedt, 2015; 
Noran, 2014). From a management perspective, collaboration is defined as two or more 
stakeholders working together voluntarily to resolve a set of problems that cannot be solved by 
the stakeholders on their own (Gray, 1985; Kamensky, Burlin, & Abramson, 2004). Gray (1989) 
argues that collaboration is not a state of organisation with a rigid milestone but a deliberative 
process in which parties communicate constructively the differences between them and enable 
the creation of synergy otherwise beyond an individual’s vision and ability. Thomson and Perry 
(2006) assert that collaboration is non-linear and process-oriented. To apply a collaborative 
approach effectively, stakeholders are expected to deal with the intertwined dimensions of 
governance, administration, organisational autonomy, mutuality, norms and trust (Thomson & 
Perry, 2006). Woodland and Hutton (2012) argue that collaboration occurs when “two or more 
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entities (organisations or people) come together or stay together… to achieve a vision…that 
could not otherwise be accomplished in isolation” (p. 370). This explains, in part, that 
collaboration is difficult and no consensus on its definition (Gajda, 2004).  
To summarise the literature, collaboration shares four key characteristics. First, collaboration 
is a strategic instrument to attain organisational objectives (Gray, 1989; Imperial, 2005). 
Second, collaboration engages two or more independent entities and encourages sharing 
resources and capabilities (Woodland & Hutton, 2012). Ideally, it also should be free from 
hierarchical governance and influence (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Third, collaboration demands 
partners to make a long term commitment rather than it being a one-off activity and (Provan & 
Kenis, 2008)Fourth, collaboration evolves, is dynamic (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Bagherzadeh, 
2015; Majchrzak, Philip, & Faraj, 2012), and can dissolve within an agreeable time frame 
(Wankhade & Patnaik, 2019a). Collaboration occurs also outside of organisational context as 
it can involve other entities such as networks, groups, individuals or communities. The next 
section discusses the various forms of collaboration.  
 Inter-organisational collaboration 
Organisations often collaborate to achieve something greater than they could on their own. 
Inter-organisational collaboration is a voluntary activity with mutual benefits to participating 
entities to solve problems that are too difficult to be solved by an organisation alone (Agranoff 
& McGuire, 2003; Bardach, 1998). This definition is commonly adopted in collaborative 
research but it does not clearly emphasise the continuum of an active process, joint decision 
making, long-term commitment and interdependency that is central to collaboration. 
Combining thinking from previous work (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Bardach, 1998; Gazley, 
2008; Imperial, 2005; Keyton, Ford, & Smith, 2008), I use the following operational definition 
of inter-organisational collaboration: two or more independent entities working together 
voluntarily and actively in an interactive process with joint decision making towards mutual 
goals that could not be achieved individually.  
Definitions of inter-organisational collaboration from the 1980s to 2010s share common 
themes of problem solving and achieving mutual goals (Graham & Barter, 1999) as the two 
primary motivating factors for collaboration. Building on a synthesis of collaboration theories 
and organisational learning literature, Woodland and Hutton (2012) summarise the five 
attributes of collaboration as: (1) shared purpose (McCann, 1983), (2) complex hierarchies 
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(Hovik & Hanssen, 2015), (3) developmental process (Doz & Baburoglu, 2000; Vangen & 
Huxham, 2003), (4) varying levels and degrees of integration (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 
2000); and (5) a cycle of enquiry consisting of dialogue, decision making, action and evaluation 
where collaborative partners aim to accomplish their shared purpose or goals (Gajda & Koliba, 
2007; Gajda & Koliba, 2008).  
This study uses collaboration as a tool of governance and a strategy to address complex 
problems following a natural disaster by examining the interactions between organisations, 
networks, and individuals. The term inter-organisational collaboration in the literature refers to 
interactions between organisations and excludes individuals or the public; its study examines 
only issues or events from the perspective of organisational interdependency in a context 
(Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003; Keyton et al., 2008). This 
study includes organisations and individuals as collaborative partners, and emphasises the 
evolving nature and long-term commitment meaningful collaboration should possess 
(Majchrzak et al., 2015; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Table 2.1 summarizes the dominant thinking 
on collaboration from 1985 to date. It shows evolution of the definition of collaboration from 
chiefly focusing on resource sharing, problem solving and mutual appreciation between the 
1980s and 90s to joint decision making, shared vision and increased stakeholder interdependent 
relationships in the 2000s.  
Table 2.1 presents various scholars definitions of collaboration across different disciplines. 
Scholars’ work on collaboration since 1985 includes some important defining characteristics: 
joint activities and decision making, resolving common problems, and interdependent 
relationships. Understanding the differences in a collaborative strategy is important because 
they lead to varied processes, memberships and performance critical for delivering results as 
expected by the collaboration initiator(s) as well as the public. 
Other forms of collaboration, such as inter-sectoral and cross-sector collaboration, are widely 
applied in diverse research domains. Inter-organisational collaboration is different from inter-
sectoral or cross-sector collaboration; it consists of organisations, groups and individuals with 





Table 2-1: Definitions of collaboration 
Sources Definitions of Collaboration 
Gray (1985, p. 
912) 
Collaboration is “the pooling of appreciation and/or tangible resources, e.g., 
information, money, labour, etc., by two or more stakeholders to solve a set of 
problems which neither can solve individually”. 
Gray (1989, pp. 
12-13) 
“Inter-organisational collaboration [is] an emergent process between interdependent 
organisational actors who negotiate the answers to shared concerns”. 
Collaboration is “a method for solving shared problems and resolving conflicts, 
[that] can be used to help organisations join forces, pool information, and reach 
mutually satisfying long-term agreements”. 
Huxham (1996, 
p. 1) 
Collaboration is “working in association with others for some form of mutual 
benefit”. 
Sink (1998, p. 
1188) 
Collaboration is a “process by which organisations with a stake in a problem seek a 





(2004, p. 8) 
“Collaboration occurs when people from different organisations produce something 
together through joint effort, resources, and decision making, and share ownership 
of the final product or service”. 
Imperial (2005, 
p. 286) 
Collaboration is “any joint-activity, by two or more organisations, intended to 
create public value by working together rather than separately”. 
Keyton, Ford, & 
Smith (2008, p. 
381) 
Collaboration is “the set of communicative processes in which individuals 
representing multiple organizations or stakeholders engage when working 
interdependently to address problems outside the spheres of individuals or 




Collaboration is “a nested phenomenon that takes place in a complex, open systems 
environment…that exists simultaneously at the inter-organisational, intra-




Defining inter-organisational collaboration from the perspective of humanitarian 
setting, inter-organisational collaboration refers to “a partnership process in which 
two or more independent organisations work closely to program and implement 
their operations…organisations negotiate and agree on the goals of their shared 





Defining collaboration from the perspective of disaster management, and inspired 
by the IFRC, collaboration happens when actors join hands across relationships and 
sectoral boundaries to assess a situation, initiate and work on a coherent response to 
mitigate disaster negative impacts. But also warn the factors of internal legitimacy, 
power balance, integration and trust may have an impact on collaborative 
processes.  
Gazley (2017, p. 
1) 
Collaboration is “a team and group dynamic…[that] occurs within and across 
institutions but also within the partnerships and networks [partners] inhibit”. 
 
 Inter-sectoral collaboration  
Current literature has a dearth of empirical studies and opposing arguments on collaboration 
involving public agencies in managing natural disasters (Janssen et al., 2010). This study 
focuses on disaster collaboration involving organisations and individuals or communities (such 
as disaster aid recipients living in rural areas), thus inter-sector and cross-sector collaboration 
(discussed in the next section) are appropriate approaches compared with inter-organisational 
collaboration which focusses only on interaction between organisations.  
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Inter-sectoral collaboration is commonly referred to as the collective actions of diverse 
specialised entities across sectors or domains, performing multiple tasks, and interacting in a 
continuum for a common objective (Beser, 2011; Gazley, 2008; Tooher et al., 2017). It is 
defined as a purposeful working relationship encompassing government, non-government, 
non-profit, business, individuals, policy makers, academia, and multi-organisational actors at 
the community, national and international scale, along and across horizontal (i.e., national and 
community) and vertical (i.e., between organisations of similar jurisdiction and authority level) 
domains (Chircop, Bassett, & Taylor, 2015, p. 182). The term inter-sectoral collaboration has 
received attention since the 1970s, when the World Health Organisation (WHO) zealously 
promoted the inter-sectoral approach as a means to promote health and health equity awareness 
and facilitate the health agenda implementation across sectors (WHO, 1978, 2011). This 
explains why inter-sectoral collaboration is widely adopted in public health policy research, 
health education promotion (Burgess et al., 2016; Delaney, 1994; Kinsman et al., 2018), disease 
control (Dhimal & Karki, 2014; Freeman et al., 2013) and community-based programme 
development (Andersson, Bjärås, Tillgren, Östenson, & Mälardalens, 2005). Only recently has 
the inter-sectoral approach been used in disaster research so the literature is limited (Chang-
Richards, Seville, Wilkinson, Kachali, & Stevenson, 2014; Kachali, Storsjö, Haavisto, & 
Kovács, 2018; Phibbs, Kenney, Severinsen, Mitchell, & Hughes, 2016).  
 Cross-sector collaboration  
Cross-sector collaboration is the key focus of this study and a disaster is the setting where 
collaboration is required. For this study, cross-sector collaboration is defined as a voluntary, 
mutually beneficial engagement with a long-term commitment to solve common problems that 
cannot be achieved working alone, involving public and non-public actors comprising 
organisations, individuals and communities spanning organisational and sectoral boundaries. 
An example of cross-sector collaboration occurs when a natural disaster strikes: public disaster 
agencies lead collaborative partners consisting of organisations, individuals or communities, 
to respond immediately to support the affected people. However, cross-sector collaboration has 
its challenges. Among others, stakeholders’ inconsistent attitudes towards regulatory 
compliance, a lack of an overall strategy, conflicting values and ambiguous roles are potential 




The definition and application of cross-sector collaboration is similar to inter-sectoral 
collaboration except the latter is more commonly used in public policy, health education and 
healthcare research, often in a formal setting (Kachali et al., 2018; Li, Huikuri, Zhang, & Chen, 
2015; Tooher et al., 2017; WHO, 2011), and emphasises technical expertise and multi-tasking 
(Beser, 2011; Gazley, 2008; Tooher et al., 2017). Cross-sector collaboration is widely applied 
as a strategy to address a myriad of public challenges (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Goldsmith 
& Eggers, 2004; Mandell, 2001; Rethemeyer, 2005). The cross-sector approach is claimed to 
have advantages over other collaborative forms such as an emphasis on interactions with 
citizens, flexibility in experimenting, and an appreciation of principal-to-principal rather than 
typical principal-agent relationships among partners as is seen in other joint activities (Forrer, 
Kee, & Boyer, 2014).  
Cross-sector collaboration is an alliance of individuals and organisations from non-profit 
organisations, government, philanthropic, and private sectors that use their diverse perspectives 
and resources to jointly solve a societal problem and to achieve a shared goal (Bryson & 
Crosby, 2008). Cross-sector collaboration implies “the linking or sharing of information, 
resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly 
an outcome that could not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately… involving 
government, business, non-profits and philanthropies, communities, and/or the public as a 
whole” (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006, p. 44). Halvorsen et al. (2017) maintain that cross-
sector collaboration consists of both formal and informal initiatives that lead collaborating 
partners towards a common goal.  
To avoid interpreting collaboration narrowly, and recognising the rigour of varying 
collaborative arrangements, reference to the collaboration literature is not limited to cross-
sector collaboration. Instead, this study includes studies of inter-sectoral and inter-
organisational approaches, public-private partnerships and other collaborative arrangements, 
inter-alia, multi-stakeholder collaboration (Djalante, 2012; Gray & Purdy, 2018; Jennifer, 
2013), multiagency approach (Van Scotter, Pawlowski, & Cu, 2013), network management 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Moynihan, 2009; Gerry Stoker, 2006), and collaborative 
governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Klijn & Skelcher, 2007). Table 
2.2 clarifies what has been discussed in earlier sections about the distinctive characteristics of 
inter-sectoral, inter-organisational and cross-sector collaboration and how they are interpreted 
and applied in their respective research domains.  
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Table 2-2: A summary of the characteristics of inter-sectoral, inter-organisational and cross-sector collaboration 
 Inter-sectoral collaboration  Inter-organisational collaboration  Cross-sector collaboration   
Definition “Inter-sectoral collaboration has been described as a 
deliberative, recognized, purposeful relationship 
constituted of government, non-government, not for 
profit, business, academia, communities, policy-
makers, managers, clinicians and multi-organizational 
stakeholders at the local, national and global scale, 
along and across horizontal and vertical axes” (Chircop 
et al., 2015, p. 182).  
Inter-organisational collaboration is defined as two 
or more organisations engaging voluntarily and 
actively in an interactive process to achieve both 
common and individual goals that neither could 
achieve if they acted alone (Agranoff & McGuire, 
2003; Bardach, 1998; Damanpour & Schneider, 
2006; Keyton et al., 2008) 
 
Cross-sector collaboration implies “the linking or 
sharing of information, resources, activities, and 
capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors 
to achieve jointly an outcome that could not be 
achieved by organizations in one sector separately… 
involving [partnerships among] government, 
business, non-profits and philanthropies, 
communities, and/ or the public as a whole” (Bryson 
et al., 2006, p. 44). Cross-sector collaboration has 
“both formalized and informal efforts to work 
together across sectors on activities…” (Halvorsen et 
al., 2017, p. 3). 
Applications Promoted by the WHO since 1970s as a strategy by 
linking relationships and efforts between many sectors 
to achieve health outcomes in a more effective, 
efficient or sustainable manner than can be achieved by 
acting alone (Adeleye & Ofili, 2010; WHO, 2011). It is 
largely applied in research related to public health 
policy, health education, tropical disease control and 
community-based programmes (Andersson et al., 2005; 
Burgess et al., 2016; Kinsman et al., 2018) 
Commonly applied as strategy in extensive sectors 
including but not limited to human service delivery, 
healthcare, science, management, public safety, 
disaster management (Bailey & Koney, 1996; 
Butts, Acton, & Marcum, 2012; Karam, Brault, 
Van Durme, & Macq, 2018; Kozuch & 
Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek, 2016; Powell, Koput, & 
Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
Cross-sector collaboration is widely applied in 
multiple research disciplines to address a wide range 
of public challenges including but not limited to the 
disaster management domain (Agranoff & McGuire, 
2001; K. Chang, 2012; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; 
Guo & Kapucu, 2015a; Halvorsen et al., 2017; 
Rethemeyer, 2005; Simo & Bies, 2007).  
Limitations Mainly focussed on health and education sectors. 
WHO’s stance on inter-sectoral collaboration may 
limit possible contributions outside the health sector to 
achieve health equity aims within a timeframe (WHO, 
2008). 
Inter-organisational collaboration is a strategy 
examined through the lens of organisational 
interdependency in a context but excludes public or 
individuals without organisational membership as 
collaborative partners (Gray, 1989; Imperial, 2005; 
Keyton et al., 2008) 
Against the traditional centred-hierarchical 
bureaucracy (Kapucu, 2009; O’Leary & Vij, 2012; 
Ortt, Bucker, & Klein, 2016), public organisations 
find it challenging to “operate in heterarchies, 
providing [collaborative organisations] greater 
discretion, flexibility, and even autonomy” (p. 46) if 
the aim is to make cross-sector collaboration 




2.3. The structures of cross-sector collaboration 
In general, two broad forms of collaboration can be delineated as: (1) ad hoc and case-by-case 
basis; or (2) an ongoing and more permanent practice (Johnson, Goerdel, Lovrich, & Pierce, 
2015). Ad-hoc collaboration is informal and focused on consensus-building; it is often engaged 
to resolve a particular dispute or issue (Goldstein & Butler, 2009; Margerum, 2002). Ad hoc 
collaboration can be formed swiftly without presupposed ideas to maintain it as an on-going 
relationship and it can be useful in an emergency response (O’Leary & Vij, 2012). In contrast, 
on-going collaboration can form as an established organisational core practice (Brooks, 2002; 
Johnson et al., 2015). Both ad hoc and longer-term collaboration are increasingly common 
across different industries and sectors, including collaboration during emergencies (Bingham, 
O'Leary, & Carlson, 2008; Gazley, 2008; Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010; Kapucu & 
Garayev, 2011).  
In addition to ad hoc and long-term relationships, collaborative arrangements can be viewed 
from four perspectives: (1) vertical collaboration (i.e., central and state government); (2) 
horizontal collaboration (i.e., across agencies at the same level of jurisdiction); (3) inter-
sectorial collaboration (i.e., government, NGOs, or the general public), and (4) wide-area 
collaboration (i.e., coordinating multiple stakeholders from vertical, horizontal and inter-
sectoral collaboration) (Brassard, Howitt, & Giles, 2015). In the present study, cross-sector 
collaboration, this study’s focus, is a form of wide-area collaboration (Aoki, 2015b; Brassard 
et al., 2015). 
Cross-sector collaboration can be voluntary or mandated (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Gazley 
(2008) suggests that most collaboration between organisations occurs voluntarily and 
informally. However, research that distinguishes mandated from voluntary collaboration 
remains scant (O’Leary & Vij, 2012). In both cases, collaboration requires some level of 
authority or legitimacy to advance and survive (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Legitimacy is defined 
as a generalised perception that the actions of an alliance or network are desirable and proper 
(Suchman, 1995). Thus, legitimacy is critical and influences stakeholders’ commitment to 
collaboration (Walker, de Vries, & Nilakant, 2017). It is noteworthy that some level of 
legitimacy in collaboration is necessary because it helps gain credibility from others in some 
systems or societies with specific norms and values (Provan, Kenis, & Human, 2015), 
otherwise it risks remaining rudimentary and unsustainable. 
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A structural arrangement in any form is the next development that collaboration between 
organisations needs to take once the shared concerns and common goals are identified (Hardy 
et al., 2003; Padiila & Daigle, 1998). The desirable structure for governing the new network in 
an ad hoc or on-going, voluntary or mandated (or some sort of combination) collaboration is 
little known. The kind of structure is important for the benefits of formalisation and governance 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Walter & Petr, 2000). The practice of collaboration among different 
organisations and collaborative actors is advancing faster than scholarly research to understand 
the reasons for the formation of the collaboration (Bryson & Crosby, 2008). In acknowledging 
multi-dimension collaborative forms, this study seeks to understand the rationale of applying 
cross-sector collaboration to address complex public problems during disasters.  
2.4. Forms of joint activity in practice 
Various forms of joint activity are often used interchangeably with the term collaboration in 
the operations and management literature. These include the concepts of teamwork, 
cooperation, partnership and coordination. It is imperative to distinguish collaboration as 
defined in this study from other forms of joint activity. A focus on a particular collaborative 
activity (e.g., teamwork or coordination) uses different processes and leads to different 
outcomes. These forms, however, differ from collaboration (as defined in this study) as set out 
below. It is helpful to clarify their meaning before proceeding with further discussion on 
collaboration and disaster management. To explain the similarities and differences of the other 
forms of joint activity in practice and collaboration, Figure 2.1 illustrates the interrelationships 
between these constructs in a Venn diagram.  
Among the constructs, teamwork is deemed to most closely resemble collaboration (Bedwell 
et al., 2012). Teamwork is an example of “instantiation of collaboration” (Bedwell et al., 2012, 
p. 135) because it is similar to collaboration in terms of being multi-dimensional, reciprocal 
and works towards a shared objective (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001; Salas, Burke, & 
Cannon‐Bowers, 2000). West (2012) argues teamwork can be expanded in a multi-teamwork 
system through effective integration between different organisations. Nonetheless, teamwork 
is different from collaboration at the analysis level because collaboration can happen between 
individuals, organisations, communities and units, whereas teamwork involves only 
individuals within a similar team or organisation (Bedwell et al., 2012). Collaboration can exist 
beyond the team level (e.g., NGOs extending further livelihood assistance support to a village 
after a disaster; public agencies organising a disaster simulation exercise involving multiple 
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non-public organisations); these collaborative arrangements cannot be categorised as 
teamwork.  
Cooperation is another construct frequently cited as a synonym of collaboration (Bedwell et 
al., 2012). Cooperation is a means of collaboration to achieve an organisation’s objectives but 
focuses only on interactions between two functional parties (Pinto, Pinto, & Prescott, 1993). It 
refers to a reciprocal interaction among participants working together to solve a portion of a 
problem while pursuing shared goals (Argyle, 2013; Dillenbourg, Baker, Blaye, & O'Malley, 
1996; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007; Sylves & Comfort, 2012). Cooperation, like collaboration, 
is a joint effort involving mutual engagement in an integrated manner to solve a problem 
through joint decision making, work and shared ownership (Kamensky et al., 2004). However, 
cooperation is focussed on solving part of a problem whereas collaboration aims to achieve a 
common goal holistically.  
Partnership is a form of cooperation usually bound by a formal agreement (Carnwell & Carson, 
2008; Kamensky & Burlin, 2004). A partnership is a specific example of cooperation. A 
partnership is like collaboration in several ways. Both require iterative communication and 
exist on an ad hoc or long term basis (Goldstein & Butler, 2009; Johnson et al., 2015). 
Additionally, a partnership involves individuals working interdependently with joint decision 
making to address a shared problem and is not limited to the leaders from respective 
organisations making major decisions (K. Cooper & Shumate, 2012; Damanpour & Schneider, 
2006; Keyton et al., 2008). The difference between a partnership and collaboration is that the 
former relies highly on relationship management (Gallant, Beaulieu, & Carnevale, 2002), and 
partnerships are always bound by some sort of agreement; collaboration does not necessarily 
have a binding agreement.  
Coordination is typically formal, requiring unified procedures and specific mechanisms to 
accomplish the assigned tasks (Bingham & O'Leary, 2006; Bingham et al., 2008; Boin, 2005a; 
Ergun, Keskinocak, & Swann, 2011; Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010; O'Leary & Bingham, 
2007). For example, coordination happens when production line operators must first 
completely assemble the necessary components of a device before moving it on to quality 
assurance supervisors for the finished product’s standard verification. Coordination is perhaps 
the most challenging term to differentiate from collaboration because teamwork, cooperation 
and a partnership require some kind of coordination to advance. This explains why 
coordination and collaboration are often used interchangeably. Coordination, like collaboration, 
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emphasises joint decision making throughout all stages of the task(s) (Ansell & Gash, 2008) 
with a high focus on attaining desired common results. Nevertheless, coordination is different 
from collaboration because the essence of collaboration is not a sequential order but the entirety 
of every process leading to achieve common objectives. Table 2.3 compares various scholars’ 
definitions of teamwork, cooperation, partnership and coordination. 
Table 2-3: Definitions of teamwork, cooperation, partnership and coordination 
Sources Definition of Construct 
Teamwork 
West (2012); Bedwell et al. (2012, p. 
135) 
Teamwork involves only individuals within a similar organisation 
and is an example of “instantiation of collaboration” (p. 135). 
Teamwork happens within an organisation and can be expanded to 
multi-team systems through effective integration (West, 2012). 
Cooperation 
Argyle (2013), Dillenbourg et al. 
(1996), O’Leary and Vij (2012), Sylves 
and Comfort (2012) 
Cooperative work requires each participant to solve a portion of 
the problem or subtasks in a coordinated way, to pursue shared 
goals in advancing participant relationships. 
Partnership 
Arnstein (1969); Carnwell and Carson 
(2008); Goldstein and Butler (2009); 
Johnson et al. (2015); Kamensky and 
Burlin (2004); Shemer and Schmid 
(2007)  
Partnership usually demands a formal agreement with binding 
obligations to achieve common results such as a public-private 
partnership; a partnership is effective when there is power sharing 
between weaker partners with powerholders or key decision-
makers.  
Coordination 
Boin (2005b); Bingham, Drabek and 
McEntire (2002); Ergun, Keskinocak 
and Swann (2011); Kapucu, Augustin 
and Garayev (2009); Kapucu, Arslan 
and Demiroz (2010); O’Leary and 
Carlson (2008); O’Leary and Vij 
(2012) 
Coordination is about efficacy. It is more formalised, and focuses 
on achieving sequential subtasks by a unified arrangement for 
effective public service delivery.  
 
Figure 2.1 shows the shared constructs, space and relationships of teamwork, cooperation, 
partnership and coordination in the sphere of multiple-stakeholder collaboration. These 
constructs are similar in terms of joint decision making, reciprocity and a desire to attain a 
common objective. This study focusses on collaboration because it best describes the 









Figure 2-1: Shared space of the related constructs and collaboration.  Adapted from Bedwell 
et al. (2012, p. 136)  
2.5. The advantages of collaboration 
Though there is much that we need to understand about collaboration between organisations, 
organisations are increasingly working in collaborative arrangements. These organisations 
include public agencies that apply a collaborative approach both during routine times and 
emergencies, such as during a disaster response (Moshtari & Gonçalves, 2017; Reitan, 1998).  
Business organisations have experimented with various forms of collaboration such as 
consortia, clusters, co-operatives, joint ventures, strategic alliances (Larsson, Bengtsson, 
Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998), networks and public-private partnerships (Büchel, 2000; Hennart, 
1988; Kamensky & Burlin, 2004; Parkhe, 1996). For instance, manufacturers collaborate in the 
form of a partnership with suppliers to enhance product innovation (Un, Cuervo-Cazurra, & 
Asakawa, 2010) and even rivals collaborate to strengthen mutual R&D capacity (Bengtsson & 
Kock, 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2009). In business, collaboration is often perceived as important 
for mutual benefit, problem solving, reciprocity and concerted action (Kamensky et al., 2004; 
O’Leary & Vij, 2012). From the management perspective, collaboration is useful to gain 
economies of scale, reduce transaction costs, better quality of service or end product, or to gain 
access to new markets (Bamford, Gomes-Casseres, & Robinson, 2003; Gazley, 2008; Gazley 
& Brudney, 2007; Gray, 1989; Linden, 2003).  
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Learning from the private sector, public agencies have begun to collaborate across different 
organisational and institutional boundaries in various forms. These forms of working together 
are alliances, agreements, associations, coalitions, commissions, networks and unions (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2013; J. Chen, Chen, Vertinsky, Yumagulova, & Park, 2013; Kamensky et al., 2004; 
Kapucu, 2005; Kapucu et al., 2009). Some collaboration, such as associations, clusters and 
networks, are found in both the private and public sectors.  
Collaboration between organisations is important and is used increasingly because of its many 
perceived benefits. It is regarded as a strategy for responding to volatile environments or to 
address funding unpredictability (Gazley, 2017). Recent research on public administration 
encourages public agencies to collaborate with external partners (Jensen, Feldmann-Jensen, 
Johnston, & Brown, 2015; S. Patrick, 2014; Sørensen, 2012). The driving forces for 
collaboration (or forming networks, as commonly termed in public administration) are to 
recognise the interdependency of various stakeholders and to balance government autonomy 
while addressing complex public problems (O’Leary & Vij, 2012). Collaboration is also 
regarded as able to strengthen efficiency in addressing shared problems, to access more 
resources, to diffuse risk, and can provide opportunities for organisational learning and increase 
institutional legitimacy (M. K. Foster & Meinhard, 2002; Gazley & Brudney, 2007; Gray, 1989; 
Provan et al., 2015; Provan & Milward, 1995). More recently, collaboration is perceived as 
useful to promote innovation (Hartley & Rashman, 2018; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). In the 
non-profit, non-government sector or among civil society organisations, collaborating with 
other partners is perceived as being able to improve service delivery and build a stronger 
relationship with the grassroots community (Snavely & Tracy, 2000).  
Often, public managers perceive accountability as important because it is associated with good 
governance that is best achieved by strategic alliances or collaboration (Linden, 2003). 
Brinkerhoff (2002, 2003) asserts that participation of common citizens including NGOs in the 
planning, implementing and supervising of government-led public good delivery is beneficial 
to good-governance performance. Thus, public agencies that deliver social services effectively 
through collaboration are deemed compliant with governance expectations. Governance is 
defined as the rules, forms and administrative practices that are consensus-driven, guiding 
collective decision making with an emphasis on decisions made by groups of individuals or 
organisations rather than by one individual (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2001; Gerry. Stoker, 2004). 
In addition, public agencies that are committed to pursuing a longer term collaborative 
arrangement can develop strategic value not achievable through a one-off activity (D. Aldrich, 
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2012; Booher & Innes, 2002). The strategic value of long-term collaborating networks includes 
strengthened coordination and effective communication among stakeholders (Healey, 2006; 
Innes & Booher, 2010). These strategic values are critical to building consensus when making 
decisions (Healey, 2006; Innes & Booher, 2010). 
Among the many benefits of collaboration, organisational learning has been widely studied 
(Berlin & Carlström, 2015; Hartley & Rashman, 2018; Milway & Saxton, 2011; Nooteboom, 
2008; Thompson, 2012). Effective learning is deemed achievable through networks and the 
locus of innovation is embedded in the network or a system of inter-organisational relationships 
(Powell et al., 1996). Powell et al. (1996) argue that a network in the form of inter-
organisational collaboration is conducive to instilling innovation because it provides timely 
access to new resources and tests internal competency and learning ability. Though there are 
extensive benefits of collaboration, collaboration can be challenging to achieve. The next 
section discusses the potential disadvantages and the challenges of collaboration.  
2.6. Potential disadvantages and challenges of collaboration 
The extensive collaboration literature suggests that the reasons for organisations collaborating 
depend on the perceived benefits to be gained from the collaborating partners (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003; Bryson & Crosby, 2008; McGuire & Silvia, 2010). Longoria (2005) argues 
that collaboration is used for its perceived values, i.e., rationality, legitimacy, efficiency and 
being socially responsible, rather than that for the desire to achieve common goals between 
partners. Bano (2019) in her recent study of partnership arrangements between government 
agencies and NGOs in Pakistan, suggests that the attributes of the NGO leadership have critical 
influences to the success of state-NGO collaborations. Literature shows the complexity in using 
collaboration as a strategy. In practice, collaboration does not guarantee the intended results; it 
is associated with many potential disadvantages and challenges. 
Among the disadvantages of collaboration, particularly involving public agencies, is the 
potential loss of institutional autonomy and mission drift (Ferris, 1993; Gazley & Brudney, 
2007). Public agencies are also concerned that collaboration can cause decreased public 
accountability and financial control, increased transaction costs and, more concerning, is that 
evaluating collaboration results has proved difficult (Ferris, 1993; Gazley, 2008; Gray, 1989; 
Huxham, 1996; M. M. Shaw, 2003). Within organisations, goals and resources may be different 
(G. Smith & May, 1980). When among collaborating partners an organisation’s goals and 
resources are different, collaboration is hindered. For example, within a disaster public agency, 
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a strategic and policy compliance unit and a disaster response operation unit may have different 
approaches to how a disaster relief action is best implemented (e.g., strictly compliant with 
standard operating procedures or is flexible depending on the context). Some argue that it is 
the participants in an organisation, not the organisation, that have objectives (G. Smith & 
Cantley, 1985).  However, their goals are not necessarily similar, hence the complications of 
collaboration between organisations are multiplied (G. Smith & Cantley, 1985).   
Collaboration involving public and non-public actors has many challenges. Public agencies 
increasingly realise that they cannot address public problems alone (O’Leary & Vij, 2012; 
Rogers, Burnside-Lawry, Dragisic, & Mills, 2016). Citizens have increased expectations of 
public agencies to implement innovative approaches for solutions, increased public 
administration governance and funding to provide quality general services (Bamford et al., 
2003; Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2009; Shi, 2012; Vangen, Hayes, & Cornforth, 2015). However, 
public- and non-public collaboration does not happen easily. For example, during an immediate 
disaster response, disaster actors may not have adequate information, resources or knowledge 
to decide when and with whom to collaborate and how an intended collaboration should be 
formed. 
To some extent, public agencies may be reluctant to inform the public about when, where, and 
how government operates, in part, because of a lack of public trust in government (Crowe, 
2013). Other challenges to collaboration can also identified. First, advances in information and 
communication technology and the popularity of social media make collaborative decision 
making between government and other actors almost instantaneously known by the public 
(Crowe, 2013; Yates & Paquette, 2011). Decision-makers from public organisations are 
concerned about possible drawbacks. Second, endogenous factors such as differing 
organisational culture and structure and leadership of the collaborating units are challenges. 
Third, there are exogenous factors such as varieties of membership, communication barriers, 
lack of trust with external partners (K. Cooper & Shumate, 2012). For example, during disaster 
search and rescue and relief operations, public actors reluctantly respond to social media 
messages without first verifying the authenticity of the spiral news and considering the 
available resources and limitations. At the time, a nodal disaster management agency has to 
deal with the consequences of unchecked information posted on websites by the first disaster 
response agencies that compete with each other to show public accountability. The 
simultaneous cooperation and competition, or coopetition, approach among partners further 
complicates intended cross-sector collaboration (Bengtsson et al., 2016). This is a typical 
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example of what some regard as organisations competing with each other fiercely and 
cooperating simultaneously without neglecting their self-interest (Bouncken & Fredrich, 2016; 
Luo, 2007; Stentoft et al., 2018). More recently, disaster scholars argue that to prepare for 
future disasters, it is necessary to develop the next generation core competencies (Feldmann-
Jensen, Jensen, Smith, & Vigneaux, 2019). These competencies emphasise developing 
individual capability, technical capacity, and building relationships critical to prepare for 
emerging hazards and disaster risks (Feldmann-Jensen et al., 2019). In the increasingly 
interconnected world, the importance of building relationships between local, national and 
international disaster actors in strengthening disaster risk management is evident (Feldmann-
Jensen et al., 2019; Jensen et al., 2015). In practice, these competencies take time and are 
difficult to develop during non-emergencies as well as in disasters. Combined, these challenges 
make collaboration difficult to design and implement. 
2.7. Collaboration is disasters 
This study acknowledges that disaster aid recipients cannot be called collaborating partners as 
commonly interpreted in the collaboration literature about organisations or groups. However, 
I include them in the study and acknowledge their role as non-organisational actors in 
collaboration (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015; Bryson et al., 2006). Including aid recipients in 
this study also acknowledges the importance of “collaboration in all its forms” (Knight, 2013, 
p. 45). Including disaster aid recipients as collaborative partners echoes the views that the 
inclusion of collaborative actors of all forms is an integral strategy to deliver an improved, 
effective, coordinated service (Boin, 2005a; Ikeda, Sato, & Fukuzono, 2008; McLoughlin, 
1985).  
Although a plethora of definitions exist (Quarantelli, 1988, 2005), a disaster, either man-made, 
natural or technologically driven, is always associated with negative consequences (Gupta, 
2010; Hermansson, 2017; Mukhopadhyay, 2005). The consequences of a disaster are chaotic 
and complex, often associated with fatalities, injuries and environmental degradation (Crowe, 
2008; Mukhopadhyay, 2005; UNESCAP, 2016). Disasters can lead to severe disruption of 
livelihoods and social order, and property damage (Rodríguez et al., 2006). Smith (2005) 
contends that the consequences of a disaster are expansive because it disrupts society 
politically, socially and economically. When a disaster strikes, it is the people in the 
communities that feel the first impact of the disaster and often they are also the first respondents 
to the extreme event before professional assistance arrives. Aid recipients may provide useful 
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feedback to public and non-public actors. This alliance, in return, provides solutions and 
assistance to support the aid recipients and affected communities. However, the collaborative 
forms, processes and approaches to develop and maintain cross-sector collaboration in disasters 
are under-researched, particularly in the disaster response and recovery phases (Robinson & 
Gaddis, 2012).  
Many organisations, including public sector organisations, regard natural disasters as events of 
“high impact, low probability” (Crowe, 2008; Hollnagel, 2015). In contrast, CRED reports that, 
in 2018, there were 315 natural disasters that killed 11,804 people, affected 68 million people 
and caused US$131.7 million in economic losses worldwide (Guha Sapir, 2019a). Some 
regions and countries suffer more from disasters than others (Sreshthaputra, 2017; UNESCAP, 
2016). In 2018, Asia accounted for 80% of the global deaths and 76% of the populations 
affected; 47% of the total deaths were recorded in Indonesia (Guha Sapir, 2019a, 2019b). 
Contrary to what is perceived as an event of low probability, the occurrence of natural disasters 
has started to become the ‘new normal’ in the world; their frequent occurrence has caused 
serious disruption to society (UNESCAP, 2016). 
In practice, since natural disasters are perceived as rare events, policy makers often opt to adopt 
a precept of As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) (Woodruff, 2005). This principle 
refers to a level of acceptable risk without incurring extra cost yet it is safe to maintain the 
status quo (Hollnagel, 2015). Though public organisations, in general, acknowledge that 
collaboration helps alleviate the negative consequences of extreme events, if public managers 
perceive disaster is unlikely in the near future and an ALARP attitude prevails, collaboration 
involving public and non-public actors in organisational and socio-ecological domains will 
remain under bureaucratic inertia (Hollnagel, 2015).  
Different from developing and managing collaboration in non-emergency and routine times, 
planning and managing for collaboration in a disaster is more complicated because it is time 
sensitive, chaotic, complex, and beyond typical contractual arrangements (Y. Chang, 
Wilkinson, Potangaroa, & Seville, 2011; Y. Chang, Wilkinson, Seville, & Potangaroa, 2012). 
However, collaboration in disasters is urgently needed for effective search and rescue, swift 
distribution of relief aid, rapid post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. Disasters are surprises 
and threats that disaster stakeholders have to manage and monitor (Lanir, 1983). Managing 
disasters corresponds to tackling unexampled events that have not occurred before and are 
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beyond the capacity or experience of a single organisation, or the collective experience of all 
organisations in the same domain, or even of the entire society (Westrum, 2006).  
Despite many challenges, some actors, such as NGOs and civil society organisations, play 
important roles in post-disaster response and recovery (Eikenberry, Arroyave, & Cooper, 2007; 
Minamoto, 2010; Osa, 2013). Public-private partnerships are commonly noticed collaborative 
arrangements; they have increasingly been applied as a strategy to build the resilience of 
communities and cities against natural disasters and are not limited to a post-disaster response 
(Auzzir, Haigh, & Amaratunga, 2014; ECOSOC, 2019; Gjerde, 2017; Hardenbrook, 2005; 
Poontirakul, Brown, Seville, Vargo, & Noy, 2017). In general, why an organisation 
collaborates and how the collaboration is best implemented and measured in a disaster are not 
fully understood (Longoria, 2005).  
Hollnagel (2015) argues that the essence of managing a disaster is to remain in control in a 
disruptive environment or to absorb its impact. Partners in non-disaster collaboration demand 
different degrees of control as identified in public and private sector collaboration in business 
(Dimancescu & Botkin, 1986; Gray, 1985, 1989; Jing & Besharov, 2014; Kamensky & Burlin, 
2004; Perlmutter & Heenan, 1986; M. M. Shaw, 2003); in collaboration between government 
and NGOs (Linden, 2003; Ramanath, 2009); and among government, business and NGOs 
(Fosler, 2002). However, remaining in control in disasters amidst cross-sector collaboration 
involving multiple organisations, networks, individuals and communities is challenging. Often, 
public agencies are the principal stakeholders in post-disaster response but the literature shows 
that cross-sector collaboration (Bryson & Crosby, 2008) in disasters involving public agencies 
is under-researched. 
 Public organisations in disasters 
Disaster management is a key governmental responsibility that is challenging to fulfil (Boin, 
2005b; Boin & 't Hart, 2003). The advancement of technological, organisational and 
institutional capacities has led to the emergence of a globalised system for disaster risk 
management (Jensen et al., 2015). This system moves away from depending on one large 
organisation in responding to disasters to a multi-stakeholder approach (Jensen et al., 2015). 
Such stakeholders include public agencies and non-public disaster agencies (e.g., NGOs and 
civil society organisations). These non-public disaster agencies have started sharing the 
responsibilities of traditional public disaster agencies in handling disasters. However, an 
effective, credible and specialised agency, often a government agency, with experience in 
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disaster management is still in demand to convene cooperation, coordinate actions and provide 
overall leadership to a wide range of organisations engaged in disaster management (Cheong, 
2011; Cornall, 2005; Shi, 2012). In this regard, the service of public disaster agencies remains 
critical in disaster management. As time is a crucial element in a disaster response to save lives 
and property, efficiency is emphasised through centralised communication so decisions are 
made quickly (D. A. Alexander, 2008; Drabek & McEntire, 2003). 
The focus of collaborative arrangements in this study is on government- or civilian-led (not 
military-led) cross-sector collaborative disaster response. In Malaysia, it includes the 
government, NGOs, regional and international aid organisations and disaster aid recipients. 
Often, government provides leadership in disaster management (Cheong, 2011; Cornall, 2005; 
Shi, 2012), and national or local governments are held accountable by the general public to 
address the disaster aftermath. When a large-scale natural disaster strikes, a network of public 
service agencies (in Malaysia, the Disaster Management and Relief Committee) (Sulaiman et 
al., 2019) are assigned to manage the disaster’s consequences. NADMA is the national focal 
point in disaster management and the secretary of the committee at national level. Following a 
disaster, responding agencies urgently seek resources (Huxham & Vangen, 2005), information 
(Janssen et al., 2010; Kaye, 1992; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) and ideas that are needed to 
respond to disasters (Dillenbourg et al., 1996). External assistance is needed more when the 
magnitude of the natural disaster is beyond the capability of any single organisation (K. Cooper 
& Shumate, 2012; Trist, 1983). In such complicated situations, collaboration, either swiftly 
produced ad-hoc cooperation or a formal collaboration in infancy, is an effective means for a 
convener who pledges to embark on on-going collaboration (K. Cooper & Shumate, 2012; 
Wood & Gray, 1991).  
Influenced by the concept of New Public Administration (Bourgon, 2011; Kettl, 2005; Seibel, 
2010) or New Public Management (NPM) in the 1980s has led to a role change and 
reorganisation of the delivery of public services that are increasingly based on efficiency and 
effectiveness, markets and competition with a focus on performance, outcomes and customers 
(Ferlie, 1996; C. Hood, 1991). Public disaster agencies are inevitably influenced by this trend; 
in return, NPM has led to increasing participation of non-public organisations, networks and 
individuals in disaster management and, therefore, collaboration between diverse stakeholders 
becomes necessary. Partly of the NPM’s influence, public agencies are increasingly promoting 
collaborative governance as an alternative, innovative approach for responding to emergencies 
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(Hutter, 2016; Kapucu, 2015; Sørensen, 2012). Collaborative governance is a governing 
arrangement that has public- and non-public actors making joint decisions by consensus and 
deliberative efforts (Ansell & Gash, 2008). In public administration, collaborative governance 
has a strong connotation of good governance because the forum is initiated by authorised 
institutions and is formal. Both public and non-public stakeholders make consensus decisions; 
the focus of the collaboration is service to the public by delivering intended results to achieve 
public policy (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Ansel and Gash (2008) and Blanco (2015) argue that the 
governance element is an inextricable determinant of a good government in a disruptive 
environment. Bingham et al. (2008) argue that collaborative public management, an innovative 
and emerging form of cross-sector collaboration, is most appropriate because it is not only 
collaboration between organisations but also encompasses the public in government decision 
making, which enhances participatory governance and the credibility of results. Therefore, 
concerned public and non-public stakeholders form a forum among themselves in a new mode 
of governance such as multi-partner cross-sector collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 
2008; Bingham et al., 2008; Bryson et al., 2015; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; 
Erakovich & Anderson, 2013).  
It is a government’s prerogative to decide with whom to engage to manage a disaster’s 
aftermath. The decision is influenced by minimalism or experimentalism (Sabel & Simon, 
2011). According to Sabel and Simon (2011), minimalism emphasises efficiency and cost-
effectiveness, obviates official discretion, and provides choices for voluntarily participation 
rather than simply adhering to mandatory rules. Minimalism can lessen frontline administration 
and minimise the influence of key stakeholders by restricting their discretion. Experimentalism 
emphasises providing direction and autonomy to local and subordinate agencies and ensures 
their compliance with intended goals. Experimentalists then monitor and assess local 
performance and find ways for improvements through constant coordination and engagement 
as a reliable institution of learning. In practice, public disaster agencies are reluctant to adopt a 
flexible minimalist approach. Instead they adopt a rather authoritative experimentalism 
approach to manage a disaster’s aftermath (Sabel & Simon, 2011). This is why the command 
and control model is traditionally favoured by public agencies in managing disasters (Green, 




 Understanding a ‘natural’ disaster  
Natural disasters, not man-made or technological disasters, are the focus of this study. Natural 
disasters include earthquakes, landslides, tsunami and volcanic activities (geophysical), 
avalanches and floods (hydrological), extreme temperatures, drought and wildfires 
(climatological), cyclones, storms and wave surges (meteorological), epidemics, insect or 
mammal plagues (biological) (IFRC, 2016). Among the five disaster types, hydrological and 
meteorological extreme events caused most deaths and affected large populations particularly 
in Asia and the Pacific in the past two decades (Guha Sapir, 2019a).  
A disaster results from both human actions and natural hazards (Wisner, 2004) thus some 
researchers claim that it is too ‘generalisable’ to define a disaster as ‘natural’ (Emrich & Cutter, 
2011). Broadly defined, a disaster can be categorised as rapid-onset (e.g., volcanic eruptions 
and earthquakes) and slow-onset disasters (e.g., drought, famine, and soil salinisation) (D. A. 
Alexander, 1993; Jha, 2009). A disaster is the result of complicated processes of natural hazards 
(natural disasters), human activities, negligence or errors (anthropogenic disasters) (Jha, 2009) 
or a complex mix of natural hazards and human actions (Wisner, 2004). However, some 
question whether there is a ‘natural’ disaster at all since most disasters nowadays are the result 
of human activities (Jha, 2010; Pall et al., 2011; Qi & Liu, 2017) or anthropogenic climate 
change (Bouwer, 2011; Mann et al., 2016). A natural hazard is not necessarily transformed into 
a disaster. Natural hazards, such as a typhoon that occurs on an uninhabited Pacific island, do 
not cause disasters. A hazard becomes a disaster only under specific conditions: an ill-prepared 
community is exposed to a hazard and is vulnerable in its ability to respond to the impact 
(Kappes, Keiler, von Elverfeldt, & Glade, 2012; R. Shaw, Pulhin, & Pereira, 2010; Wisner, 
2004). Vulnerability is commonly referred to as a weakness to potential damage and destruction 
results from the malfunction of a current system or part of a system against the hazard 
(Birkmann, Fernando, & Hettige, 2006; Timmerman, 1981). Rather, not surprisingly, a badly 
managed disaster response generally gives rise to organisational and societal system reforms 
(Birkland, 2009; Boin, 't Hart, & McConnell, 2009). 
The debate on whether a natural disaster is rare is contentious. According to CRED, in the 
decade 1999 to 2008, 4,503 natural disasters were documented and resulted in 900,828 
fatalities, affected 2.36 billion people and cost US$957 million damage (Guha Sapir, 2019a). 
In the most recent decade, 2009 to 2018, the total natural disasters decreased to 3,702 with 
fatalities reduced to 496,049 people, and the total affected people was 1.8 billion, but the total 
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damage cost soared to US$1.6 billion. These figures do not include technological disasters 
(Guha Sapir, 2019a). Combined, natural disasters for the two decades ending in 2018 averaged 
410 natural disasters per year. Available evidence does not support the notion of a disaster 
being rare; with climate change, disasters seem to be recurring phenomena. 
 
 Understanding disaster management 
Disaster management is based on a multi-hazard approach covering all four major components 
of disaster management: prevention (or mitigation), preparedness, response and recovery (C. 
Peters & Prosser, 2010; Zakour & Gillespie, 2013). However, the common public perception 
and in aid organisations of disaster management primarily focusses on search, rescue and relief 
operations – activities in the post-disaster response (Bush, 2015; Croco, 2014). Of late, Kwok 
et al. (2016) in their research in New Zealand suggest paying attention to ‘social resilience’. 
They define social resilience as “the capacity of people and communities to deal with external 
stresses and shocks – and how it contributes to community preparedness, disaster response, and 
post-disaster recovery” (Kwok et al., 2016, p. 197).  
In the natural disaster management framework, the mitigation stage helps communities to 
reduce the potential impact of disasters through a proactive approach such as enforcement of 
building codes and land development zoning. The preparedness stage is about planning how to 
respond when a disaster strikes, which involves capacity building, simulation exercises and the 
installation of early warning systems. The response stage minimises the negative consequences 
created by a disaster and addresses the immediate, short-term needs of the affected community, 
including search and rescue and disaster relief. The recovery stage is usually a long-term 
programme helping the community return to normal involving grants, rebuilding and 
restoration (Chou, Zahedi, & Zhao, 2014; Khan et al., 2008). The various stages of disaster 
management are interdependent – work on a particular phase contributes to the success or 
failure of other phases. In all four phases, collaboration plays a key role. For example, a 
coordinated, collective response leads to successful recovery and reconstruction. Thus to meet 
the public’s expectations of the disaster management cycle, collaboration with other actors 
before, during and after disasters is critical (Kapucu, Garayev, & Wang, 2013).  
There are differences in the definitions of an emergency, a crisis and a disaster. The terms crisis 
management and emergency management are often used interchangeably in the disaster 
management literature and in policy-making. No doubt, a disaster is a crisis and an emergency 
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(Mukhopadhyay, 2005; Piotrowski, 2010; Salman Sawalha, 2014). However, the definitions 
and application of crisis management and emergency management differ. Having a clear 
understanding of the terms and concepts of these commonly used terms in disaster management 
is instrumental to discussing the dynamics of cross-sector collaboration in disasters. From the 
organisational perspective, a crisis is “an unstable condition caused by a low-probability and 
high-impact event at a turning point requiring a swift action for its resolution” (Chou et al., 
2014, p. 999). Some posit that crisis management is the body knowledge to manage an 
unexpected incident that threatens society’s values and must be addressed immediately 
(Olsson, 2009). Like ‘natural disaster’, a crisis is a chaotic condition that may cause instability 
and bring social, economic and political changes (Mukhopadhyay, 2005). In terms of the 
characteristics of surprise and instability, disruptions to society and an urgent need for action, 
crisis management and emergency management share meanings. However, the term emergency 
management is more technically and operationally driven than crisis management. Emergency 
management consists of operational, strategic decisions for search and rescue, medical relief, 
provision of shelter, and mobilisation of the resources and people affected by the disaster, but 
also includes “hazard mitigation”, “disaster preparedness” and “disaster response activities” 
(Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006, p. 131).   
In Southeast Asia, crisis typically refers to financial turmoil, border disputes, security issues, 
insurgencies, refugees and displaced populations, institutionalisation challenges, regional and 
political conflicts (Roberts, 2010; Rüland, 2000; Sangsubhan & Basri, 2012; Weatherbee, 
1985). In the EU, the terms crisis and crisis management are generally used within the 
framework of the EU Security and Defence Policy in reference to military and civilian 
intervention, including natural and man-made disaster management, oil spills, maritime 
incidents, terrorist attacks, epidemic outbreaks, conflicts and refugee crises (Gourlay, 2004; 
Olsson, 2009). Therefore, this study avoids using the terms crisis or crisis management because 
the definitions are too broad and may diffuse with natural disasters and other unexpected non-
natural disaster events that disrupt a society. To be consistent, the study uses the terms disaster 
and disaster management to refer to the body knowledge about managing problems arising 
from natural disasters. This study recognises that both emergency management and disaster 
management are used interchangeably and are commonly found in the natural disaster 
management literature ("Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002," 2002; Osei, 2011; 
Raikes & McBean, 2016; Waugh Jr, 2009). This study therefore uses the terms emergency 
management and disaster management interchangeably.  
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It is worth noting that research on collaborative initiatives before the onset of disasters is 
extensive. Inter alia, there are studies about the factors influencing the design and subsequent 
implementation of the governance of cross-sector or inter-organisational collaboration before 
the onset of emergencies (Vangen et al., 2015), preparing emergency plans (FEMA, 2010), and 
aligning the missions of different levels of public agencies before emergencies (Fleming, 
McCartha, & Steelman, 2015). These kinds of collaboration are designed, planned or executed 
before extreme events. Conversely, studies on collaboration following a disaster are scarce in 
the public administration and management context. Research on collaboration design, planning 
and execution in disasters is less common than before the onset of a disaster. Examples of 
collaboration research following a natural disaster include studies on multi-agency disaster 
management with an emphasis on information management and coordination (Janssen et al., 
2010), building network relationships with an emphasis on members’ status and behaviours in 
the Caribbean (T. Cooper, 2015), and using an inter-governmental and inter-organisational 
approach in coordinating a disaster response involving many stakeholders with an emphasis on 
building capacity at the local level (Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010). The next section 
discusses approaches to disaster management commonly adopted by public agencies and their 
partners. 
 Disaster management models 
There are different approaches to managing a disaster aftermath. Some scholars argue that a 
hierarchical organisation with centralised command and control is efficient in a disaster 
response (D. A. Alexander, 2008; Guo & Kapucu, 2015a). Other scholars refute the 
authoritative, strict command and control model, and suggest that a flexible, collaborative 
approach, without creating any additional structures other than a pre-existing emergency 
authority, is more effective (Comfort, 2007; Dynes, 1994; Mandell & Keast, 2007; O’Leary & 
Vij, 2012; Quarantelli, 1988; Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006). Further, some argue that collaboration 
characteristics such as shared leadership and shared resources among organisations (Mandell 
& Keast, 2007), open communication, broad and inclusive participation, have become the 
preferred option over the classic top-down bureaucratic system (Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006).  
However, in practice, the prevailing model in disaster operations for public agencies is the 
command and control one, particularly during the rapid response phase (Green, 2001; Guo & 
Kapucu, 2015b; Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006). Command and control, a term closely associated 
with a military doctrine, is defined as: “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
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designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission” 
(Alberts, 2007, p. 318). The command and control model emphasises a hierarchical chain of 
command to implement “pre-defined schema and pre-determined action plans…communicated 
down the ranks…and no room for dissention” (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019, p. 2). This model, 
featuring a rigid “top-down” approach (Green, 2001) is associated with a high degree of 
internal control (Page, 2004), centralised decision making and a strict division between those 
who command and those who act (D. A. Alexander, 2008; Drabek & McEntire, 2003). When 
an organisation adopts the command and control model, decision making becomes centralised 
(D. A. Alexander, 2008). In the command and control model, those who control and decide 
(e.g., a leaders in a government organisations) demand others execute and act (e.g., disaster 
frontline responders or external assisting organisations) (Drabek & McEntire, 2003).  
However, the conventional command and control model has several limitations. It has been 
suggested that organisations operating with the command and control model are unable to 
effectively coordinate integrated responses, innovate, and mobilise resources to meet urgent 
demands arising from a disaster (Bier, 2006; Comfort & Kapucu, 2006; Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2006). A vivid example is the failed response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 by FEMA under a 
hierarchical structure and multi-layered bureaucracy despite it being a resource-rich, 
experienced central agency (Eikenberry et al., 2007; Sobel & Leeson, 2006). During the 
Hurricane Katrina response, the command and control model hindered two-way 
communication among federal, state and local leaders and disrupted collaborative opportunities 
within and outside organisations (Garnett & Kouzmin, 2007). After a disaster, the primary 
objective of responsible public agencies is to facilitate and enable communities to respond 
effectively and creatively to emergencies (Healey, 2006; Innes & Booher, 2010). This pressing 
objective can often be achieved only through collaboration between agencies (Curnin & Owen, 
2014; Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010; K. Patrick & Kim, 2011). In the disaster response 
phase, compliance with normal standard operating procedures as practised during routine times, 
are often inadequate; public organisations have to address the complexities of the disaster 
holistically (Coppola, 2015; UNISDR, 2007a, 2015). In this regard, integrating collaborative 
approach within the command and control framework can be one way to address the limitations 
of the command and control model. 
Notwithstanding the varied disaster management approaches, for two decades, disaster policy 
makers and practitioners have increasingly promoted a collaborative approach to strengthen 
operational effectiveness in coping with disasters’ uncertainty and complexity (Comfort, 2007; 
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Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). For example, Waugh and Streib (2006) and Alexander et al. 
(2013) advocate ‘Integrated Emergency Management’ through multiple agencies working to 
address the consequences of extreme events (Salmon, Stanton, Jenkins, & Walker, 2011). Other 
scholars suggest ‘Collaborative Emergency Management’ (Kapucu, 2008; Kapucu, Arslan, & 
Demiroz, 2010; Kapucu & Garayev, 2011; Oh, Okada, & Comfort, 2014) and ‘Collaborative 
Public Management’ to resolve common public problems too difficult to be resolved by a single 
organisation, often through multi-sector and multi-actor endeavours (Agranoff & McGuire, 
2003; O’Leary & Vij, 2012). These collaborative frameworks suggest that collaboration is 
increasingly demanded to enhance society’s capacity to cope with complicated, extreme events 
such as natural disasters (Boin, 2005b; Kapucu, 2005; McGuire, 2006; Nohrstedt, 2013; Waugh 
Jr & Streib, 2006). This is consistent with the call from the UN and the international community 
to collaborate “across mechanisms and institutions for the implementation of instruments 
relevant to disaster risk reduction and sustainable development” (UNISDR, 2015, p. 17).  
 Lessons learnt in disaster collaboration  
Evaluations of past disaster responses provide useful insights into our understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of disaster management systems. Recent disaster literature informs 
that disaster actors often neglect a more proactive concept of disaster risk management and 
underestimate potential policy failure (Tong & Zhang, 2019). In their recent study, Doyle et al. 
(2019) identified important lessons to understand disaster uncertainties, problems in 
communication and how to communicate these uncertainties for informed decision making. 
Several recent failed disaster responses in both developed (e.g., the USA, Portugal) and 
developing countries (e.g., Haiti, Myanmar) as a result of lack of capability to collaborate in 
disasters, among other reasons, demonstrate valuable lessons in disaster management. The 
lessons learnt from these disasters provide a picture of the possible impact if collaboration is 
not used in disaster responses.  
This section discusses two failed disaster responses that happened in developed countries 
followed by two that occurred in developing countries. The first is the weak, uncoordinated 
response in 2005 of the USA’s public administration to Hurricane Katrina, which was beyond 
expectations (Bier, 2006; Comfort, 2005; Eikenberry et al., 2007; Kaniewski, 2011). The 
Category 5 hurricane devastated Louisiana and neighbouring states along the Gulf of Mexico, 
killed at least 1,836 people, and caused an estimated US$81.2 billion damage, making it the 
“costliest natural disaster in U.S. history” (Levitt & Whitaker, 2009, p. 2). Because central 
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administration was not able to perform its role in coordinating and organising a coherent 
disaster response for days, international NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children, Amnesty 
International and World Relief provided disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in the USA 
for the first time (Eikenberry et al., 2007). Kettl (2006) posits it as “a failure to learn” (p. 274), 
which was echoed by Donahue and Tuohy (2006) who argue that often the same lessons are 
identified, incident after incident.  
Researchers have highlighted the major lessons learned from the failed Hurricane Katrina 
response. Among the lessons are: a) uncoordinated leadership (i.e., each agency focused on 
solving its individual mandated mission with its own command and control model and lacked 
a commitment to coordinate actions with others); b) failed communication; c) weak planning; 
d) resource constraints; and e) poor public relations (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Other 
researchers identified the lessons from different perspectives. Among them were: a) the tragedy 
of anti-commons (i.e., too many individuals vetoing or making overlapping decisions); b) over 
cautiousness in decision making (i.e., it took approximately six days before the arrival of 
humanitarian assistance from the federal government); c) political manipulation; d) difficulties 
in acquiring timely information; e) glory seeking by government officials; and f) bias in 
decision making among governments (national, state, local government) (Sobel & Leeson, 
2006). Awareness of the importance of investing time and resources in managing the 
relationships of important stakeholders, planning for disaster communication and strengthened 
coordination of actions between public and non-public actors before the disaster, might have 
helped mitigate the negative impacts of the hurricane. However, such arrangements can happen 
only by collaboration among the partners that, in responding to Hurricane Katrina, did not 
happen.  
Another failed disaster response in a developed country, almost unnoticed by many, occurred 
more recently in Portugal in summer 2017. A forest fire killed at least 64 people in central 
Portugal (“Portugal wildfires”, 2017). The Portuguese Prime Minister claimed the disaster was 
a human-induced tragedy (“Blame game starts”, 2017; “Portugal wildfires”, 2017). The lessons 
learned are surprisingly familiar: uncoordinated measures of prevention, surveillance, 
detection, as well as a poor early warning system, poor communication and a lack of equipment 
and resources (“Blame game starts”, 2017), matching the conditions commonly argued by 
scholars in the failure to apply effective interagency collaboration to deliver a coherent, 
networked response (Drabek & McEntire, 2002; Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006). Such challenges 
have also been seen in wildfire management in Australia (McLennan & Handmer, 2012; 
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Wettenhall, 1975) and the USA (Czaja & P. Cottrell, 2014; Fleming et al., 2015; Useem, Cook, 
& Sutton, 2005). For the past two decades, western USA has had an increased frequency and 
extended period of wildfires (Czaja, 2015). Addressing this alarming phenomenon, recent 
research from the USA on wildland fire management suggests collaborative action in a national 
strategy, state task-force initiatives, a larger fire-fighting community coupled with strong 
political will would enable resilience in the communities at risk and provide methodology for 
other domains of disaster management (Czaja, 2015).  
A magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti on 12 January 2010 resulting over 222,000 fatalities 
and over 300,000 injuries. It affected approximately one third of Haiti’s total population either 
directly or indirectly (IASC, 2010). The magnitude of the damage attributed to the earthquake 
almost paralysed the country with the economic losses of US$7.8 billion, equivalent to its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2009 (IASC, 2010). The collapse of government buildings 
and the death of many civil servants tremendously reduced the government’s capacity at 
national and local level to respond to the disaster (IASC, 2010). The void of relief 
administration and humanitarian assistance was filled by UN agencies, international military, 
humanitarian donors, society organisations and cross-border aid. Notwithstanding Haiti’s 
government’s structural limitations, the influx of NGOs from the global community during the 
aftermath was perceived as a form of neoliberalism in action that some claimed went against 
Haiti’s self-determination in reconstruction (Edmonds, 2013). Other lessons in responding to 
the Haitian earthquake include poor logistics arrangements, weak coordination among aid 
givers and recipients, constraints in resource mobilisation and linking relief to recovery, and 
failure to pay attention to post-disaster health service delivery (IASC, 2010; Tappero & Tauxe, 
2011). In retrospect, disaster planning across multi-jurisdictional actors, particularly local 
government, and effective leadership might have mitigated the negative consequences of the 
disaster (Piotrowski, 2010). Awareness, knowledge and the ability to do disaster planning is 
achievable only by collaboration with others before the disaster.  
Another example of an uncoordinated disaster response in a developing country happened in 
Southeast Asia. In May 2008, the Ayeyarwady Delta of Myanmar was devastated after a 
category 3 cyclone Nargis made landfall causing over 138,000 fatalities (Creac’h & Fan, 2008; 
Fritz, Blount, Thwin, Thu, & Chan, 2009), affected 2.4 million people and destroyed over 75% 
of the health infrastructure (Willis, 2012). This cyclone was the largest natural disaster in 
Myanmar’s history (Seekins, 2009). However, the then military regime of Myanmar denied 
international emergency relief aid for two reasons. First, the junta prioritised state security over 
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human security (e.g., having a planned referendum on a new constitution over humanitarian 
relief). Second, a fear of mass unrest and foreign influence (e.g., foreign assistance during the 
natural disaster was regarded as a threat to national security) (Seekins, 2009; Suwanvanichkij 
et al., 2009). At times when immediate water, food, shelter, and medical services were much 
needed by the disaster-affected population, the regime allocated only US$50,000 for disaster 
relief (Seekins, 2009; Suwanvanichkij et al., 2009). Only 10 days before Nargis, China’s 
Wenchuan township, Sichuan Province, was devastated by a magnitude 7.9-8.0 earthquake that 
killed over 69,000 people, injured 374,643 and 17,923 were reported missing (Y. Chen & 
Booth, 2011; Cui et al., 2011). In a stark contrast to Myanmar’s post-disaster relief actions, 
China’s relief actions were swift and effective. The response included mobilising 100 
helicopters to carry out search and rescue operations (Seekins, 2009). 
The deadlock in the post-Nargis humanitarian relief action was resolved only when the then 
military regime agreed to forge a formal multi-party collaborative effort that led to the 
formation of the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) (TCG, 2008a, 2008b). The TCG comprised three 
parties: the Myanmar government, the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). The ASEAN-led collaboration successfully facilitated the post-Nargis 
humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009; TCG, 2008a).  
Each disaster response is unique. With the post-Nargis emergency relief, disaster policy makers 
and practitioners witnessed multiple problems intertwined with political concerns, a lack of 
trust, and poor communication channels between aid-giving and aid-receiving parties. To some 
extent, the deliberately developed engagement and interaction between ASEAN, as an 
institution, and the then Myanmar government before the disaster became catalysts for the TCG 
formation, which later proved crucial for post-Nargis relief, recovery and reconstruction 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2009; TCG, 2008a). Conversely, a similar trust relationship such as 
between ASEAN and Myanmar authority, was not detected between the UN bodies and the 
Myanmar government, at least during the infancy of the TCG concept’s development. The 
complex disaster response in Myanmar is a reference for future disaster actors that early 
engagement between key stakeholders might be helpful for collaboration in disasters. 
2.8. Why is it difficult to promote collaboration in disasters? 
Recent literature suggests that collaborative arrangements are increasingly welcomed in 
disaster management (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bush, 2015; Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; 
Mathbor, 2007). However, many reasons hinder collaboration in disaster management: (1) 
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there is a risk that one party may dominate and influence decision making (Ansell & Gash, 
2008); (2) collaboration involving the public sector is highly political because public agencies 
compete with each other for funding allocation, priority in operation and standard setting (Gray, 
1989; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987); (3) the results of collaboration are difficult to measure 
(Nohrstedt, 2015); and (4) collaboration does not guarantee consensus in action (Gray, 1989).  
Furthermore, collaboration between organisations is highly contextual and volatile. Indeed, 
several factors are responsible for a lack of collaboration: rigid organisation frameworks, poor 
inter-organisational communication, inadequate mutual awareness and understanding of goals, 
and inter-organisational competition (Cited in Foster-Fishman, Salem, Allen, & Fahrbach, 
2001; Glisson & James, 1992). Collaboration results in multiple services that cannot be 
delivered by organisations acting alone (Gray, 1989; Imperial, 2005).  
Malaysian public disaster agencies are traditionally government-driven, risk-averse and apply 
a top-down approach when responding to disasters (N. W. Chan, 1995). It is noteworthy that 
the overall disaster response leadership in Malaysia is always civilian-led (e.g., government 
agencies or local governments). That is, a disaster response with military providing central 
leadership in disaster rescue and relief as seen in other countries (Liao, 2012; D. S. Miller, 
Pavelchak, Burnside, & Rivera, 2008) is not common in Malaysia. Nevertheless, Malaysian 
military forces’ role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, particularly related to 
aspects of mobilisation of human resources, logistics and coordination among agencies, is 
widely recognised (Idris & Nizam Che Soh, 2014). 
Aspects of the collaborative approach are also evident in Malaysia's disaster response approach.  
Research suggests the collaborative approach is more regularly applied on activities or 
programmes prior to the onset of disaster (Fisk, Good, & Nelson, 2019; Moshtari & Gonçalves, 
2017; Thomson & Perry, 2006). However, when disaster strikes, the command and control 
model is the prevailing model in Malaysia (N. W. Chan, 1995; Chong & Kamarudin, 2018), 
but a more collaborative approach is being increasingly applied as inspired by the concept of 
new governance and new public administration (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Kettl, 2005). 
Malaysian public disaster agencies found the collaborative approach is conducive in engaging 
with potential partners, strengthening public accountability and mutual learning (personal 




2.9. Chapter summary 
Though public disaster agencies are increasingly collaborating with diverse partners to handle 
disasters (Kapucu & Garayev, 2011; Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006), by no means has collective 
action become the ‘panacea’ for natural disaster responses. This chapter reviewed the extensive 
literature on collaboration, emergency and disaster management to understand the definitions, 
concepts, challenges and applications of cross-sector collaboration in disasters between public 
and non-public actors, including disaster aid recipients. To add to this body of knowledge, this 
research investigates the barriers to cross-sector collaboration in disasters. The next chapter 
discusses the methodology, research design, study context, and the participant selection 














The way lies in what cannot be seen, its function in what cannot be known. 
Be empty, still, idle and from your place of darkness, observe the defects of others.  
See, but do not appear to see; listen, but do not appear to listen;  
know, but do not let it be known that you know  
 
--- Hanfei (韓非子), legalist philosopher, China 
2 millennia ago (ca. 280 B.C.E – 233 B.C.E) 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I explain and outline my assumptions, methodological approaches and illustrate 
why a case study approach is most suited for this study. First, I discuss how my stance on 
ontology and epistemology guided the research design. I describe my study participants and 
the sampling techniques. I then outline the data collection techniques, including the interview 
protocol development and how I collected insights from key informants through semi-
structured interviews. I conclude the chapter by discussing approaches to strengthen the 
findings’ validity and reliability. The following chapter clarifies how the data are analysed with 
qualitative research tools. 
3.2. Ontological and epistemological considerations 
Throughout the process of designing and conducting this study, I was aware of my experience 
of numerous floods in Malaysia. I have spent many years in the private and intergovernment 
sectors. I developed a growing interest in understanding the rise and consequence of hazards, 
natural disaster management, disaster response, public administration and the meaning of 
catastrophic events to society and academics. From the private sector, I moved to the UN to 
become an officer with duties that included the promotion of public-private partnerships and 
the utilisation of information and communication technology (ICT) for disaster risk reduction 
(DRR). More recently, I was an officer in an ASEAN intergovernmental body that coordinated 
and provided assistance to disaster-affected ASEAN member states. I oversaw its 
administration, project and programme development. Therefore, I conducted this study, not by 
observing from a distance, but as a concerned citizen of the contexts I was examining. 
 Ontology 
Ontology is critical in research because it serves as one of three major philosophical elements 
of research: paradigm, ontology and epistemology. Together, these beliefs guide my research 
design in a search for what can be known, how we arrive to know, and all processes in between 
before representations and findings are finalised (Leavy, 2014). The Oxford Handbook of 
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Qualitative Research defines ontology as “a philosophical belief system about the nature of 
social reality, including what we can learn about this reality, and how we can do so” (Leavy, 
2014, p. 3). Ontology includes the philosophical assumptions and beliefs employed by the 
researcher in the pursuit of knowledge (Schwandt, 2007) and a study of social reality, which 
emerges independently from the take-it-for-granted human interpretation and understanding 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). I recognise that my knowledge is incomplete and can be erroneous 
(L. D. Peters, Pressey, Vanharanta, & Johnston, 2013).  
I employed a critical realist ontological stance to study the existing knowledge (the being stage) 
and, from this, what can be known further (Latsis, Martins, & Lawson, 2007). I acknowledge 
that meaningful knowledge is not generalised based on the large scale of an event or mass 
behaviour of particular society (Bhaskar, 2002). Instead, I am more concerned about causal 
relationships between individuals and groups, and how these relationships relate to other 
relationships in a particular setting (Bhaskar, 2002) as and when an event unfolds (Hartwig, 
2007; L. D. Peters et al., 2013). 
 Epistemology 
Epistemology is related to a thinking process that seeks clarity on the relationships between 
what one knows and perceives (Guba, Lincoln, & Lynham, 2011). An epistemological stance 
shapes a researcher’s approach to query what is knowable, and how to pursue further 
knowledge (Daly, 2007). Leavy (2014) argues that it is the relationships between researchers 
and participants throughout research activity that co-creates new knowledge. In brief, 
epistemology is about study to understand knowledge’s nature and justification (Schwandt, 
2007). I am drawn to Daly’s (2007) view that the primary principle of any research process is 
its epistemological considerations. Three considerations apply to my stance as a researcher. 
First, I am fallible but expect and am determined to conduct research with integrity, 
underpinned by my values and beliefs. Second, defending my integrity in employing 
epistemological considerations may be challenging, but it is my responsibility to do so. Third, 
epistemology is important because it brings my values to the forefront of the study (Daly, 2007).  
I view the continuum of epistemological position between objectivism and subjectivism. My 
epistemological standpoint is not limited to objectivism that supports conclusive knowable 
reality (seeking truth by reasoning), or subjectivism that believes knowledge is created in 
accordance to the inquirer’s perceptions and understandings (Daly, 2007). In addition, axiology, 
which refers to value judgements, moral conduct and ethics, also influences the way I design 
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research strategies (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). My values shape the way I scrutinise plausible 
reality through the use of data collected in an authentic environment (Guba et al., 2011).  
As a reflective researcher, my ontological and epistemological stance makes clear my choice 
of a research design. I have taken a critical realist approach and not constructivism to conduct 
this empirical study. Critical realists assert that all knowledge is error-prone; ideas and 
knowledge have causal relationships in a socially structured world (Bhaskar, 2002; Horowitz 
& Camp, 2006; L. D. Peters et al., 2013). When conducting the study, I investigated phenomena 
from multiple perspectives. I examined complex dialectical relationships between public and 
non-public actors, and the relational factors and causal powers that led to the formation of a 
new relationship (i.e., collaboration between organisations and individuals) and not others (L. 
D. Peters et al., 2013). My experience and world view that I can be mistaken in my 
understanding of knowledge shape the basis of this research approach (Creswell, 2014). In 
addition, my personal, professional, and political experience and commitments influence the 
way I see the world (Leavy, 2014; L. D. Peters et al., 2013).    
In contrast to critical realists, social constructivists do not believe causal powers in social 
structures. Instead they suggest that social structures and systems are informed through social 
interactions such as language, roles and positions (Edvardsson, Tronvoll, & Gruber, 2011). 
Social constructivists do not simply accept social structure as real because they claim such 
social structures are purposefully constructed by researchers and theorists (Latour & Woolgar, 
1979; L. D. Peters et al., 2013). This empirical study is conducted in a natural setting where 
participants respond in the way they see the world. Participants’ behaviour and responses 
cannot be predicted or constructed, therefore I am not taking the constructivists’ approach for 
this study. The interpretivist and non-reductionist nature of critical realism ontology is 
particularly suitable for an empirical study investigating the dynamic and unpredictable 
phenomenon of collaboration in natural disasters (Harré & Bhaskar, 2001; L. D. Peters et al., 
2013). This is because the interpretivist approach emphasises the meanings derived from events 
or activities, as well as the interactions among chosen participants and between the researcher 
and the participants (Schensul, 2008).  
Some scholars maintain that researchers should not be too ambitious in applying traditional 
epistemological tenets. Being too compliant risks the propensity to suppress cognitive 
judgment (Horowitz & Camp, 2006). I therefore exercised some flexibility and avoided over-
interpreting the relationships between individuals or organisations. Instead, I documented their 
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relationships the way I noticed them. As a researcher, I am not the sole authority in this study; 
I work together with the participants who mutually contribute to knowledge creation (Leavy, 
2014). I acknowledge that nothing is absolute in nature and that knowledge tied to anything 
particular in nature will never be fully comprehended (Guba et al., 2011). I am also mindful of 
accepting my own limitations throughout the research leading to a more robust philosophical 
value (Horowitz & Camp, 2006); these arguments exemplify the importance of upholding 
integrity in research (Daly, 2007).     
3.3. Research design 
Social science researchers have several research design options (Creswell, 2013, 2014) or 
inquiry strategies (Pelias, 2011). These include qualitative, quantitative or some combination 
of these two research approaches. Research design essentially provides “specific direction for 
procedures” (Creswell, 2014, p. 12). Qualitative and quantitative approaches both have their 
strengths. A qualitative approach is useful to build theory in inductive research (Huy, 2012), 
and enables the researcher to delve into participants’ everyday life and attain a rich context 
within a particular phenomenon by interviewing them (e.g., local government’s response 
following a disaster) (Yin, 2016). A quantitative approach allows the researcher to address 
statistical requirements by collecting a wide range of data from a large number of participants. 
By collecting data through a survey, inter alia, a quantitative approach allows participants to 
share sensitive information comfortably without meeting the researcher in person (Creswell, 
2014). Researchers who conduct sequential or transformative research will likely consider 
mixed methods (Creswell, 2013, 2014). A mixed method approach has the strengths of 
complementarity and triangulation by converging both qualitative and quantitative data that is 
useful for cross-validation of the study (Hesse-Biber, 2010).  
In this study, I use a qualitative approach. Given that cross-sector collaboration in extreme 
environments is scarce, an emerging research method is most appropriate (Charmaz, 2008; 
Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). My critical 
realist ontological, reflective epistemological and axiological stances influence the way I opted 
for a qualitative approach instead of a quantitative or mixed approach. Because I examine the 
causal relationships between participants as and when they experienced an unfolding post-
disaster, the qualitative approach enables me to study this unique phenomenon by gaining an 
insider’s perspective (Phillimore & Goodson, 2004). In this study, the unique event is the 
aftermath of floods. The events are not necessarily of the largest scale or ones that result in 
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massive social behavioural repercussions to an entire society but are ones that are significant 
enough to advance knowledge. The chosen events, floods, will be discussed in detail under 
section 3.5 when elaborating on the case study strategy. I am determined to conduct this study 
with integrity and am aware that participants are not simply tools to generate results for the 
study but are co-creators of new knowledge based on their interactions with organisations, 
networks and individuals during a post-disaster response phase. Often, I ask myself if I have 
presupposed assumptions or generalisations when entering this study; am I upholding my 
ethical values by integrating only the views of participants and not mine into the study, or 
preserving as much as I could to bring to the forefront the real-life experiences of participants 
into this study? In this regard, the inductive, interpretive and flexible attributes of a qualitative 
approach make it a suitable research strategy matching the demands of the situation (Charmaz, 
2008).  
The interpretive nature of qualitative research permits me to collect rich data and understand 
the views that make sense regarding cross-sector collaboration from the participants’ 
perspective (Pratt, 2009). Additionally, a qualitative research approach allows me to explore 
complex issues and to understand the particular context in which research participants exist in 
their natural setting (Liamputtong, 2013; Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005). A qualitative approach 
also allows me to record the varying views of interviewed participants that cannot be captured 
in an inflexible survey (Liamputtong, 2013; Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005). In a nutshell, I chose 
a qualitative approach because this type of research design can produce a broad, detailed 
description of what is meaningful for participants in their interpretation (Rynes & Gephart, 
2004). I use a qualitative approach to investigate the barriers to cross-sector collaboration in 
disasters. 
Social science qualitative researchers use narrative, phenomenological, ethnographic, case 
study (Creswell, 2013) and ground theory methods (Charmaz, 2006, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 
2017) to conduct research. This study uses case study approach which will be discussed in 
section 3.5. This study does not use grounded theory as a method to conduct the study; it uses 
grounded theory tools such as coding, memoing, constant comparisons and theoretical 
saturation only to analyse the data systematically (Charmaz, 2008). Consistent with the 
qualitative research design, grounded theory tools offer useful, practical guidelines “to analyse 
qualitative data to construct theories ‘grounded’ in the data themselves” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 1). 




Research methodologies provide the principles for researcher to produce data for analysis 
(Carter & Little, 2007; Liamputtong, 2013). Methodology is a blueprint consisting of 
assumptions, beliefs, principles and standards that guide the researcher in analysing his or her 
work and the choice of research methods (Schensul, 2008). Crotty (1998, p. 3) defines 
methodology as “the strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and use 
of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes”. 
Compared with methodology, research methods refer to the protocols and techniques to collect 
and analyse data and multiple evidence sources (L. B. Christensen, Johnson, & Turner, 2014; 
Wilson, 2016). The methodological approach and the particular methods to collect and analyse 
the data can be decided (Crotty, 1998; Daly, 2007) only after confirmation of a research design.   
A qualitative researcher has a responsibility to provide “methodological justification” (Avis, 
2003, p. 1003) because methodology provides the framework that leads to rigorous, convincing 
stories based on evidence without preconceptions (Liamputtong, 2013; W. L. Miller & 
Crabtree, 2005). With this in mind, my ontological and epistemological assumptions will 
inevitably influence my choice of methodology. A particular research method is chosen once 
methodology confirmed. There are various methodological frameworks that qualitative 
researchers may apply: ethnography, phenomenology, postmodernism, grounded theory and 
case studies, amongst others (Creswell, 2014; Liamputtong, 2013).  
3.5. Case study strategy 
This research uses a case study approach to investigate the under-researched phenomenon of 
cross-sector collaboration in disasters. Case study research is common in social science, 
education, anthropology, legal, public health, social work, nursing, and community planning 
(Liamputtong, 2013; Yin, 2014). Yin (2014) argues that case study research is a social science 
approach that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in its real-world context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” 
(p. 2). Nevertheless, having chosen a case study approach for this study does not imply that 
other methodological frameworks are less effective in examining emerging phenomena. A case 
study is preferred because it can address the research questions why collaboration in disasters 
is challenging as the event unfolds (Yin, 2014). Case study research is useful to investigate 
human interactions by exploring participants’ experiences (Rynes & Gephart, 2004; Van 
Maanen, 1979). A case study also has strength to generate novel theory and uncover new 
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insights from the comparison of contradictory evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). Additionally, the 
inductive nature of case studies is conducive to the generation of new theory via repetitive 
cycles by ordering case data, emerging themes and theories, and the literature (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). This is why I used the case study approach to examine the little known 
phenomenon of collaboration in disasters (Creswell, 2013; Stake, 2007; Yin, 2014). 
Chapter 2 revealed an unclear phenomenon with opposing views: collaboration in disaster 
management is important and increasingly demanded, but acknowledges that collaboration is 
hard to develop and maintain. This paradox requires further investigation. I began designing a 
research question by seeking a deeper insight into the barriers to collaboration in disasters from 
participants to inform the study’s findings. I then considered the relevance of data, what data 
to collect, and the approach to analyse the data (Philliber, Schwab, & Samsloss, 1980; Yin, 
2014). In so doing, I was able to discover, learn or solve problems arising from unknown 
phenomena (P. Foster, Hammersley, & Gomm, 2013; VanWynsberghe & Khan, 2007).  
Conventional qualitative research, such as a case study, is mainly descriptive, describing how 
theory operates in specific examples (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), or portraying how social 
experience is created (Rynes & Gephart Jr, 2004). Commonly, case study research focuses on 
analysing a narrative interspersed with participants’ quotes (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In 
this regard, qualitative researchers who use a case study approach often find it challenging to 
find a balance between rich stories and rigorous theories (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
Though detailed coding of data from case study research is less common, to address the above 
challenge, I use Saldaña’s (2016) coding method to analyse qualitative data based on a critical-
realist lens. The heuristic and linking characteristics of coding allow qualitative researchers to 
capture the essence and stories from participants as they see the world (Saldaña, 2016). Coding 
is heuristic, exploratory and capable of making new meanings from one event to another (Fuller 
& Goriunova, 2014). Coding is also capable of linking, connecting data to ideas, and from the 
ideas to all relevant data associated with the ideas (Richards & Morse, 2013). Thus, coding 
qualitative data is useful to initiate rigorous analysis (Saldaña, 2016). For complementary 
analytical purposes, I use summary tables to catalogue salient codes, categories and themes to 
make clear the synthesis of case evidence (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). These tables are 
important for traceability and testability of the theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Through 
synthesising the process of collective data in the form of a category, theme or concept, the 
researcher finds a “consolidated meaning” (Saldaña, 2016, p. 10).  
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Eisenhardt and Graebner (1989; 2007) posit that there are several potential advantages in using 
case studies to investigate an unclear contemporary phenomenon such as cross-sector 
collaboration in disasters. The most prevalent advantage is that building theory from cases is 
likely to be empirically valid and accurate because theory-building is closely tied to the 
evidence from the data collection and analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). If the evidence is derived from different strands it increases the likelihood of developing 
a novel theory. Therefore, in addition to interviews, I investigated official and news reports. 
To some extent, I also observed body language and present living conditions, which are all 
central to qualitative research (Wertz, Charmaz, McMullen, Josselson, & McSpadden, 2011). 
During the interviews, I received some official reports from participants. Because of the 
sensitivity of these documents, I have chosen not to quote them in the study. However, the 
essence of these official documents was integrated into my analysis. Subsequently, the primary 
data collected from in-depth interviews and the secondary data (i.e., operation status reports, 
regulations and standard operating procedures) are triangulated to reflect the different realities 
(Liamputtong, 2013; Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005; Stake, 2007). The emergent theory is likely 
to be testable with constructs and hypotheses.  
Case study research includes both single and multiple case studies. Multiple case studies, not 
chosen for this study, have more than one case in the content of the same study; the approach 
is suitable for comparisons across settings where it is impossible to glean answers from a single 
study (Taylor, 2013; Yin, 2014). A multiple case study, like a single case study, is suited for 
theory-building research, since diverse findings may lead the researcher to discover the 
underlying reasons through juxtaposition. Nevertheless, single case study designs (Shadish & 
Sullivan, 2011) and single case data analytical techniques have been increasingly used during 
the last decade (Manolov & Moeyaert, 2016). A single case study design is suitable for building 
theory, assessing unique cases, representative or typical cases, revelatory cases and 
longitudinal cases (Yin, 2014). A single case study design is also suitable for testing a well 
formulated theory (Yin, 2014), although that is not the intention of, or relevant to, this study.  
Guided by Yin’s (2014, 2016) process of analytical generalisation, this study works towards 
theory building with a single case. Single cases are increasingly used because they are 
outstanding examples, distinctively revelatory and suitable for uncommon research (Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007). In part, this explains why I chose a single case study to examine the barriers 
to collaboration in disasters (Yin, 2014). I first explore how the study’s findings are likely to 
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inform particular concepts (i.e., collaboration following a natural disaster) and then see how 
similar concepts can be replicated in other situations (i.e., collaboration following a human-
induced conflict) (Yin, 2016). In doing so, the theoretical concepts are generated from a more 
generalised perspective embedded in a particular qualitative pattern (Halkier, 2011), which Yin 
(2014, 2016) asserts is useful to inform either support for or challenges to present theory.  
 Case study context 
Between December 2014 and January 2015, Malaysia experienced its worst floods ever 
recorded (H. Alexander, 2014; "Malaysian government under fire for flood response," 2014). 
This mega flooding became the catalyst for change in the Malaysian disaster management 
landscape (Kaos, 2015). Record-setting torrential rains, high tides, and, in part, environmental 
degradation including landslides, extensive logging (R. Davies, 2015; Sulaiman et al., 2017) 
and a lack of preparedness culture (Mokhtar, 2015) contributed to seven of the thirteen states, 
i.e., Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Perak, Johor, Perlis and Sabah, being inundated (IFRC, 
2014). Among the flood-affected states, the east coast states of Kelantan, Terengganu and 
Pahang were severely affected; among all states, Kelantan was the worst hit by the floods. In 
the three states, most dwellings were submerged by the floods (IFRC, 2014). Over 200,000 
people were evacuated and though the news reported that at least 21 people killed, the official 
number is fewer (R. Davies, 2015). Over half a million people were affected, a relatively high 
proportion of a country with a 31 million population (H. Alexander, 2014; Mohd Yassin, 2015). 
In early January 2017, about 24 months after the mega-flooding, I conducted field interviews 
in Kelantan, the worst flood-hit state. During data collection, a second flooding occurred in 
several east coast states including Kelantan (“Bridge to be built”, 2017) . Although the scale of 
the flooding was less severe than the December 2014 flood, this 2017 flood was among the 
first involving an official disaster response to a mid-scale flooding after NADMA was 
operationalised in October 2015 (Zakaria & Sim, 2017). It was impossible to separate the 
participants’ two experiences of flooding they had recently experienced.  
This study focuses on the disaster response to the two floods (Bingham et al., 2008). Among 
the disaster response activities are rescue and relief actions in the two floods as performed by 
the public disaster agencies and their wider partners. These two floods resulted in interactions, 
communications and forms of cooperation among multiple stakeholders; some became 
research participants in this study. Disaster response is the phase that attracts diverse 
collaborative partners. Because this study investigates cross-sector collaboration, which 
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requires the views of varying partners, collecting data in the response period was deemed most 
suitable compared with other disaster management phases. 
3.6. Data collection overview 
Data collection began after completion of the interview protocol and question design. The 
interview process and interview question development will be discussed in Section 3.9. Two 
pilot interviews were conducted in November 2016 after the Human Ethics Committee of the 
University of Canterbury approved the study on 15 November 2016. The Human Ethics 
Committee approval letter is in Appendix 3A. 
Two pilot interviews were conducted by audio-visual conference with participants from 
NADMA and an ASEAN regional organisation. The pilot interviews are important not only to 
practise interviewing (Dilley, 2000) but also to evaluate the overall design, relevance and 
clarity of the interview questions. They also provided an opportunity to improve and strengthen 
the interview questions before conducting interviews with key informants. I started collecting 
data from key informants in January 2017; they shared with me their experiences in the mega 
flooding of December 2014, and they highlighted their experiences in responding to a recent 
flood. Therefore, in the middle of data collection, I changed my plan to include both floods in 
the study. In hindsight, 83% (n=25) of all participants had experienced, had knowledge of or 
were involved directly or indirectly in the December 2014 flooding in Malaysia; whereas 77% 
(n=23) of the participants had experienced the January 2017 flooding alone. Combined, 67% 
(n=20) of the participants had experienced both floods.  
In this study, semi-structured interviews were the primary method of data collection. Interview 
data and secondary data obtained from archival records, government and organisations’ 
documents, and news records offered complementary opportunities for data gathering and 
analysis. Semi-structured interviews are flexible, allowing alterations to interview questions 
and, in most cases, questions evolved naturally during the interview (Liamputtong, 2013; 
Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005). Throughout the face-to-face interviews, I paid special attention 
to listening, observing body language and understanding content, emotions and ‘silent voices’ 
(Dilley, 2000). The formal interviews were conducted only after gaining experience from pilot 
interviews and the protocols for interviews had been finalised. The interview protocols and 
interview questions are in Appendix 3B. 
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Except for three interviews that were not audio-recorded for the interviewees’ personal reasons, 
all interviews were digitally audio-recorded. Six (20%) interviews were conducted in Malay, 
three (10%) were in Mandarin Chinese, and the rest were in English. For interviews not in 
English, I translated them into English. Later, I transcribed and analysed the interview data, 
leading to transcripts of approximately 100,000 words. Appendix 3C shows the data collection 
milestones including the interview methods and follow-ups deployed sequentially across a one 
year data collection period from November 2016 to November 2017.  
Twenty-four interviews (80%) were conducted face-to-face at the participants’ office, and for 
four participants, at their residence. Six interviews (20%) were conducted through audio-visual 
conferencing facilities. I understand and appreciate the advantages in collecting data from 
participants in person at their preferred location and time. However, to not cause unnecessary 
pressure on participants, in terms of their time and commitments, audio-visual conferencing 
was the most suitable, practical and acceptable alternative means to collect data for both the 
researcher and the participants.   
I acknowledge the logistical and administrative challenges in conducting data collection across 
a range of organisations and individuals within and beyond the Malaysian border. I have 
cultural and language advantages in conducting this qualitative research. I am a Malaysian 
national who has served in a regional intergovernmental organisation based in Jakarta, 
Indonesia, since 2012. That job description related to engaging public disaster agencies in the 
region. This experience helped establish trust and good working relationships with key disaster 
management agencies’ decision makers who took part in this study. In addition, my proficiency 
in the national languages of Malaysia and Indonesia facilitated data collection, including 
communication with non-participant office administrators, and subsequent interview data 
translation as necessary into English. Follow-up interviews are beneficial to refine and expand 
the emerging theory (Draucker, Martsolf, Ross, & Rusk, 2007). Therefore, I followed up with 
participants eight to ten months after initial data collection to seek their verification of the 
interview transcripts and let them reflect on their views or clarify specific developments, 
especially with some key strategic and operational informants.  
3.7. Overview of the study participants 
Thirty participants were recruited because their experience is important to this study and is 
likely to co-create the knowledge this study aims to achieve. The study began with selective 
sampling to identify potential research participants based on a set of criteria (Coyne, 1997). 
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The sampling criteria included a preference for cross-sector representation (i.e., government 
and NGOs), levels of hierarchy (i.e., central and state-level government agencies), disaster 
management experience (i.e., disaster aid givers and recipients), and the participants’ society 
role (i.e., key strategic and operational decision-makers in disaster management and citizens 
affected by disasters). I interpret the terms strategic and operational loosely. In this study, 
strategic leaders are those who held senior positions in their organisations (e.g., departmental 
head, chief of state government agencies or chief executive of organisation). They provide 
leadership to a group of employees and make important long-term and strategic decisions 
during non-emergencies and emergencies. Operational leaders refers to individuals including 
employees of public disaster agency, NGOs or regional organisations. They usually have no 
employees reporting to them during routine and non-emergency situations, though some 
provide leadership to a limited number of subordinates. Nonetheless, these operational 
participants provide leadership to a larger group of first responders, volunteers or local 
government officials and make important decisions, often ad hoc and spontaneous, when they 
are deployed to a one-off disaster response. These strategic and operational decision makers 
are key informants. All key informants, except one who was new to disaster management with 
less than two years’ experience, held various strategic and operational positions and had at least 
five years disaster management experience. All participants took part in this research 
voluntarily and provided written consent before the interviews. A sample of information sheet 
and participant consent form is in Appendix 3D.  
Natural disasters require a coordinated response among a host of actors including public and 
non-public, established and less-established organisations, to help people in need after a 
disaster. They are referred to as the stakeholders in disaster management. These stakeholders 
are my research participants and key informants. The participating entities are as follows: 
a) government sector (i.e., ten participants from NADMA and members of other 
assisting government agencies); 
b) non-government sector (i.e., nine participants from major local and foreign NGOs); 
c) UN specialised agencies (i.e., two participants from UN agencies involved in 
humanitarian assistance and emergency logistics);  
d) regional intergovernmental organisations (i.e., three participants from ASEAN 
organisations); and 
e) six Malaysian nationals who had experienced a disaster.  
This study acknowledges that other private organisations, philanthropic organisations, media, 
scientists and academics also play important roles in disaster management. However, not all 
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key stakeholders were interviewed. Instead selected leaders or decision-makers from 
humanitarian aid agencies, or participants from the major disaster management institutions 
most relevant to the study were chosen for this study.  
 Selection of participating organisations 
This section profiles the organisations selected to contribute to this study. In sum, five groups 
of organisations were involved: a) NADMA, as the focal organisation, b) assisting government 
agencies, c) NGOs, d) regional intergovernmental organisations, and e) UN specialised 
agencies. Aid recipients comprise a group of participating individuals who will be discussed in 
Section 3.7.2. The five groups were chosen because each played complementary, critical roles 
in delivering effective disaster management. NADMA provides overall leadership and 
direction and facilitated coordination between the public and non-public actors during the 
official disaster response phase. The assisting government agencies render professional and 
technical support (e.g., search and rescue, emergency medical services) that no ordinary 
agencies can perform. NGOs complement the relief efforts initially led by government actors 
even after the official relief operation concluded. In disasters, regional intergovernmental 
organisations stand in solidarity with fellow member states with similar organisations. These 
organisations play an important role in providing quick resources and logistical support as well 
as sharing information among member countries. The UN specialised agencies serve as a 
bridge between the disaster-affected country and international society. These UN agencies 
share best practice and build the capacity of countries against natural disasters; more critically, 
UN’s rich network can facilitate a country reaching out to multiple resources not available (the 
desired quantity, a particular specification or needed in a specific time) in a disaster-affected 
country, especially in a large-scale disaster. In this study, the views of only participants from 
the five groups of organisation are collated, juxtapositioned and analysed; private sector 
organisations, scientists and academics are not included in the study.  
Participants from the groups are referred to as informants. Key informants were initially 
identified from my previous contact with them when participating in various official activities 
on regional disaster management. The snowball technique (Creswell, 2013, 2014) was used to 
reach other individuals who have experience in recent disaster responses. Of the 30 individuals 
interviewed, 24 are from 12 organisations; the others were interviewed as individuals who have 
experienced a disaster. As the participants are of differing backgrounds or represent 
organisations of varying specialisation, experience and priorities in disaster management, they 
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interpret their experiences in disaster management differently from one another. Table 3.1 
describes the selected groups of organisations and individuals.  
Table 3-1: A description of the selected organisations and individuals 
Category of Participant 
Group  
No. (%) of 
Participant
s 
Number Descriptions of participants  
in the groups 
NADMA 4 (13.33%) 1 
Employees of NADMA, the national focal point and 
leading agency of disaster management in Malaysia 
including those with strategic and operational 
backgrounds. 
Assisting government 
agencies 6 (20%) 3 
Non-NADMA employees but government officials 
from other line agencies that support and work 
alongside NADMA in disaster response and relief 
operations at the national, state and district levels, i.e., 
Health Department, District Officers, and other first 
response agencies. 
NGOs 9 (30%) 4 
Fulltime employees and volunteers who held senior 
positions in NGOs. The participating NGOs consist of 
both major local and international organisations with 
offices or branches in Malaysia. The international 
NGOs consist of both nationals and non-nationals of 
Malaysia. 
ASEAN regional 
organisations 3 (10%) 2 
Non-Malaysian nationals and officers from 
intergovernmental organisations and committees under 
the auspices of ASEAN, with secretariats in Jakarta, 
Indonesia. 
UN specialised agencies 2 (6.67%) 2 
UN officers with specialisation in disaster 
management and humanitarian logistics.  Consists of 
both nationals and non-nationals of Malaysia based in 
UN offices in Malaysia. 
Aid recipients 6 (20%) n.a. 
Disaster-affected individuals who experienced floods 
in Malaysia and received aid either from government 
or non-government sources. 
 
Malaysia National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) 
NADMA is the newly established focal coordinating government agency (“Government 
establishes”, 2015) responsible for disaster management in Malaysia with a mandate from the 
central government (NADMA, 2015). It was established in August 2015 and operationalised 
in October that same year. Some argue that it was the slow and disintegrated official disaster 
response and relief to 2014’s flooding ("Malaysian government under fire for flood response," 
2014) that ultimately led to the restructuring of the Malaysian national disaster management 
system and the formation of NADMA (Chong & Kamarudin, 2018; Zakaria & Sim, 2017). 
NADMA consists of a network of four entities: Disaster Management Division of the National 
Security Council, the Post Flood Disaster Recovery Unit of the Prime Minister’s Department, 
the Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (SMART) and the National 
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Disaster Command Centre (Pereira, 2018). These independent entities, which previously 
reported to various decision makers, are now united under NADMA with a new reporting line, 
mandate, leadership and centralised management under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s 
Department (Pereira, 2018). NADMA consented to be the focal organisation for this study and 
permitted the use of the term, NADMA, in the thesis and potential future publications. 
The Director-General is the highest officer in NADMA and is supported by three Deputy 
Directors-General who oversee the three major divisions: Planning and Preparedness, 
Operation, and Post-Disaster. Before October 2015, it was the Disaster Management Division 
of the National Security Council that was responsible for matters related to disaster 
management. Disaster management was only one of the many National Security Council’s 
functions that include national security, anti-terrorism, border management and intelligence. 
Subsequent government restructuring related to disaster management include the shifting of 
the Civil Defence Department from the Home Affairs Ministry and realignment with NADMA 
under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Department in 2015. For the first time, both 
NADMA and the Civil Defence Department, the former being the central coordinating agency 
and the latter the experienced first responding agency, are now under the supervision of one 
minister. In September 2016, the Civil Defence Department was renamed Civil Defence Force 
(“Civil Defence Department”, 2016).  
The inception of NADMA implied that it replaced the Malaysia National Security Council in 
playing a central coordinating role for all matters related to disaster management (Chong & 
Kamarudin, 2018; NADMA, 2015). However, as a newly formed networked organisation with 
limited resources, funding and credibility, NADMA counts on other peer agencies to 
complement its strengths (personal conversation with a participant). When a major natural 
disaster strikes, NADMA provides leadership and guidance to the peer agencies for 
implementing central government’s disaster response plans and actions. Nevertheless, these 
peer agencies have their respective organisational priorities and programmes during normal 
non-disaster days (personal conversation with a participant).  
Assisting government agencies  
At the time of this study, NADMA operated exclusively at the national level; it did not have 
state or district offices. To ensure that central directives are implemented at state and district 
levels, NADMA interacts with and counts on the support of other government ministries and 
agencies for coordinated, effective disaster management. Specifically, for every natural disaster 
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at the national level, NADMA teams up with at least 18 disaster management counterparts (e.g., 
Police, Health Department, Environmental Department) in the government to form a National 
Disaster Management and Relief Committee (CFE, 2016; Sulaiman et al., 2019). This 
committee becomes a network of disaster management authorities. This study defines the 
committee members or national disaster management organisations loosely and hereinafter 
refers to them as ‘assisting government agencies’. This network is involved at state and district 
level where disasters have occurred (Sulaiman et al., 2019). If a disaster occurs at a district 
level, district officers are mandated to provide leadership to the District Disaster Management 
and Relief Committee. In the Malaysian disaster management context, public agencies focus 
on seven service themes that are beyond the capacity of a single organisation. These services 
are: (1) post-disaster search and rescue; (2) health and emergency medical services; (3) media 
and communication; (4) general support to public; (5) security control or to restore order; (6) 
welfare and social services; and (7) warnings and alerts (Sulaiman et al., 2019). Appendix 3E 
details the public agencies involved in disaster management in Malaysia.  
This study includes the views of several first-responders of assisting government agencies who 
played critical roles in first response and disaster relief; such agencies are responsible for search 
and rescue and emergency logistic arrangements. Other assisting government agencies, such 
as the Social Welfare and Health Departments, Police, and the Fire and Rescue Department, 
also play important roles but are not included in this study. Local government officials, 
religious teachers and village heads (non-members of national disaster management 
organisations) are also important actors at both district and community level but are not 
included in this study because of accessibility constraints. 
NGOs 
This study focused on both local and foreign-affiliated NGOs with offices in Malaysia. An 
example of a participating major local NGO is one with thousands of volunteers nationwide 
that, over the years, has gained a reputation as a competent, experienced aid provider with a 
surfeit of resources including funding, technical capability and networks. This participating 
major local NGO had longer history and, to some extent, has a richer experience in managing 
disasters than NADMA. This NGO complemented the government’s efforts in several ways, 
inter alia, distributing relief items including food, clean water and hygiene kits, providing 
counselling and emergency medical services to flood survivors with volunteer doctors, nurses 
and trained volunteers on site, and organising community-based disaster risk management 
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programmes targeted at building overall community resilience to disasters in selected 
communities.  
In addition to the major local NGO, two interviewed NGOs are national branches of overseas 
organisations. One is a faith-based, not-for-profit organisation and the other is a national branch 
of the world’s largest volunteer-based humanitarian movement. The faith-based NGO is a 
branch of an international religious foundation with a presence in over 50 countries. After the 
2014 severe Kelantan flooding, this NGO provided relief items, funds, temporary shelter and 
continuous support to the livelihoods of affected individuals for over a year. The second one, 
the national branch of the world’s largest humanitarian movement, is different from other 
overseas-affiliated NGOs because it has an auxiliary status on a legal basis to support the 
government in the humanitarian field. When devastating flooding paralysed the eastern states 
in December 2014, the Malaysian government specifically requested this NGO to mobilise 
volunteers for rescue and relief operations. (Citations are not included to keep these NGOs 
anonymous.) 
To obtain the perspective of an international not-for-profit organisation with experience in 
disaster management, an international NGO with its Asia-Pacific regional office in Malaysia, 
was also interviewed. This international NGO assists and advises its geographically dispersed 
national branches on matters related to relief and development programmes through regional 
cooperation. All local and overseas-affiliated NGOs interviewed are directed, administered and 
operated by Malaysian nationals. The international NGO is directed by foreign nationals with 
transnational commitments to serve Malaysia and other member countries under its 
jurisdiction.  
ASEAN regional organisations 
In addition to the UN organisations and NGOs with an international affiliation, other external 
partners engaged with Malaysian public disaster agencies are the intergovernmental 
organisations and thematic committees under the auspices of ASEAN. ASEAN organisations 
such as the one coordinating humanitarian assistance operations, are among the most preferred 
overseas organisations to Malaysian public managers in the disaster management context 
(personal conversation with participants). The reasons are three fold. First, the Malaysian 
government has a legally-binding agreement with these ASEAN regional organisations 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2005). Second, the Malaysian government has a representative on the 
governing board of the ASEAN organisation. Third, Malaysian public authorities have frequent 
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formal and informal interaction with ASEAN organisations that has developed into a high 
degree of mutual trust (AHA Centre, 2015a; ASEAN Secretariat, 2005). The ASEAN 
organisations support NADMA at the central coordination level and often work alongside the 
UN specialised agencies in mobilising relief items or sharing information. NADMA, as the 
Malaysian disaster management focal point, often works closely with the regional 
organisations. This scenario is evidenced by the ASEAN organisation being the only foreign 
organisation allowed by the Malaysian government to respond alongside the public disaster 
agencies to the Kelantan flooding between 2014 and 2015 (AHA Centre, 2015a, 2015b). 
UN specialised agencies 
Malaysia has been a member state of the UN since 1957. Currently, Malaysia has a presence 
on several UN organisations including, but not limited to, the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), World Health Organisation (WHO) and United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR), in which, together, they form the UN Country Team to support Malaysia 
to achieve overarching goals in socio-economic development, international integration and 
public governance. This study includes two participants from the UN Country Team members 
based in Malaysia with specialisation in humanitarian aid and emergency logistics. One is the 
superior organisation to the other, a regional emergency supplies logistical hub for Asia. The 
Malaysian government works closely with the UN through the UN Country Team led by the 
UN Resident Coordinator, who is also the head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). 
The initial study plan was to include the UN Resident Coordinator in Malaysia, the highest 
ranking UN official based in Malaysia. However, when interviews were organised and 
conducted in Malaysia at the beginning of 2017, the former UN Resident Coordinator had left 
and the successor did not arrive until later in the year. Therefore, I focused on interviewing UN 
Country Team members with strategic and operational disaster management experience. The 
UN specialised agencies in Malaysia have demonstrated high expectations of NADMA 
(personal conversation with a participant). In many ways, the Malaysian government’s efforts 
to achieving its vision as the champion in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in 
Southeast Asia is well acknowledged by international society (CFE, 2016). 
 Selection of participating individuals 
I also interviewed individuals who have experienced disasters first-hand and received aid in 
the initial stage of the disaster from either government or non-government sources. 
Interviewing aid recipients in rural communities that were once under the seven metres of water 
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was not the original plan. The idea arose during data collection and was confirmed later after 
almost all interviews with participants from NADMA, the assisting government agencies, 
NGOs and the UN agencies had been completed. The need to include the perspectives of aid 
recipients in the study became clearer as I tried to understand how a lack of collaboration or 
difficulties in collaboration influenced those in need. Fortuitously, with the help of some former 
volunteers (non-research-participants) from a local NGO, I managed to interview six citizens 
who had experienced mega flooding in 2014 as well as the mid-scale flooding in early 2017. 
Their views are as important as those of the key informants from organisations since they were 
in the front line of the disasters and were aid beneficiaries. They are the people to whom the 
key informants from various organisations delivered their social good in disaster management.  
 Approaching the focal organisation  
From the beginning, I intended to interview participants with a strategic and operational 
backgrounds. I sent an email invitation for an interview to four NDMA senior staff with whom 
I was acquainted; all accepted my invitation. Of these four participants from NADMA, the 
focal organisation, two are strategic decision-makers and the other two are operational 
decision-makers. When the face-to-face interviews were conducted with the NADMA staff in 
January 2017, NADMA was merely 14 months in operation. Not all key positions had been 
filled by that time. Furthermore, the number of decision-makers with strategic and operational 
backgrounds is generally small in public disaster agencies. This explains why only four 
participants from NADMA were selected for this study. It is worth noting that four is the 
highest number of interviews conducted in any single organisation for this study. Typically, I 
interviewed only the most senior two participants from a single organisation, ensuring one is 
from a strategic background and the other is operational.   
3.8. Theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation 
Theoretical sampling and saturation are key strategies in qualitative research (Charmaz, 2008). 
Theoretical sampling is a method of collecting data guided by the concepts or themes derived 
from data. Theoretical sampling is cumulative, theoretically driven and concept oriented 
(Charmaz, 2008; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). When I started collecting 
data, I was uncertain what kind of data that I would get or when the process could conclude. 
By employing theoretical sampling, I underwent a journey of collecting data from different 
places, people and events to maximise the opportunities for the discovery of new dimensions. 
Data collection and analysis go hand in hand; earlier notions inform the questions to be asked, 
60 
 
or what is to be observed, in subsequent interviews, hence clarifying my theoretical sampling 
direction (Corbin & Strauss, 2012). Theoretical sampling is not the same as sampling from 
studied populations and with procedures completed before data collection (Van den Hoonaard, 
2008). On the contrary, researchers conduct theoretical sampling in a responsive way; it is a 
flexible process (Corbin & Strauss, 2012). The concept-driven nature of theoretical sampling 
is useful to generate theoretical sensitivity (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). By following an 
analytical trail and observing the development of the unique features of the emerging theory, 
or even fortuitous events in data collecting, I am determined to explore the concept in depth 
(Breckenridge & Jones, 2009).  
Initially, I aimed to explore at least four different natural disasters that happened in Malaysia. 
However, only two different floods, which happened in Malaysia between 2014 and 2017, were 
largely discussed by the participants. Two replicated cases is a modest number, but natural 
disasters are comparatively rare, particularly from 2014 to 2017 in Malaysia (Guha Sapir, 
2019a). These two floods were chosen as cases for theoretical purposes and their probability 
of leading to the generation of an emergent theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) that will 
allow replication consistency as and when several cases are used (Yin, 2014).  
Following the theoretical sampling procedure, I took analytical steps (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) 
in the data collection. In doing so, the study’s direction hinges on the data collection and 
analysis that happen simultaneously as the researcher interprets the data during the process 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Theoretical sensitivity may happen during data collection, as an 
emerging idea results from an attentive process that “begins from data collection and goes on 
throughout the collection and analysis of data” (Daly, 2007, p. 104). During the first interview, 
the participant (a government agency officer) emphasised the importance of “preparedness, 
preparedness and preparedness” in delivering an effective and well-coordinated post-disaster 
response. I then asked: “With whom?, Why?, How? and What next?” Based on this awareness, 
I interviewed the following participants in the light of what was mentioned by previous 
participants and asked them the processes and challenges of cross-sector multi-stakeholder 
collective action toward a disaster response.  
I continued collecting data until the thirtieth interview when I reached saturation; i.e., the 
analytical threads or concepts became saturated when the addition of new data created no 
properties or dimensions of further interpretive value (Charmaz, 2006, 2014). I am satisfied 
that the complexity and variations in category development related to the properties and 
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dimensions were fully addressed (Charmaz, 2006; Sandelowski, 2008) and all concepts have 
been identified and delineated (Bryman, Liao, & Lewis-Beck, 2004; Corbin & Strauss, 2012). 
 Maintaining balance between selective and theoretical sampling 
I attempted to select the most representative combination of participants based on sectoral 
diversity, strategic and operational roles, of old and young age, and geographical variation. The 
diversity of the participating organisations and individuals was paramount to attain objective, 
balanced, genuine opinions and elaboration essential to a qualitative study.  
Most study participants were leaders and decision-makers holding senior positions in their 
respective organisations and making strategic and/or operational decisions every day. However, 
I did not presume that only leaders possess insights or a complete understanding of the 
investigated phenomenon. There are risks that strategic leaders share only positive information 
to uphold the image of their able leadership or because of concern about misinterpretation of 
controversial issues, so I also focused on operational staff. Research efforts that focus on 
collecting data from diverse organisational leaders have advantages in obtaining insights from 
a sample group within a larger population. This allowed me to observe differences in 
collaboration involving organisations from dissimilar sectors, hierarchical levels, geographical 
locations and organisational priorities and ability to achieve common goals.  
At times, after interviewing many key informants, I noticed the number of participants 
representing Malaysian public disaster agencies was fewer than I desired. I attempted to 
increase the number of research participants from Malaysian public disaster agencies but was 
challenged by a lack of access. Four months after 29 interviews had been conducted, I managed 
to arrange an additional interview with a participant from the Malaysian Armed Forces; the 
army was not included in the original interviewee plan. This interview turned out to benefit the 
study because the participant possessed an expansive disaster response experience in both 
Malaysia and overseas. The addition of only one participant may seem small but the data 
collected contributed to and strengthened the validity of the study. The decision to have one 
additional participant at late stage was arrived at with the idea that senior, experienced 
participants with knowledge of disaster management, as well being willing to share reflective 





3.9. Data collection 
Qualitative studies have multiple levels of data collection units that Yin (2016) terms a ‘nested 
arrangement’ (p. 91). This study aims to integrate both a broader and narrower level of data 
collection units. At the broader level, it is a community of disaster management stakeholders; 
at the narrower level, it includes individuals, organisations and networks. Integrating such a 
breadth of data collection units is useful to achieve maximum information (Kuzel, 1992). Being 
aware of selecting purposeful sampling and aiming to obtain maximum variation, I deliberately 
interviewed participants who were likely to provide opposing views related to my study (Yin, 
2016).  
I was familiar with one third of the 30 research participants through previous formal contacts; 
all participants interviewed were at least 30 years old. I interviewed the participants according 
to their preferred language; no interpreter was required because I am proficient in the preferred 
languages. Conversing in the language familiar to participants was critical for them to share 
their lived stories and experience without difficulty. My proficiency in the national Malaysian 
language, Malay, was particularly conducive to data collection involving Malaysian civil 
servants and rural participants, though most of the research participants were also well-versed 
in English.  
 Timing of the interviews 
One point to highlight is that being able to interview key informants on the last day of an 
official response operation could not have been more helpful for the study. I interviewed 
several key participants who just had reported back to their office from a recent demobilisation. 
Interviewing participants at this time is beneficial because their memories are fresh, minimising 
recall bias and increasing the probability of providing accurate data (Van den Berg, Wong, 
Velden, Boshuizen, & Grievink, 2012). However, collecting data soon after the end of a 
disaster response operation was on the pre-condition that it did not cause emotional distress to 
the participants. The interviews took place in various Malaysian cities (e.g., Putrajaya, Kuala 
Lumpur, Georgetown), townships (e.g., Kuala Krai) and villages (e.g., Manek Urai, Kampung 
Karangan). The villages are located approximately 338 km from my city and required over a 
five hour drive one way to reach them. The exception is that I interviewed two strategic 




 Developing the interview guide 
I reminded myself to enter the research journey tabula rasa. However, my experience in both 
disaster management policy options and operations may have influenced the way I designed 
the interview guide. At times, I may have been inclined to follow official news issued by public 
actors rather than non-public actors. I was also aware that the data collected at the beginning 
form the foundation for the theories or concepts subsequently generated (Charmaz, 2006, 
2014). Therefore, from the beginning, the interview guide design is critical to collect data 
pursuant to the research questions. 
In the initial stage of preparing for the interviews, I aimed to design interview questions that 
could lead to ‘emerging themes’ necessary to generate emergent empirical findings. In my first 
pilot interview via an audio-visual conferencing system, I asked the participant questions such 
as: 
• Can you tell me about the culture of your organisation? 
• To what extent does your organisation work together with other organisations? 
• Usually when you work together with a particular organisation, what do you actually 
want from this kind of collaboration?  
 
Not surprisingly, the first pilot interview was far from satisfactory. After the interview was 
transcribed, I found little insightful information and, at times, my questions were unclear and I 
frequently interrupted the participant while he was contemplating. Twenty days later, I 
conducted my second pilot interview with the same participant via a similar conferencing 
system. This time, I revised the interview questions as a result of what I have learned. The 
participant then shared his stories unreservedly despite the fact I asked fewer questions. The 
major questions were: 
• What were you doing during your 2-week disaster response operation? 
• Please tell me more about your work in the operation centre. 
• Will you act differently if you meet a similar disaster response? 
 
Through the pilot interview experiences, I was conscious that the design of interview questions 
was critical as they formed the basis of theory generation.  
The study participants were broadly divided into ‘aid-givers’ (e.g., participants from NADMA 
and the NGOs that provide assistance), and ‘aid-recipients’ (i.e., disaster-affected individuals 
who received assistance). These two groups stand at directly opposite ends of the humanitarian 
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service line in a disaster. Hence, two different sets of research questions were designed to 
explore participants’ views about the activities and arrangements that took place on the ground 
following a disaster. Their views are then triangulated throughout the analysis. For organisation 
key informants, most of the participants, I asked four major questions focusing on their:  
a) career history and connections with disaster management;  
b) experience in recent disaster response and recovery;  
c) experience of working together with other organisations in a disaster response; and  
d) reflections on and expectations of a successful disaster response.  
For individual aid recipients, I asked three major questions, focusing on what:  
a) they were doing when the floods were unfolding;  
b) happened after the floods receded; and  
c) were their reflections on experiencing the floods.   
After the two pilot interviews and before interviewing participants, I prepared some prompting 
questions to advance the interview if any participants had difficulty verbalising their 
experiences. These questions were more explicit. For example, I asked aid givers “How long 
have you been with this organisation, and where were you before this?” Another prompt 
question for aid recipients was “What kind of assistance have you received?” In hindsight, the 
prompt questions were not necessary because, after several interviews, I learned tactics to probe 
deeper insights from the participants. Two interview questions were particularly useful to my 
data collection. First, “Looking back, what would you have done differently? Why?” The 
second was “To what extent are you satisfied with the level and quality of collaboration? Why 
or Why not?” On reflection, such preparation is necessary to provide the confidence I needed 
to begin data collection. 
 Interview process and protocol 
During the interviews, the participants responded to initial questions focused on what happened 
after the disaster aftermath. The participants then expanded on questions regarding 
organisational and operational challenges, decision making, collaborative actions, recollection 
of experiences, and expectations for future improvement. Participants related their experiences 
to some disasters, mainly the devastating flooding of December 2014 and/or the more recent 
flooding in January 2017. The interview time ranged from 30 to 120 minutes with an average 
of about 60 minutes per participant. I rigorously wrote notes during the interviews.  
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The benefits of interviewing participants who have recently experienced floods have been 
discussed earlier, however, interviewing may be sensitive for some participants, particularly 
aid recipients. With this in mind, I adjusted my language when asking questions. Instead of 
asking “Were you afraid when water was rising?”, I asked “What were you doing when the 
water was rising?”. Often, I paused between questions to permit participants to express only 
the views they were most comfortable with without pressure.  
I demonstrated interest throughout the interviews, actively listening, making notes, and I wrote 
analytical memos as soon as I possible after the interview to document serendipitous and 
interesting concepts that arose from the discussion. In qualitative research, research analysis 
and data collection make a simultaneous, on-going cycle throughout the study: new concepts 
derived from the analysis become the basis for subsequent data collection (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008). After three to five interviews, I deliberately took a break to write reflective memos, 
review field notes and interview questions, and prepare for the next interviews. This reflection 
was useful in subsequent data analysis. 
3.10. Principles of collecting and reporting case study evidence  
I adopted the naturalistic generalisation approach to generate propositions or potential theories 
based on my experience in summarising data collected from multiple sources (Creswell, 2014; 
Stake, 2007). I also upheld my integrity principle and was a responsible researcher throughout 
the study. I was aware that ethics are an integral part of my approach to research from the way 
I ask and respond to questions, and the way reflections made on the data collection (D. Davies 
& Dodd, 2002).  
For the benefit of the case study evidence, I looked at diverse evidence sources, built a case 
study database, maintained a chain of evidence and cautiously used data from electronic 
sources (Yin, 2014). Maintaining a chain of evidence enhances the information reliability 
embedded in a case study (Yin, 2014), so that an external observer or reader can trace the data 
analysis steps either from conclusions to research questions or vice-versa. The chain of 
evidence serves the purpose of an audit trail to prove how data are linked to findings (Carpenter 
& Suto, 2008; Chilisa, 2012; Tobin & Begley, 2004). Lastly, I use only statistical data from 
electronic sources to avoid being overwhelmed with excess data.  
I was aware that triangulation is a powerful means to strengthen the credibility of findings 
(Liamputtong, 2013). Therefore, I converged data obtained from interviews and on-site 
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observations (methodological triangulation) as well as field notes and official documentation 
(data or source triangulation), “to corroborate the data and evolving themes” (Carpenter & Suto, 
2008, p. 152). Yin (2014) asserts that using multiple sources of evidence is critical in case study 
research to benefit from the elaborations and outcomes of converging information from diverse 
sources. I observe that having applied these principles increases the likelihood of building 
novel theory with concepts embedded in case-based data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
I adopted a constant comparative approach from the beginning of the data analysis and not at 
the end once all data were collected (Yin, 2014). For example, early interviews with NADMA 
and its collaborative partners informed my decision to include disaster aid recipients to cross-
examine the causal mechanisms of collective aid delivery and reception. Additionally, by using 
analytical memos generated from the interviews, I identified salient codes and emerging themes 
that led to the subsequent theorisation.  
3.11. Validity and reliability of research findings 
With Yin’s (2014) principles of collecting data in mind, and by applying Creswell’s (2014) 
notions on reflexivity and Stake’s (2007) naturalistic approach to data analysis, I logically 
linked the data to propositions, critical to developing internal and external validity. Validity 
refers to the ‘correctness’ of the findings and examines if an appropriate method has been 
applied to investigate what is intended to be investigated (Bryman, 2012; Holloway & Galvin, 
2017; Liamputtong, 2013). Reliability refers to the stability, consistency and trustworthiness 
of research findings with an emphasis on a finding being reproducible by other researchers at 
other times (Carpenter & Suto, 2008; Kvale, 2007; Liamputtong, 2013).  
Quantitative researchers, especially those who practise the positivism paradigm, evaluate the 
trustworthiness of findings based on validity and reliability. Qualitative researchers who adopt 
the postmodern theoretical paradigm believe in many realities and truths, like this researcher, 
to evaluate the trustworthiness of findings based on validity and reliability. However, 
qualitative researchers incline to use the term ‘rigour’ to refer to validity and reliability because 
rigour indicates varying methodology applied in research that focuses on meaning and 
interpretation to which quantitative research pays little attention (Liamputtong, 2013). 
Specifically, rigour refers to the quality, trustworthiness, and legitimate process compliance of 
qualitative enquiries (Liamputtong, 2013; Murphy & Yielder, 2009; Tobin & Begley, 2004). 
Without rigour, qualitative research may risk to becoming fictional journalism or may fail to 
contribute to knowledge creation (Tobin & Begley, 2004).  
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Qualitative research holds that reality is socially constructed by multiple participants and a 
socially constructed reality can be interpreted but cannot be measured (Liamputtong, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the merits of qualitative research can be examined from four aspects: internal 
validity to credibility; external validity to transferability; reliability to dependability; and 
objectivity to confirmability (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Credibility is 
compatible with authenticity, and is useful to confirm whether the research is genuine, 
authoritative or simply questions if the research can be trusted (Bryman, 2012; Carpenter & 
Suto, 2008; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). This study addressed the credibility concern by 
triangulating various reference points from diverse sources to allow a more convincing and 
accurate conclusion (Yin, 2014) and through constant reflexivity (Chilisa, 2012).  
Transferability is compatible to external validity and is similar to generalisation of inquiry 
(Chilisa, 2012; Tobin & Begley, 2004). Transferability emphasises applicability and questions 
to what extent a study’s findings can be applied to other individuals, groups or settings 
(Carpenter & Suto, 2008). I addressed the transferability concern by illustrating a chain of 
evidence as reported in the following chapters when discussing how data are sorted, organised 
and analysed. Hence, by paying attention to transferability criteria, I also addressed analytical 
generalisability of research findings (Liamputtong, 2013; Tobin & Begley, 2004).  
Dependability asks whether the research findings “‘fit’ the data from which they have been 
derived” (Carpenter & Suto, 2008, p. 150). I addressed this concern by illustrating the methods 
used to conduct this study, triangulation of participants of both strategic and operational 
backgrounds and seemingly opposing collaboration and disaster management theories (Chilisa, 
2012). Confirmability is associated with objectivity or neutrality in qualitative research (Chilisa, 
2012). The major objective of confirmability is to ensure the research findings are free from 
personal biases, motivations, or interests (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), and clearly link to the data 
(Chilisa, 2012; Padgett, 2008; Tobin & Begley, 2004). I addressed the concern of 
confirmability and other criteria through constant reflexivity as a responsible researcher.  
In retrospect, I exposed different perspectives of reality (Patton, 1999). I also triangulated data 
from multiple sources and applied more than one triangulation method, which is conducive to 
attain higher internal validity (Liamputtong, 2013). Combined with converged ontological and 
epistemological assumptions and the positionality of the researcher, I have validated the 
research findings with evidence guided by the four evaluative criteria to demonstrate the rigour 
of this study’s findings.  
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3.12. Reflections on the research 
Conducting this inductive qualitative research to investigate the barriers to cross-sector 
collaboration in disasters generated several reflections. Throughout the analysis, I constantly 
documented self-reflections on how disaster management organisations operate in a 
complicated, uncertain and rapidly changing environment. From the beginning of the research 
design to data collection, I constantly reminded myself to mitigate if not entirely eliminate 
presupposed ideas and practical disaster management experience so that this empirical study 
could be conducted in the most possible objective basis. Having such an awareness throughout 
all phases of the qualitative study, I was able to address the potential trap of positing personal 
experience as a sort of theoretical framework. I trust that the discussion of personal reflections 
in qualitative research is instrumental in heuristic learning, a conscious effort to remain 
objective, and “reflections is one method of knowledge creation” (Thompson, 2012, p. 197). 
From the outset, self-reflexivity (Tracy, 2010) was an integral part of this study built into the 
data collection and analysis.  
Before data collection, I acknowledged my research had certain risks. The reason for such risk 
is because of concern that some participants may experience emotional distress during data 
collection given the natural disaster context of the research. I am aware of my obligations to 
adhere to the ethical guidelines prescribed by the university’s Human Ethics Committee and to 
“protect the participants from any forms of possible risk” (LeCompte & Schensul, 2010, p. 
183). I am also mindful of treating participants with respect throughout the research journey, 
with sensible of asking of questions not causing unintended psychological distress.  
However, many times some elderly participants started to look sorrowful and dismal when 
recalling the traumatising flood that had devastated their houses and communities two years 
before. I was in a dilemma in demonstrating an interest because rich data were unfolding but I 
was also concerned not to cause unnecessary distress. When such a situation arose, I paused, 
and often discontinued asking participants to elaborate or I ended the interview. In hindsight, 
if participants relayed in-depth stories should I have followed up assiduously with them on how 
they survived water as high as the coconut trees? The idea of exploring stories under such 






This chapter presented the research design, the selection of participants and research methods 
used in the study. It began with a discussion of the rationale for employing inductive qualitative 
and critical-realist approaches to examine the dynamics of cross-sector collaboration in 
disasters. In selecting this approach, I use a case study design as the most suitable strategy to 
investigate a unique phenomenon. I have reflexively given due consideration to ontological 
and epistemological beliefs on how the chosen research methods on collecting data generate 
research findings.  
I then discussed the participants, who are the key informants for this study, and participant 
selection and engagement strategies. The challenges in balancing theoretical sampling and 
theoretical saturation were also discussed. Finally, I presented the data collection techniques: 
how to design an interview protocol and interview questions, and how to apply qualitative 
research tools to collect data for a case study. The evaluative criteria of validity and reliability 
of qualitative research inquiries were illustrated to provide evidence about how this study 
addressed various challenges to generate novel theory. The next chapter discusses the data 





Chapter 4:  
Data analysis 1: 






We can know only that we know nothing.  
And that is the highest degree of human wisdom. 
  
-- Leo Tolstoy, a Russian writer (1828-1910) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter is the first of two chapters on data analysis. It begins by discussing the analytical 
techniques used, the processes to organise and categorise participants’ quotes and identifies 
codes from the interviews. The initial (or open) coding of the interview data led to numerous 
open codes. This was followed by two levels of focused coding. The following chapter 
discusses how selected focused codes led to the discovery of the themes derived from the 
analyses. 
4.2. Data analysis techniques 
My ontological, epistemological and axiology stances guided me in designing this study. I 
sought a deliberate approach to explore the perspectives of participants in a complicated social, 
physical and situational real world (Liamputtong, 2013; Mills, Durepos, & Wiebe, 2010). 
Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2008) report that there are 18 qualitative data analysis techniques, 
inter alia, classical content analysis, constant comparative analysis, keywords-in-context, 
discourse analysis, narrative analysis, conversation analysis and text mining. However, I made 
an informed choice to select the most suitable data analysis tools to conduct this interpretive 
study by using grounded theory tools, which are commonly referred to as qualitative research 
tools, including coding, memoing, constant comparisons and theoretical saturation (Charmaz, 
2008). In part, these tools are useful and practical for my study to generate theory from the data 
in participants’ original environment (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 2017). As Charmaz 
(2014) argues, the quality and credibility of empirical study begins with the data; and gathering 
data through interviews is considered one of the most effective ways to explore emerging 
phenomena (Charmaz, 2014; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) such as the barriers to 
collaboration in disasters that this study investigates. Gathering data through interviews is also 
what I intended to do from the beginning, to elicit the participants’ stories. After the 
development of research questions, the subsequent processes of theoretical sampling and 
saturation, and attention to constant comparative method, became clearer so that I used 
grounded theory tools to construct theory embedded in data collected from the interviews 
(Charmaz, 2014; Tweed & Charmaz, 2011).  
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Data analysis begins with data collection in an on-going cycle that is instrumental to construct 
theory grounded in data. Qualitative research tools are culturally sensitive and suitable for 
theoretical explanations with an emphasis on the development of events (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008) and are particularly useful for research with characteristics of “uncharted, contingent or 
dynamic phenomena” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 155). Using qualitative research tools also enables 
the addition of new data even if it comes later in the analysis (Charmaz, 2011, 2014). In my 
case, after over six months since the first interview was conducted and data were transcribed 
and analysed, I was still able to add new data when a keen participant became available. These 
attributes of grounded theory tools are critical for this study that involves participants from 
different cultural backgrounds. 
The data collected through semi-structured interviews were organised, sorted and synthesised 
through qualitative coding and reflective memo writing. I transcribed all digitally voice-
recorded interview data verbatim. If the interview was not conducted in English (e.g., Malay 
or Mandarin), I translated it. The transcriptions and field memos were stored and sorted in 
NVivo with pseudonyms assigned to each participant. I backed up all files of the raw interview 
data, the transcriptions, field memos and the NVivo file in a portable disk protected with an 
encrypted password and locked in my office at the university.  
Analysis commenced immediately after the initial interviews. I constantly compared current 
data with data on hand. The data comparison between interview transcripts, field memos and 
secondary data (e.g., news and government documents) was conducted and analysed 
concurrently with subsequent data collection. By immediately systematically analysing data 
collected and writing reflective field memos after each interview, I found cues within the data 
crucial for subsequent interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989). Appendix 4A shows two excerpts from 
my reflective field memos written in different days and how the earlier field memo helped to 
prepare for the next interview by asking more direct and critical questions.  
I used two major methods of coding: initial coding (or open coding) and focused coding 
(Charmaz, 2008). Initial coding began with reviewing transcripts line-by-line, coding “as a 
‘lumper’, not a ‘splitter’” (Saldaña, 2016, p. 79) where I coded larger chunks of work instead 
of specific lines of interview transcription. Throughout the coding, I was aware that only the 
essential parts were to be coded. Data analysis includes categorising codes, comparing data and 
looking for possibilities of specific patterns, and identifying properties and dimensions 
(Charmaz, 2008, 2011; Saldaña, 2016). As coding progressed, patterns emerged (Glaser & 
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Holton, 2007). For example, varying organisational plans to prepare for effective disaster 
response depicted in the codes ranged from strengthened legitimisation to capacity building, 
membership inclusiveness, relationship management, leadership preferences and others. These 
codes led to the discovery of an emerging theme (in focused code form) and informed larger 
stories beyond the meaning of individual themes and dimensions (Charmaz, 2014). The 
focused codes showed a theme that organisations had taken varied preparatory actions they 
perceived essential for effective disaster response without having a common understanding of 
approaches and objectives to attain a swift, effective and coherent disaster response.  
By organising and realigning codes, the participants’ meanings and views were distinguished 
to explain their actions (Charmaz, 2008). These codes are like the bones of the analysis and, 
when all relevant codes are integrated, the analysis skeleton is formed (Charmaz, 2014). 
Examples of open coding showed that codes such as resentment, gratefulness, criticism and 
optimism were diagnosed throughout the interviews, which led to the identification of a focused 
code: expressing emotions by disaster actors. This focused code explicitly presented the varied 
emotions experienced by diverse actors in emergencies. It is common for qualitative 
researchers to use active codes and gerunds (a verb that functions as a noun ending in ing) such 
as leading and coordinating (Charmaz, 2014). In my case, the word expressing, inter alia, is 
used. Coding is non-linear; it oscillated between data and analysis iteratively (Charmaz, 2008). 
Throughout the analysis, several tables were used to illustrate categories, properties and 
dimensions identified in the analysis. They formed the basis of the final theory. 
Focused coding followed initial coding to sift, sort and synthesise large data sets to identify the 
nature of relationships between and within categories (Charmaz, 2008). During the focused 
coding, line-by-line codes were lifted to compare data and codes. Subsequently, two iterations 
of focused coding were conducted to produce first-level and second-level focused codes. For 
example, ‘expressing emotions by disaster actors’, ‘searching preferred leadership style in 
disaster response’, and ‘preparing for disaster through varied actions’ were identified first-
level focused codes that led to a salient second-level focused code with a higher level of 
message ‘attitude to disaster leadership’.  
Throughout the analysis, I compared data and codes and defined links between them and 
categories were generated. Subsequently, I compared “data and data, data and codes, codes of 
data and other codes, codes and category, and category and concept” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 163). 
The constant comparisons of common themes and patterns in several codes led to conjecture 
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and generalisation (Charmaz, 2011, 2014). Finally, the primary data from the in-depth 
interviews and the secondary data, were triangulated (Liamputtong, 2013; Liamputtong & 
Ezzy, 2005; Stake, 2007). 
 Organising the data 
The verbatim transcriptions comprised 93,645 words. Individual interview transcripts were 
stored, organised and catalogued with computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS) such as NVivo version 11. Documentation and organisational reports were stored 
and sorted manually as printed copies. I maintained all the participants’ signed consent forms 
for the interviews, field notes, audio records, and interview transcripts in locked cabinets in the 
university and all electronic data are protected with encrypted passwords.  
Under the code category, three node levels were created: parents, children and grand-children. 
For example, the description by operational participants of stockpiles of necessary equipment 
(the grand-children node) implied government groundwork (children node) that led to the 
parent node describing how government actors so far contended with the preparatory actions 
in disaster management. I further categorised the interview data into two groups when I 
organised and sorted the data with NViVo. I not only visualised any collaborative arrangements 
identified but also highlighted the continuum of the disaster response operation as it unfolded. 
For the organisations that provided aid such as NADMA, other assisting government agencies, 
NGOs, UN agencies and ASEAN organisations, I grouped the interview questions as follows: 
a) Career history and connection with disaster management 
b) Experience in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery 
c) Experience of inter-organisational collaboration in disaster management 
d) Insights and reflections of collaboration in disaster management 
For the disaster aid recipients, I asked interview questions that differ from the others as follows: 
a) What were you doing before and during the disaster? 
b) What happened after the flood receded? 
c) What was your experience of the aid you received? 
The responses from asking the two groups of questions were constantly compared for 




 Reflective field memorandum 
I drafted reflective, analytical memos immediately after each interview. I wrote the memo 
quickly while memories were still fresh. These field memos were written in various places. 
This memo writing provided a space for me to reflect on what had been communicated, 
observed and explored between me and interviewee. Writing memos and field analytical 
memos is a useful act to prepare a researcher for the next interview. Through the memo writing, 
I benefitted from being able to correct otherwise unnoticed errors in the previous interview. 
Through learning from previous interviews, I became proactive and asked important questions 
earlier, listened without interrupting, and attentively observed the body language of 
interviewee.  
 First cycle coding 
As mentioned above, I conducted two data coding phases, an initial coding followed by focused 
coding (Charmaz, 2008) that will be discussed in the next section. The first cycle coding began 
with initial or open coding. I looked for the stories, flows, hidden messages and anomalies from 
the interview transcripts that Charmaz (2008) terms “close reading and interrogation of data” 
(p.163). The initial coding was interactive and comparative. Throughout this coding, I actively 
identified frequently used words, essential sentences or paragraphs of interview transcripts with 
similar patterns that I categorised as open codes. To benefit the search for emergent leads 
during the initial coding, I applied In vivo coding, which consists of participants’ original 
statements and process coding that uses gerunds to show action in the data (Charmaz, 2006, 




Table 4-1: Examples of in vivo and process coding 
General Qualitative Coding 
Examples of In 
Vivo Coding 




My driver was 
crying 
Participant’s Quotes 
Not sure what should we do. We are not good to get 
prepared. We are sad… My feeling...is sad. We are also 
human. How can we left out. Regardless how we voice 
out, still receive nothing (Aid recipient). 
Later I discover lots of food arrived at Air Keruh but 
cannot cross river…[because] no transport. …On 27 
December [2014], Kota Bahru was shut down. My driver 
was crying...he said, madam, I cannot be help much, my 














Being selective in 
relief items 
 
Initial Narrative Data in Interview Transcript 
 
…on current procedures, federal government is in-charge 
of disaster management but state government want to 
control it. So we have to seem 'dancing' (in managing the 
relationships) (assisting government agencies). 
They [Japan, USA] will not receive [simply] any assistance 
from any countries …. Japan received assistance from 
Indonesia but only for blanket. Before we sent the blankets, 
Japan Embassy officials came to [our office] to select, to 
test...ready to-eat food, they test each of the item that suit 










For the in vivo coding, the keyword sad was identified from the raw interview data. Hence the 
selected word for the open code was sadness for we are sad and my driver was crying.  
Throughout the initial coding, the coding principle of linking codes to codes leading to 
emerging links between the coding was applied. The coding resulted in many open codes; 
however, not all are relevant or useful. One notion to highlight is that in vivo codes about 
emotion can be referred to as emotional codes. During interviews, participants expressed 
myriads of emotions and such emotional codes are important parts of the interview data 
analysis. Saldaña (2016) provides a succinct explanation why a qualitative researcher needs to 
pay attention to emotional codes while analysing data because these codes are “suitable to 
explore interpersonal participant experiences and actions, especially in matters related to 
relationships, reasoning, decision making, judgement and risk-taking; provide deep insights 
into participant’s perspectives, worldviews” (p.125).  
Two examples of process coding are “exerting the right of state government” and “being 
selective in relief items”. These two codes demonstrate a commonality where participants tried 
to protect their basic rights even in an emergency. After integrating these two codes, “defending 
autonomy” was adopted as the representative open code. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the 
categorisation of open codes, and first-level and second-level focused codes. A detailed 
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account of arriving at the first- and second-level focused codes from the open codes will be 
discussed in the next section with examples to illustrate the process in a structured manner.  
Table 4-2: Categorisation of the open codes, first- and second-level focused codes  




• Sadness (e.g., We are sad3) 
• Gratefulness 









• Defending autonomy (e.g., We are sitting in 
the driver’s seat.) 
• Engaging partners proactively 
• Emphasis on apolitical approach 
• Hands-on and pragmatic 
• Command and control model 
Searching for a preferred 
leadership style in disaster 
response 
• Perceived satisfactory preparatory work (e.g., 
In my opinion, we have the best inter-agency 
operation in Malaysia.) 
• Clarifying the importance of disaster 
management  
• Leveraging on influential people 
• Performing standard governmental 
groundwork 
• Adhering to institutional priorities 
• Holistic approach by NGOs 
• Promoting general public’s awareness  
• Benchmarking on regional cooperation 
Preparing for disaster 
through varied actions 
• Positive and enabling factors in disaster 
response (e.g., When a good leader visits, …, 
the victims felt that they were not forgotten, 
they will respond positively to the request of 
the government officials.) 
• Negative and constraining factors in disaster 
response 
• Tension between central agencies and state 
governments 
• Politicised humanitarian aid 
Experiencing political 
influence in the process of 




stakeholders • Asserting formal and coordinated approach 
(e.g., We do receive them but not coordinated 
well. … then you will cause frustration. We do 
not want that happened.) 
• Suggesting informal and innovative approach 
• Monitoring situational awareness after disaster 
strikes 
Seeking optimum 
solutions in emergencies 
                                              
3 An example of a participant quote to illustrating the open code identified.  
78 
 
• Considering cultural norms and customs in 
disaster relief (e.g., They know the norms of 
the village...for us from outside of Kelantan, 
it's hard for us.)  
• Approach of international organisations in 
relief operation 
• Approach of local organisations in relief 
operation 
• Differing perspectives in interpreting 
successful disaster relief 
Observing cultural 
differences and 
sensitivities in disaster 
relief operation 
Levels of trust 
toward among 
actors 
• Adhering to organisational principles (e.g., We 
have to make sure all agencies react 
according to National Security Council 
Directive no. 20.) 
• Completing relief mission as driven by 
passion (i.e., professional turn humanitarian 
and disaster expert) 
• Completing relief mission as driven by official 
duty 
• Attitudes towards disaster response operation 
• Altruistic approach through volunteering work 
in disaster response operation 
Accomplishing mission 
despite challenges 
• Sceptical towards NADMA’s capabilities 
(e.g., How effective is NADMA? Because they 
are not tested yet.) 
• Approving of NADMA’s capabilities 
• Disapproving of NADMA’s capabilities 
• Reviewing status of on-going organisational 
restructuring  
• Varying understanding of good collaboration 




• Welcoming (e.g., That's a good start, because 
you have ASEAN regional warehouse there. 
That's quick win.). 
• Reserved attitude 
• Fulfilling national mandate 
• Empowering new agency with legitimate 
duties (i.e., providing central directives, 
serving as national focal point of disaster 
management) 
• Differing interpretation of empowerment 
among officials 
• Understanding of planned resilience4 (i.e., 
proactive attitude, operational- or strategic-
driven capacity) 






                                              
4 Planned or inherent resilience refers to an organisation’s capacity to function as planned in the absence of adverse 
events (i.e., before a disaster), critical to “reduce probability of failure and reduces negative consequences of 
failure, …” (S. Cutter et al., 2008; Hall, Malinen, Vosslamber, & Wordsworth, 2016, p. 44) with an emphasis on 




• Understanding of adaptive resilience5 (i.e., 
leadership, collaboration, employee well-
being and organisational capabilities to learn) 
• Dedicated humanitarian specialist (e.g., I am 
an architect and urban designer, I joined 
relief operations since the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami in Aceh. I have 13 years of 
experience.) 
• Career government official 
• Humanitarian professionals with international 
and regional experience  
• Distinguishing government and non-
governmental actors 
• Understanding disaster aid recipients  
Understanding actors’ 
background in disaster 
management 
• Addressing organisational ego (e.g., It 
happened, and happened again in this recent 
flood response. Despite with the Standing 
Order, each agency has its ego.) 
• Examining organisational accountability  
• Reviewing the nature of multi-tasking in 
disaster response operation 
• Extent of service from disaster response to 
recovery 
Reviewing organisational 
roles and attitudes in 
disaster management 
• Coordinating stakeholders (e.g., My role is to 
coordinate my men, my agencies.) 
• Communicating challenges between actors 
• Compliance with standard operating 
procedures 
• Dealing with chaotic and unexpected 
situations involved victims 









• Building ‘goodwill’ relationships with peer 
agencies (e.g., You have to do personal 
relations, doing it through goodwill training 
[practice]) 
• Building trust and credibility between actors 
• Conducting training and simulation exercises 
to building and renewing relationships 
• Observing regional and international best 
practice in cooperation 
Being aware of intra- 
and inter-organisational 
relationship building 
                                              
5 Adaptive resilience refers to resourcefulness and flexibility in responding to uncertainties during adverse events 
(e.g., post-disaster) (S. Cutter et al., 2008), a process of “learning by doing…by increasing system knowledge 
through a structured feedback process” (Allen, Fontaine, Pope, & Garmestani, 2011, p. 1340). Here, Nilakant and 
colleagues’ (2014) interpretation of four factors about adaptive resilience are: Leadership, collaboration, employee 
well-being and organizational capability to learn. 
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• Interaction between major local NGOs during 
disaster response (e.g., …We never thought 
about trying to mobilise or collaborate with 
other NGOs. I never thought of collaboration 
with any parties.) 
• Interaction between public managers and 
disaster aid recipients 
• Interaction between government actors  
• International NGOs’ approach in reaching out 
to government decision makers 
• Post-disaster interactions among multiple 
stakeholders 
• Understanding and exploring regional 
cooperation and mechanism 
Relationships across 
different stakeholders 
• Demonstrating different values of 
accountability (e.g., The military does not 
want to be coordinated by civilian.) 
• Collaborating with familiar organisations and 
personnel (homophily) 
• Developing collaboration by enthusiastic 
convener 
• Endorsing existing mechanism 
Exploring preferences 
for collaboration among 
organisations 
• Coping with public expectations (e.g., Victims 
are not grateful...they always hope for the 
better treatment but themselves cannot 
cooperate with us in terms of cleanliness, 
working together.) 
• Varying training and development programme 
to prepare for disasters 
• Coping with familiarising new structure and 
systems 
• Coordinating emerging partners 
• Individual officials are coping with new job 
scope 
• Coping with leaders’ expectations 
Acknowledging 
multiple challenges in 





• Collaborating with convenient and existing 
partners including other assisting government 
agencies (e.g., When there is a disaster 
response, we need coordination of various 
response agencies. The Bomba, Civil Defence, 
military, Police, RELA, state committee, 
district committee.) 
• Exploring possibilities of collaboration 
involved local and foreign actors 
• Exploring collaboration with major local 
NGOs 
• Collaborating with trusted external partners 
• Reviewing collaboration involved emerging 






• Learning from best practice (e.g., … We use 
global standard but localised those 
standardise in country. So, this is what we 
bring in. When we are strengthening our 
mechanism and coordination, how we engage 
with the community, we are using 
international standard.)  
• Sharing of regional experience in disaster 
management  
• Benefitting from useful individual advice 
• Maximising individual learning experience 
• Exploring organisational and individual 
learning 
• Enhancing mutual learning experience 





lessons learned • Public managers’ self-portrayed improvement 
in operation (e.g., The disaster management in 
Malaysia is improving in every aspects. We 
are improved in terms of mechanism, 
...procedures, manpower, skills, knowledge, 
logistic.) 
• Reality of disaster relief 
• Reviewing strategical challenges  
• Organisation-wide lessons learned 
• Operational lessons learned 
• Other partners’ views on lessons learned by 
public organisations 
• Integrating advices and best practices into 
future plans and actions 
Being aware of lessons 
learned from previous 
experience 
 
 Second cycle coding 
Second cycle coding followed the first cycle coding. The second cycle led to the discovery of 
focused codes where open codes were reorganised into specific categories, prioritised to form 
anchor categories, and synthesised to develop a central category (Saldaña, 2016). Using 
Charmaz’s (2008) coding techniques, 100 open codes were chosen from the initial analysis. 
The selected open codes were coded a second time since Saldaña (2016) contends it is 
necessary “…to develop a sense of categorical, thematic, conceptual, and/or theoretical 
organization from your array of first cycle codes” (p. 234). As a result, 19 first-level focused 
codes and 7 second level focused codes were identified as delineated in Table 4.2. 
For illustrative purposes, the following describes the process to identify first-level focused 
codes from the selected open codes. For instance, the first-level focused code “preparing for 
disaster through varied actions” highlights the varying perceptions, plans and practices of 
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disaster stakeholders during different phases of disaster management. It was an integrated result 
of the following eight open codes supported by various participants’ quotes.  
• Perceived satisfactory preparatory work. For example: “In my opinion, we have 
the best inter-agency operation in Malaysia6” (Yusri Salahhudin7, a participant 
with a strategic and operational background from an assisting government 
agency). 
• Clarifying the importance of disaster management. For example: “NADMA aims 
to bridge some of the gaps in other provisions that relates to disaster management 
that is deposited with the various responding agencies. These are the things that 
we know, eh...this is required because there are areas…as we talk about  
mainstreaming the disaster risk reduction, there can be area where one 
jurisdiction of a particular agency ...cannot cross the bridge over” (Abdul 
Rahman, a strategic and operational participant from NADMA).  
• Leveraging on influential people. For example: ”…ex Community Service 
[division] Chairman, is the Sultanah of a southern state. …She comes as an 
advisor. … She has mobilised the Mall...we have a strong lady to support the 
work” (Sivaragam Jaya, a strategic participant from a major local NGO). 
• Performing standard government groundwork. For example: “…disasters are 
unpredicted, no doubt we have the agencies to do predictions, sometimes, it just 
happens. If we are ready, we can do some prevention measures, it is better than 
being responsive” (Che Singh, a strategic participant from an assisting 
government agency). 
• Adhering to institutional priorities. For example: “So we need a legal framework 
as our source of authority. We are heading....in the process of formulating the law 
on disaster risk reduction” (Abdul Rahman, a strategic and operational participant 
from NADMA).  
• Holistic approach by NGOs. For example: “emergency phase is 'honeymoon' 
period, everyone wants to be there. When they leave, everybody will leave at once. 
And left everything behind. Nobody cares what happen after that. So, when we 
                                              
6 Participant quotes are used for illustrative purposes throughout Chapters 4 and 5. Quotes are italicised and 
documented verbatim. Any addition to the quotes is distinguished with brackets; some omissions are made to 
remove unnecessary words or identifying information.   
7 All names are pseudonyms. However, descriptions to illustrate the organisations with which participants were 
associated or the general background of interviewed participants as individuals are real.   
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stay in Kelantan after 2014, we stay till now” (Senin Awang, an operational 
participant from a major local NGO). 
• Promoting general public’s awareness. For example: “...Awareness of public... we 
asked them to evacuate but they denied. Now improved…when flood happen in 
December 2016, it is very easy for us to evacuate them. Before flood [occurs], they 
have evacuated themselves first” (Fakhrul Mansor, a strategic and operational 
participant from an assisting government agency). 
• Benchmarking on regional cooperation. For example: ”we are basically looking at 
the ASEAN level, we are at par and keep abreast, we adjust, able to come in 
responding in the region as one” (Abdul Rahman, a strategic and operational 
participant from NADMA). 
In addition to “preparing for disaster through varied actions”, another two first-level focused 
codes detected were “expressing emotions by disaster actors”, and “searching preferred 
leadership style in disaster response”. These three first-level focused codes led to the discovery 
of a second-level focused code named “attitude to disaster leadership”. Seven second-level 
focused codes were detected from the data set. These focused codes were merged into three 
themes within the broader codes; a detailed discussion is in Chapter 5.  
Table 4.3 summarises the discussion in the preceding sections on identifying the seven second-
level focused codes from the 19 first-level focused codes derived from participants’ quotes as 




Table 4-3: Categorisation of the second-level focused codes  
No Second-Level Focused Code Focused Code 
1 Attitude to disaster leadership  
How an organisation positions itself in a specific environment 
and how other collaborating partners evaluate the organisation 
based on varied lens in terms of leadership, mandate and 
planning or preparatory actions. 2 
Tensions between central and state 
stakeholders 
3 Level of trust among actors How the actions or inactions, level of engagement between and 
performance of disaster actors as well as attitudes towards 
organisational ability were interpreted by other stakeholders 
through the collaborative process. 
4 Unclear organisational roles and legitimacy 
5 Attitude to managing stakeholder relationships How organisational perspectives on relationship management, 
learning and building capacity influence the processes, 
structures and mechanisms to collaborate in emergencies. 
  
6 Orientation on building organisational capacity 
7 Learning from experience and lessons learnt 
 
4.3. The process to identify salient focused codes 
This section discusses and provides the evidence for how the second-level focused codes were 
identified from the 19 first-level focused codes as in Table 4.3. Seven second-level focused 
codes were identified. To illustrate the process, the first four second-level focused codes 
identified are used as examples. The processes to identify these four second-level focused 
codes is discussed in detailed, illustrated and supported by participants’ quotes.  
 Attitude to disaster leadership 
The second-level focused code “attitude to disaster leadership” was derived from the first level 
focused codes “expressing emotions by disaster actors”, “searching for a preferred leadership 
style in disaster response”, and “preparing for disaster through varied actions”. Analysis of 
“expressing emotions by disaster actors” showed that disaster actors demonstrated varied 
sentiments towards leadership and leaders’ decisions, including resentment, gratefulness, 
empathy, optimism, criticism and denouncement. For instance, Harumi Mohammad, a disaster 
survivor and aid recipient, lamented that she and other villagers were left unattended and 
unaided by government officials in the evacuation centre: “we were left alone”. Safiya 
Mahmod from NADMA criticised another peer agency for being incapable of performing a 
designated duty: 
…they cannot make right order, decisions, for example, there is a centre managed 
by an assistant officer, he cannot react how to manage the evacuation centre; the 
problems arise, for instance, the stock is depleting and he doesn't know what to do, 
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seems afraid to contact higher decision-makers because he think his position is too 
low. 
In the discussion about “searching for a preferred leadership style in disaster response” among 
various stakeholders, participants with a strategic background from NADMA, ASEAN 
organisations and the UN, preferred command and control leadership. For instance, Sofyan 
Febrita from an ASEAN organisation, highlighted that if a leader is not strong and 
authoritative, no one will take his or her word seriously. Nonetheless, participants with an 
operational background from NADMA, other assisting government agencies, NGOs and aid 
recipients, preferred consultative and engaging leadership. For instance, Safiya Mahmod, an 
operational employee from NADMA observed the importance of engaging leadership with the 
following evidence: 
…there was a local assemblyman that took charge to help, he formed the team and 
assigned people of work. There was a present of good leadership that make it 
difference…bring his followers together. … good leader visit, stay together, try to 
understand their feeling, the victims felt that they were not forgotten, they will 
response positively to the request of the government officials…. These kind of 
leaderships are not seen elsewhere. 
For “preparing for disaster through varied actions”, participants from regional and international 
organisations had higher expectations of disaster preparedness and mitigation than NADMA 
and other assisting government agencies. Often, public managers with both strategic and 
operational backgrounds claimed they had made necessary pre-arrangements to prepare for 
future disasters but their partners and disaster aid recipients did not share their view. Sofyan 
Febrita from an ASEAN organisation and Stefano Jean-Pierre from an international NGO 
argued that preparing for a disaster is like buying insurance (an example of a mitigation activity) 
for property against fire. These views resonated with NADMA’s operational officer, Fahruddin 
Iskandar, with first-hand operational experience in an uncoordinated large-scale flood relief 
operation in 2014, claimed that advanced preparedness and a back-up plan are critical for an 
effective disaster relief operation. Iskandar’s reflective notion is: 
what happened in Kelantan [flooding] is actually we do not have [back up] plan. 
… the response agencies in the district and the state are not well prepared. They 
don't have Plan B or Plan C.  
Although varying foresights, positions and experience among participants may lead to different 
preparatory actions, there are common areas agreed by both strategic and operational 
participants, such as disaster relief simulation exercises, continued training and public 
awareness programmes. Daniel Rasyid from an ASEAN organisation, believes necessary 
preparatory action against disaster were, first, to gain full support from the most senior central 
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leaders; second, to secure adequate funding; and third, to be able to coordinate with multiple 
agencies including the military. Rasyid’s advice to NADMA is: 
My suggestion to NADMA is...agency should get full support from the Prime 
Minister. Once they have the full support from the Prime Minister, they can do their 
job because in disaster management, it is very tough. The agency chief should 
coordinate everything...sometimes, military does not want to be coordinated by a 
civilian. 
When asked what were the pressing issues in preparing an organisation for future disasters, 
NADMA’s strategic decision-maker, Zain Ahmad, contended that NADMA needs to 
demonstrate strong leadership because it is necessary in engaging and managing multiple 
organisations and individuals with varied values and perspectives. Ahmad’s co-worker, Abdul 
Rahman, echoed his view on the importance of public managers possessing strong leadership 
to ensure all actors are compliant to the procedures. Their views are: 
managing people consists of various organisational culture, different jurisdiction, 
so...the leadership needed is not only to get respect, confidence...we need to gain 
confidence not only [from] agencies but the confidence of the Prime Minister (Zain 
Ahmad, NADMA).  
… called upon to make critical decisions, if they are not well versed with the 
standard operating procedures, then you will see some disorganisation because 
the leaders must be strong enough (Abdul Rahman, NADMA). 
In summary, this section illustrates how the first level focused codes of “expressing emotions 
by disaster actors”, “searching preferred leadership style in disaster response”, and “preparing 
for disaster through varied actions” led to the discovery of the “attitude to disaster leadership’, 
the first second-level focused code. 
 Tensions between central and state stakeholders 
The second-level focused code of “tensions between central and state stakeholders” was 
derived from the first-level focused codes of “experiencing political influence in the process of 
responding to disasters” and “seeking optimum solutions in emergencies”. Participants based 
at the central level believed that they were in total control (with a national mandate, necessary 
resources and information, and by giving central directives). However, state governments did 
not share this view and aimed to minimise interference by central agencies. The contrasting 
views are widened when a state has a governing party different from central government. For 
example, Nik Sidek, a school teacher and an aid recipient, was under tremendous pressure from 
his principal not to accept a cash donation from an opposition party leader. In another example, 
Syed Anwar, an operational staff member based in a state, argued for the importance of 
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understanding the nuance of balancing control and coordination between central and state 
actors. Anwar illustrated as follows: 
…when you work with state government, public relations is quite important 
because as a federal government official, and you are trying to...on behalf of the 
federal government, sometimes, state government wanted to be in control in certain 
things. But on current procedures, federal government is in-charge of disaster 
management but state government want to control it. So we have to seem 'dancing' 
[in managing the relationships].  
Often, official relief operations were manipulated and politicised at varying levels. For 
instance, Fahruddin Iskandar, an operational staff member from NADMA, shared his 
experience of how he applied an innovative approach to convince a military general to release 
quarantined relief items from military possession:  
There was one time, we used to have coordination meeting at night, we started at 
10 pm. I collected all information that I can get, try to negotiate with the General, 
I said that Sir, this [relief item] is from one NGO, and they have in contact with me 
mentioned that you are keeping their possession, I will try to sell some of the 
politicians' names, i.e. Tok Penting...He is Kelantanese. Deputy Prime Minister 
asked Tok Penting to take charge of the disaster operations. I said that Tok Penting 
already know about this thing, so I hope you can give the things back to the owner. 
In practice, the tension between central and state governments always exists as Safiya Mahmod 
from NADMA’s operational team highlighted: 
…we need to develop good relationship between federal and state governments 
because district offices will listen to the state government. If we did not have...any 
[or] build good relationship with state government, it will be some problems for us 
to give order to the district office….  
 Levels of trust among actors 
As illustrated in Table 4.2, the juxtaposition of “observing cultural differences and sensitivities 
in disaster relief operation”, “accomplishing mission despite challenges”, and “varying 
attitudes toward NADMA’s capabilities” led to the discovery of the second-level focused code 
“level of trust among actors”. Starting with “observing cultural differences and sensitivities in 
disaster relief operation”, aid recipients generally expressed distrust towards uniformed 
personnel. For instance, the aid recipient, Noh Agus, argued that: “…a Police Officer came to 
remind us for evacuation but I do not trust him”. Conversely, NADMA’s operational officers 
judged aid recipients as ungrateful and “stubborn”. Abdul Rahman, a strategic participant from 
NADMA, contended that population living in the East Coast states understood they were prone 
to flooding during monsoon seasons but regretted they poorly prepared themselves for 
disasters. Instead they heavily relied on government assistance. Rahman explained: 
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That is a very difficult part because...culturally the people in the East Coast states, 
are ...North-East Monsoon flood is water festival kind of thing. That's the mentality 
(Abdul Rahman, NADMA).  
Under the first-level focused code: “accomplishing mission despite challenges”, participants 
from major local NGOs demonstrated practice or standard rarely seen among other participants. 
The way these NGOs’ volunteers were mobilised vividly demonstrated their trust in the values 
of the organisations with which they were associated. For instance, volunteers of a particular 
NGO applied for leave from their companies and paid for their own air tickets to render relief 
support in a faraway state. Some revisited aid recipients regularly after the official relief 
operation was concluded. According to Lim Chiang Hock from a local NGO, he was moved 
by the contributions of these volunteers and observed: 
…the HQ chartered a flight, FireFly with 72 seats fully booked by …. volunteers. 
Left home at 6 am, return home with same flight at 10 pm. Each volunteer pays 
RM600 for the return air ticket. The objective is first, provide manpower; second, 
the flight is full of breads, food, mineral water, I think this mission is one of the 
best relief operation we delivered so far. 
On the other hand, when I asked Fakhrul Mansor, a strategic and operational officer from an 
assisting government agency, about his experience working with the military, he explained that 
the level of distrust and the different command systems distanced them from in-depth 
collaboration. His observation was:   
Military has their own system, command and control, strategy. We coordinate with 
them, we discussed with them on areas that are not covered. We tell them we will 
go to specific place, we report back our findings....just sharing information with 
military.  
Under the first-level focused code “varying attitude towards NADMA’s capabilities”, varying 
open codes such as approving, scepticism, organisational re-structuring and development were 
generated. Georgia, from an international NGO, welcomed and recognised the positive changes 
that happened in Malaysia’s disaster management institution, she contended: “positive 
[development] now is...they have been some changes made. The agency [NADMA] has been 
established directly under the Prime Minister Department. This is [a] positive step”. On the 
other hand, Lim Chiang Hock from a major local NGO, provided an example and elaborated 
that his organisation welcomed collaboration with local government agencies. He was 
convinced that it was the right move because it would make his organisation’s field work easier 
especially when the request came from government officials for “they will assign officers to 
facilitate our work”. Zamrud Mederka, from another major local NGO, observed that though 
some forms of collaboration between her organisation and government existed she was 
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reserved about further in-depth collaboration because she believed current policy lacked 
enforcement. She also lacked confidence in the government agencies’ long term commitment. 
Conversely, Sivaragam Jaya, a strategic participant from a major local NGO, was sceptical 
about NADMA’s operational capability to deliver quick, coordinated, effective relief 
management. According to Jaya, “same thing will repeat. There is no change”. The attitude 
towards NADMA varied widely, ranging from welcoming, through reserved to sceptical. 
On the other hand, Benedict, an experienced strategic officer from a UN agency, argued that 
cultural differences and a sense of distrust in anything foreign could have contributed to the 
gaps for NADMA to strengthen its overall performance within national disaster management. 
Benedict observed: 
…should not be regarded as a shame to accept international assistance. It should 
be a little bit more managed. Well, the government may know exactly the 
requirements, some of the requirements are unable to fulfil. This gap can be filled 
by external organisations. Without feeling it is a shame. There is a nationalist 
behaviour or attitude, that we can do it, we don’t need any external support. But in 
reality, specific support are required. 
This explains how the second-level focused code of ‘level of trust among actors’ was derived 
from the three first-level focused codes of “observing cultural differences and sensitivities in 
disaster relief operation”, “accomplishing mission despite challenges”, and “varying attitudes 
toward NADMA’s capabilities”. 
 Unclear organisational roles and legitimacy 
This second-level focused code is a result of the integration of the three first-level focused 
codes “setting up a new nodal national agency”, “understanding actors’ background in disaster 
management”, and “reviewing organisational roles and attitudes in disaster management”. I 
began by examining the first-level focused code “setting up a new nodal national agency”. The 
participants showed mixed interpretations ranging from a rather straight-forward observation 
(e.g., welcoming, reserved) to a more strategic and operational mode (e.g., proactive approach 
in planning and anticipating, adaptive capacity). Not entirely taken by surprise, NADMA, the 
national focal point of disaster management, is not clear about its role after one year’s 
operation. Zain Ahmad, a strategic officer from NADMA, expressed his concern as follows: 
…[We have to] to come up quickly, policy and standard operating procedures, so 
we can have a clear path and understand what NADMA's role, and where it is 
leading to. This should be the first priority... After one year, [in NADMA], I am 
worried. After one year, we still like not having clarity of role. 
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When NADMA’s organisational priorities and roles are not clearly known to external 
stakeholders, these partners are confused about the objectives, means and benefits of 
collaborating with this central agency. For that, Zain Ahmad responded that the establishment 
of NADMA was a quick win although NADMA is still short of competent officers to 
implement its strategic and operational mandate. Ahmad’s view is: 
We [NADMA] already has the institutional aspect, only how to further strengthen 
NADMA as a national focal agency. We need people, leaders to move forward.  
When analysing open codes for the first-level focused code of “understanding actors’ 
background in disaster management”, I was aware that some participants regarded their current 
roles in disaster management as an evangelistic mission whereas, for others, it was merely a 
job. An example of a high-spirited participant can be seen in Aminah Ishak’s personal 
experience. Ishak left her previous job in an NGO and was now a UN officer. She recalled her 
experience as follows: 
I was their first volunteer. My no is 0001. … I am keen to go to Gaza. So when my 
organisation offered the opportunity, I went [to Gaza] in 2007. I was at Syria 
border because 2007-2009 there were war….  I stranded, I spoke to someone, they 
told me they are almost 1.7 mil Palestinian living in Syria. Ok, I joined you to 
Syria's Damascus. 
Conversely, Che Singh, a senior state-based strategic and operations officer from another 
assisting government agency, demonstrated a business-as-usual tone when asked about his 
disaster management experience: “We just do our duty, and work, that's all.…The natural 
disaster, we can't do anything. It's act of God. That's why we just try to educate the general 
public”.  
Some participants recollected their experiences in previous disaster response missions more 
delicately. If I had not been interviewing the participants, these important observations could 
have been unnoticed. For instance, Aminah Ishak, from a UN agency, elaborated on the 
importance to distinguish aid workers’ intentions in a disaster relief operation. Ishak asserted 
that: “in humanitarian, there are good people, but also they are people make use of 
humanitarian for their own benefit. That was my first lesson”. Stefano Jean-Pierre, an 
experienced disaster administrator from an international NGO, observed that varied levels of 
accountability exist among participating organisations in a disaster relief operation that made 
it difficult to forge collaboration in emergencies. Jean-Pierre observed: 
…because everyone have different level of accountability. When we are dealing 
with UN and international organisations, we have to understand, no one is 
accountable to the UN [actually]. It is purely a coordination mechanism.  
91 
 
Similarly, Sivaragam Jaya, a leader from a major local NGO, implied that local NGOs were 
generally interested in cooperating with government agencies in disaster responses. However, 
this could be driven by the potential benefit of using public resources and not to complement 
each other’s strengths in disaster relief. Sivaragam argued: 
the government [agencies] have ...bringing in their resources. We have to play the 
game along with them [in using their resources]. Maintain neutrality is very 
importance for my organisation….We cannot go there. We have to manage from 
outside. In …disaster relief, you need passion. Passion is very very important. 
Under the first-level focused code “reviewing organisational roles and attitudes in disaster 
management”, I detected the view from NADMA’s Abdul Rahman that NADMA is yet to 
understand emerging partners’ intentions effectively and speedily in a disaster response. 
Rahman wanted to welcome these emerging partners, such as private sector companies and 
local NGOs, in future disaster relief operations but was yet to find a solution to coordinate their 
mobility effectively. Rahman said: 
External partners [both from the private sector or NGOs]...previously we have seen 
they are coming in but not coordinated. Sometimes, they just arrived there ...who 
are you, I don't know you are coming, those kind of things [happened]. We do 
receive them but not coordinated well. 
Nordin Kamal, a senior officer of another assisting government agency recalled with  
disheartened tones about his experience of performing multiple, disintegrated tasks during a 
previous flood response. His roles included coordinating the receipt and deployment of relief 
items, press releases, situation updates, social media management, and countering 
misinformation. Fakhrul Mansor, a strategic and operational officer from an assisting 
government agency, explained reflectively that sometimes he was confused about his 
organisational role. He observed: 
Malaysia is unique, every agency has respective speciality. ...I have better 
understanding on actual role of [my agency] after return from training organised 
by an ASEAN organisation, I try to talk to superior...may be one day we can do 
post-disaster damage assessment….[But] we are short of manpower to do post-
disaster need assessment (PDNA). Now we are multi-tasking, cannot focus [only] 
on PDNA and recovery.  
This explains how the three first-level focused codes of “setting up a new nodal national 
agency”, “understanding actors’ background in disaster management”, and “reviewing 
organisational roles and attitudes in disaster management” led to the establishment of the 






• Perceived satisfactory preparatory work
Examples:
• Positive and enabling factors in disaster 
response
• Asserting formal and coordinated 
approach
Open Codes First-level Focused Codes Second-level Focused Codes
Examples:
• Considering cultural norms and customs 
in disaster relief
• Adhering to organisational principles
• Sceptical attitude towards NADMA’s 
capabilities
• Expressing emotions by disaster 
actors
• Searching for a preferred 
leadership style in disaster 
response
• Preparing for disaster through 
varied actions
• Experiencing political influence 
in the process of responding to 
disaster
• Seeking optimum solutions in 
emergencies
• Observing differences and 
sensitivities in disaster relief 
operation
• Accomplishing mission despite 
challenges
• Varying attitudes toward 
NADMA’s capabilities
Attitudes to disaster leadership 
Tensions between central and state 
stakeholders




• Dedicated humanitarian specialist
• Addressing organisational ego
• Setting-up new nodal national 
agency
• Understanding actors’ background 
in disaster management
• Reviewing organisational roles and 
attitudes in disaster management








Figure 4-1: A summary of examples of the process to identify first-level and second-level 
focused codes from open codes 
Figure 4.1 summarises the process to identify the first- and second-level focused codes from 
the open codes. This summary is non-exhaustive since it presents only the first four of seven 
second-level focused codes discussed earlier. Beginning with open codes, supported with data 
analysis led to the discovery of the first- and second-level focused codes. See Table 4.2 for the 
detailed linkages between the open codes and first- and second-level focused codes.  
4.4. Chapter summary 
This chapter summarises the processes in organising the data and identifying codes through the 
first and second cycle of data coding. The first cycle produced numerous open codes but only 
100 open codes were selected as relevant and essential to research question: “What hinders 
cross-sector collaboration in disasters?” The second cycle coding produced 19 first-level 
focused codes. These codes in turn led to seven second-level focused codes. Throughout this 
process, the interview transcripts of participants were the major data sources complemented by 
government documents and reports, news feeds and observations of participants’ body 
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Chapter 5:  





We join spokes together in a wheel, but it is the centre hole that makes the wagon move. 
We shape clay into a pot, but it is the emptiness inside that holds whatever we want. 
We hammer wood for a house, but it is the inner space that makes it liveable. 
We work with being, but non-being is what we use. 
 
--- Daodejing (道德經), Chinese classic text, Laozhi (c.a. 6th century BC) 
Translated by Stephen Mitchell, 1988  
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter continues the data reduction from Chapter 4 which discussed how the salient first- 
and second-level focused codes were identified from the open codes. This chapter focuses on 
discussing the process of how the focused codes were reduced to three key themes. Chapter 6 
that follows discusses the study’s results. 
5.2. Identifying themes from focused codes 
Illustrated by participants’ comments, the following sections detail how the identified themes 
were developed from the various codes. The first theme: Perceived organisational status and 
hierarchy, results from the integration of two second-level focused codes: a) attitude to disaster 
leadership, and b) tensions between central and state stakeholders. Participants explained how 
the status of an organisation in a specific disaster environment may impact its credibility and 
competency in terms of leadership, mandate, planning and preparatory actions. The analysis 
showed that the first theme of organisational hierarchical structure is a barrier to collaboration 
between organisations.  
The second identified theme relates to organisational motivation to collaborate. This theme was 
identified after integrating two focused codes: a) levels of trust among actors; and b) unclear 
organisational roles and legitimacy. These two focused codes showed how actions (or 
inactions), cultural differences and sensitivities, levels of engagement and performance of 
actors and attitudes towards organisational ability were interpreted by other stakeholders while 
developing collaboration. Such perceptions affect individual and organisational motivation to 
collaborate. 
An organisation’s ability to collaborate was the third theme identified from three focused codes: 
a) attitude of managing stakeholder relationships; b) orientation on building organisational 
capacity; and c) learning from experience and the lessons learned. This analysis uncovered that 
stakeholders' relationship management, learning and building capacity influenced the 
structures and mechanisms needed to collaborate in disasters. Table 5.1 summarises the process 
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to identify the three major themes from the broad analysis of the first-level focused codes and, 
subsequently, the second-level focused codes.   
Table 5-1: Categorisation of the first- and second-level focused codes and themes  
First-Level Focused Code Second-Level Focused Code Themes 
Expressing emotions by disaster actors 
Attitude to disaster leadership 
Perceived 
organisational status 
and hierarchy  
Searching preferred leadership style in 
disaster response 
Preparing for disaster through varied 
actions 
Experiencing political influence in the 
process of responding to disaster Tensions between central and 
state stakeholders Seeking optimum solutions in 
emergencies 
Observing cultural differences and 
sensitivities in disaster relief  
Levels of trust among actors 
Different levels of 
motivation to 
collaborate 
Accomplishing mission despite 
challenges 
Varying attitudes toward NADMA’s 
capabilities 
Setting-up new nodal national agency 
Unclear organisational roles and 
legitimacy 
Understanding actors’ background in 
disaster management 
Reviewing organisational roles and 
attitudes in disaster management 
Interacting with multiple stakeholders 
during operation  
Attitude to manage stakeholder 
relationships 
Organisation lacks 
ability to collaborate 
Being aware of intra- and inter-
organisational relationship building 
Attempting of building relationships 
across different stakeholders 
Exploring preferences for collaboration 
among organisations 
Acknowledging multiple challenges in 
preparing for disasters Orientation on building 
organisational capacity 
Identifying collaboration partners 
Learning experience 
Learning from experience and 
lessons learned 






5.3. First theme: Perceived organisational status and hierarchy 
This section discusses how ‘perceived organisational status and hierarchy’ was identified as 
the first theme regarded as a key barrier to collaboration. This theme was derived by combining 
two focused codes: a) attitudes to disaster leadership; and b) tensions between central and state 
stakeholders.  
 Attitude to disaster leadership 
Conceptualisation of disaster leadership differed from one organisation to another. The 
emotional display of organisation members towards the official disaster response and the 
organisation’s approach in preparing for future disasters are likely indicators about how 
leadership is practised in a disaster. Traditional hierarchical government agencies generally 
preferred a “strong leadership” that they deemed necessary to administer, control and 
coordinate a disaster relief operation. Local major NGOs and the general public believe that a 
less hierarchical but engaging and collaborative approach is a more appropriate approach when 
dealing with a disaster. Public managers from NADMA and other assisting government 
agencies oscillated through a disaster response between leadership styles. At times these public 
managers applied the command and control model of leadership (e.g., NADMA towards aid 
recipients and NGOs) and, under other circumstances, a collaborative leadership was preferred 
(e.g., NADMA towards ASEAN organisations and UN agencies). However, command and 
control leadership was always the more preferred style in responding to a disaster. For instance, 
strategic participants from NADMA, ASEAN organisations and UN agencies felt that “strong 
leadership” was critical for an effective disaster relief response. In their view, “strong 
leadership” was synonymous with a command and control hierarchical, centralised leadership. 
However, operational members of other government agencies, major local NGOs and disaster 
aid recipients, preferred a consultative, collaborative leadership style to resolve complex, 
public problems in the immediate disaster aftermath.  
Participants had varying perceptions of public managers’ ability to prepare for a disaster from 
the perspective of internal (e.g., alignment of organisational strategy and structure) and external 
fit (e.g., alignment of organisational strategy and changing environment). International NGOs 
and ASEAN organisations viewed a public manager as a legitimate, powerful, indispensable 
entity in emergency collaboration, whereas major local NGOs viewed a public manager as an 
alternative partner who was difficult to deal with. When asked for his opinion on effective 
disaster leadership, NADMA’s disaster strategic administrator, Abdul Rahman, did not provide 
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a direct answer; he portrayed leadership as demonstrated by his superior in disaster 
management as follows:  
…very operational, …always on the ground, …know what is happening, [and 
capable of]...directing. [And] the advantage is, under him, you have Civil Defence 
[Force] under him, NADMA under him. …this is our sister or strategic partner 
at the state level.… whatever decision [made] at the central committee, 
[NADMA] will instruct and guide the secretariat at the state and district [levels]. 
Benedict, a senior official from the UN agency, highlighted that the leadership demonstrated 
by NADMA as the nodal disaster management agency could be strengthened. Benedict 
perceived that “strong leadership” is crucial for an effective, well-coordinated disaster 
response. This perception arose from his years of following the development of Malaysia’s 
disaster management protocols and mechanisms. Benedict believes that Malaysia has a bright 
future as the regional leader of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief but not without 
“strong leadership” and a strong political will. Nonetheless, Benedict also asserted that to 
achieve this goal, responsible public agencies should avoid “working in silo” but it is not clear 
how “stronger leadership” may promote the intended collaboration. Benedict’s views are as 
follows:  
…[responsible national disaster management organisation] needs to expand its 
capacities [through] stronger leadership. …understanding of different roles, not 
to work in silo, …and a change of mindset that focal points have to seek approval 
from their respective bosses [for every single decision], [and risk] time was 
wasted to mobilise resources. 
In part, Benedict’s view was echoed by Sofyan Febrita from an ASEAN organisation. He 
claimed that a practical leadership style was effective for a disaster response. He emphasised 
that moral and legal authority were the two key features of an effective leader who made crucial 
decisions and judgements. He contended that: 
…when [a leader with moral authority] talks, people listen, people will follow 
him…. disaster is not a normal [situation], the laws should be strong, less 
specialist, don't make it as a normal law, …. The clarity of disaster laws is 
important because only the law will provide leadership in crisis management. If 
the law doesn't highlight authority to coordinate, no agencies will follow.…A 
leader, coordinator will need to decide. I also believe, as a leader, coordinator, 
you need to know the finish line. The process is something you can do by judgement, 
practice ...leader will decide, we need to go [t]here. That's the authority and right 
of responsibility of a leader as a person, or on behalf of [an] organisation to decide 
where we want to go. Democratic leader, if unable to reach finish line, that's not 
effective. Authoritarian leader, [though] painful but if it brings to finish line, it is 
effective. 
On the other hand, a strategic official, Stefano Jean-Pierre, from an international NGO, and 
NADMA’s officials with operational backgrounds, such as Fahruddin Iskandar and Safiya 
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Mahmod, shared the view that leaders need a stable temperament, positive attitude and mindset, 
and flexible attributes critical to develop cross-sector collaboration in emergencies. For 
instance, Iskandar’s experience at a military base working under a General who practised a 
command and control style in overseeing logistic arrangements epitomised the importance of 
these attributes. At times, the General commanded that as soon as relief items were in the 
military camp, civilian officials, including Iskandar from NADMA, had no right to claim them 
except with his approval. Iskandar was under pressure while serving under that authoritative 
leadership at military camp. He recollected that: 
It was quite tough of experience for me to work under the direction of a General. 
Sometimes, there are a little bit pushy,...Because of the setting also, I cannot say, 
speak a lots, there are differences when working in the military environment.  
Unlike NADMA’s participants with a strategic background, operation-driven participants from 
other assisting government agencies tended to prefer a collaborative leadership style. Yusri 
Salahuddin emphasised flexible, empathetic leadership in mobilising resources because he: 
“does not want [his] people to be stressed”. Fakhrul Mansor argued that that the existing law 
empowered him to execute his duty in search and rescue and even use public assets in an 
emergency. However, he would prefer: “to collaborate and coordinate with others, so [he is] 
able to harmonise mechanism to run the rescue”. Zain Ahmad, NADMA’s senior disaster 
administrator, agreed with the operational participants from other assisting government 
agencies on the importance of working together with other disaster actors. Ahmad’s 
observation was: “to facilitate and coordinate [in an official disaster response operation]. I 
cannot operate [alone]…We should be able to carry ourselves. That's why to me, the working 
together is very important”. 
Contrary to public managers with a strategic background, the major local NGOs ‘on the 
ground’ suggested a proactive, engaging leadership style was more effective approach when 
interacting with disaster aid recipients. For instance, Pak Kok recalled how he encountered a 
family of five sitting in front of the remnants of their house with no idea of their next move. 
Pak Kok incentivised them to clear their house debris and paid them relief cash. This 
unconventional approach was not only effective in interacting with locals but also helped build 
trust quickly between his organisation and the disaster aid recipients. Instead of directives from 
above, disaster aid recipients prefer the consultative, engaging approach. They claim that orders 
from above were easily manipulated, were inefficient and failed to serve the best interests of 
disaster-affected communities. Two disaster aid recipients gave evidence as follows: 
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The village head will decide who will entitled for housing support from the central 
government. Some villagers did not get anything. I did not get anything [from the 
central government]. Not even 5 cents from the central government. It is all up to 
the village head to decide….We are also human. How can we left out. Regardless 
how we voice out, still receive nothing. In the meeting, I also asked why the relief 
funds not released [to me], my other relatives did receive, but I receive no answer 
(Harumi Mohammad, aid recipient).  
 
I did not receive other assistance except this temporary house. My rented house 
though was inundated but it is not destroyed or collapsed. They [authority] said 
you can only apply for further assistance if your house was collapsed or destroyed 
in the flood. So, we did not qualify [to apply]. Haha...it's all about the policy (Megat 
Rabu, aid recipient).  
 Tensions between central and state stakeholders  
Research participants from central government had different perceptions from those at the state 
level on what were the most critical tasks to perform or the optimum measures in responding 
to a disaster in a state. The variation of priorities and actions taken by higher-level authority 
units (e.g., represented by NADMA) to lower-level authority units (e.g., represented by a state 
government or district offices) is a barrier to collaboration between them.  
NADMA officials are all based at national headquarters without a presence at state or district 
levels. Safiya Mahmod, an experienced operational official based at NADMA headquarters, 
emphasised that one of her major roles is to: “make sure all [responding] agencies react 
according to National Security Council Directive no. 20”8. However, Mahmod’s view only 
reflected the understanding of the operational officials from the central agency; her colleagues 
at the state level did not share her view. Her superior, Abdul Rahman, iterated that NADMA is 
ultimately in-charge of disaster management in the whole country. He claimed that NADMA 
is: “sitting in the driver’s seat…and at the central level, the secretariat is still with 
NADMA…and will instruct and guide the secretariat at the state and districts”. These 
statements imply that by upholding the existing standard operating procedures, NADMA 
intends to legitimise itself as the sponsor, champion, facilitator and convener of national 
disaster management as mandated.  
Conversely, state-based officials did not always agree that compliance to standard operating 
procedures was paramount in disaster responses. Instead, according to a state-based operational 
                                              
8 The National Security Council Directive No. 20 is the “Policy and Mechanism on National Disaster Relief and 
Management” (CFE, 2016, p. 12), the backbone of series of guidelines created since 1971 (revised in March 
2012) indicating the responsibilities and coordination of multiple agencies at central, state and district levels in 
times of disasters particularly floods (Majlis Keselamatan Negara (Malaysia National Security Council), 2019). 
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staff member, Syed Anwar, the top priority of state government is to remain in control of a 
local disaster situation rather than be compliant to standard operating procedures per se. 
Anwar’s observation is: 
…when you worked with state government, personal relationship is quite important 
because as a Federal government official, and you are trying to...on behalf of the 
federal government, sometimes, state government wanted to be in control in certain 
things. But on current procedures, federal government is in-charge of disaster 
management but state government want to control it.  
UN agencies are consistent in their view of the importance of “strong leadership” in disaster 
response strategic planning and decision making. However, they seemed to move away from 
compliance to command from a higher-unit of authority when operating in disasters. In this 
circumstance, UN agencies shared the opinion of state-based assisting government agencies 
officers and queried the purpose of standard operating procedure compliance in disasters. For 
instance, Benedict, a senior UN official with a strategic background, argued that a coordinated 
and coherent disaster response is measured by the speed of mobilising resources, common 
situation awareness among actors, and the flexibility to design a practical action plan. 
Benedict’s observation is:  
The role of NADMA is not to hide behind the National Security Council Directive 
No 20, which is a very nice directive on the paper. But when there is a disaster, 
nobody … care about the directive. But care about how fast one mobilise the 
response....coordinate the response, need people to understand the directive, and 
translate directive into operational action. 
The state government has a different perception from a central organisation like NADMA in 
terms of control, coordination and compliance with standard operating procedures. District-
based agencies or authorities project a different perspective from NADMA in terms of human 
resource competency and organisational priorities. A district is a second-level administrative 
regime below the state level in Malaysia. States in East Malaysia (i.e., Sarawak and Sabah) 
name a district as a division though in other states it is referred to as a district. A district officer 
is the administrative head of a district. Both operational and strategic participants from 
NADMA admitted that they count on district officers to chair and lead the district level disaster 
management committee as outlined in the national disaster management plan. However, Abdul 
Rahman, a senior administrator from NADMA, expressed concern that district officers may 
not have relevant disaster management experience and training; their priority is community 
development rather than disaster management. The rigidity of the current bureaucratic structure 
and procedures left little room for NADMA to make the necessary adjustment when dealing 
with disasters in local communities as the following evidence demonstrates:  
102 
 
[referring to district officers] their main concern is about development, security 
issues. But come to disaster [management], it is something ...an entirely new 
discipline that they have to understand well. … there are guidelines and standard 
operating procedures. But how it has been practised, are not well translated, I 
believed. Basically some of those key people are not very well versed [with the 
standard operating procedures]. When people get promoted [to the current 
position], they have never done this things before. At district [level], [managing 
disaster management] is not top priority to the officers at district level (Abdul 
Rahman, NADMA) 
Participants acknowledged the challenges of balancing the relationships between central and 
state governments as well as the district level. NADMA acknowledged the importance of 
maintaining good working relationships with its collaborating partners from different 
administrative levels to ensure a well-coordinated response within the national disaster 
management plan. NADMA’s strategic participant, Abdul Rahman, asserted the importance of 
controlling through an authoritative order that:  
…now people know that there is a central agency looking at disaster management, 
who they [can] refer to for to give guidance and facilitate, to face than...in the 
ground. The issue is...if they are not managed, if they were just to jump there, it 
will be a problem to the management on the ground. Then the issue is they will not 
getting the cooperation as they expected. …and in the process is not being handled, 
manage them, will be another burden to the already constraint ....mechanism down 
there. … so we will instruct our officials to liaise with these people, to receive 
them…and to actually discuss… (Abdul Rahman, NADMA). 
In addition to the differences in administrative and operational priorities and limited flexibility 
in mobilising appropriate personnel to respond to disasters, the political factor also contributed 
to the tensions between central and state stakeholders. Nik Sidek, a school teacher at a 
government school and an aid recipient, ruminated on his experience of accepting a donation 
from an opposition party leader to rebuild his school’s damaged computer laboratory. He 
argued that: “till today, my salary was not adjusted because I have been labelled negatively. 
For being a civil servant, I have brought the opposition party into school”. Public managers 
from NADMA contended that they played unexpected middlemen’s role when performing 
official relief operations in states administered by a government of a different party from 
central government. The state government informed these public managers what kind of 
assistance they needed and the public managers were expected to pass on the request to the 
central government without formal or regular meetings between the state and central 
government representatives. 
The delegation of directives on how a local flood relief operation is to be conducted is 
complicated. The directive comes from the central NADMA to state and district levels; the 
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tasks were performed by varying agencies and personnel at different administration levels. 
Fahruddin Iskandar, an operational official from NADMA, observed:  
…the decision was made by the chairman of the disaster management committee 
at the federal [central government] level, [but] the Civil Defence Force is 
responsible at the state; and the Secretary of the State [is responsible at state] and 
the district level. So, for the [immediate] emergency response, it is [not NADMA’s 
responsibility but] the Civil Defence Force.  
Notwithstanding the tensions between central and state stakeholders, there were areas where 
both groups of officials had similar views. For instance, Syed Anwar, a state-based operational 
staff member, agreed with Fahruddin Iskandar, an operational staff member based at the central 
level, on the importance of strengthening training in coordination among local (districts), state 
and central governments, and they were determined to enhance overall capacity through 
learning from ‘best practice’ in the region.  
The delineation of varying attitudes to disaster leadership and the contest and conflict between 
organisations as experienced by participants, led to an assemblage of a more prevalent theme 
of organisational status and hierarchy. Understanding the intricacies of the inflexibility of 
organisations and individuals to a leadership model of his or her choice and balancing 
individual organisational and collective goals in responding to a disaster within a traditional 
hierarchical structure is crucial to fostering multi-stakeholder collaboration in disasters. 
5.4. Second theme: Different levels of motivation to collaborate  
Before presenting the second theme on how different motivation levels impact cross-sector 
collaboration in disasters, this section first discusses the varying perceptions among the 
stakeholders. These perceptions can be categorised as positive, neutral and negative. A positive 
perception happened between stakeholders when both organisations were enthusiastic, inter-
dependent and have the confidence to collaborate in a joint activity for their mutual benefit. An 
example of a neutral perception was when two organisations were lukewarm to collaboration. 
An example of a negative perception was when two organisations attempted to avoid 
collaborating with each other unless required by law or in emergencies to do so; otherwise they 
acted separately. Myopia, unfamiliarity, previous interaction experience and organisations’ 




Table 5-2: The perceptions of partners on cross-sector collaboration  
Positive Neutral Negative 
Example: NADMA and 
ASEAN organisations have a 
positive collaborative 
arrangement supported by 
agreements and official 
mandates9.  
 
NADMA is positively engaged 
with ASEAN organisations in 
multiple ways. For instance, 
NADMA is committed to 
arrange staff from disaster 
management agencies to 
attend training organised by 
ASEAN organisations. Also, it 
actively participates in 
regional initiatives as a 
responsible member, and is 
keen to learn best practice 
through ASEAN. 
 
ASEAN organisations are 
committed to work closely with 
NADMA to maintain the 
legally-binding relationship 
and acknowledge NADMA’s 
position as a champion of 
national and regional disaster 
management. 
Example: Though NADMA 
and other assisting government 
agencies in disaster 
management have a strong 
dependent relationship 
between them, in practice, they 
have a neutral collaborative 
arrangement.  
 
NADMA is new and lacks 
resources. Its capability and 
leadership are yet to be fully 
tested in disaster management.  
 
Other assisting government 
agencies are more established 
and resource-rich. They see 
themselves as equal peer 
agencies with NADMA though 
they receive directives from 
NADMA in emergencies. 
Often, NADMA counts on 
other assisting government 
agencies for coordination, 
information and resource 
mobilisation. NADMA remains 
diplomatic, neutral in action 
with its peer agencies. 
Example: NADMA and 




NADMA does not see any urgent 
need to work with international 
NGOs. NADMA simply has 
many choices for partnerships. 
It is deemed sensitive and 
inappropriate for a national 
government agency to form a 
close relationship with a foreign 
entity such as an international 
NGO.   
 
International NGOs claim it is 
difficult to meet senior 
government decision makers 
and claim that public managers 
seem not interested in 
developing meaningful 
collaboration. Shallow 
relationships between NADMA 
and international NGOs were 
detected. Further, their 
relationships are boxed in by 
cultural differences. 
International NGOs struggle to 
build trust with NADMA. 
Table 5.2 summarises and highlights several examples of perception differences between key 
partners. Three examples of the varying perceptions between stakeholders are presented as 
illustrations although there are diversified perceptions among stakeholders. An example of a 
positive perception between stakeholders is the interaction between NADMA and ASEAN 
organisations. The entities have a positive collaborative arrangement supported by agreements 
and official mandates. Because of the positive perception between them, NADMA encourages 
its officials to attend capacity building programmes organised by ASEAN organisations and 
                                              
9 The Malaysian government signed the legally-binding ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and 







takes part in various regional initiatives. In return, the ASEAN organisations demonstrate their 
support for NADMA through sharing information, technical expertise and best practice.    
An example of neutral perception is between NADMA and the other assisting government 
agencies in disaster management. They have a neutral collaborative arrangement because both 
parties have relevant authorities, specialities and resources, and opt to first operate within their 
respective machinery unless emergency collaboration with other organisations arises. To some 
extent, these assisting government agencies have more resources than NADMA, at least during 
its inception phase, and do not see the need to work together with a relatively new central 
organisation. In practice, central directives will always come from NADMA to these assisting 
government agencies for further coordination and action, particularly at state and district levels, 
which explains why any joint activity between them is a result of cooperation and competition 
and a balance in power distance.  
An example of negative perception involving stakeholders in disaster management is 
demonstrated by the interaction between NADMA and international NGOs. NADMA, as a 
nodal national agency, has many options in choosing its preferred partners and international 
NGOs that approached NADMA were only some of many intended partners. Except with 
consent from top government officials, NADMA is unlikely to forge closer cooperation with 
foreign entities, such as an international NGOs, to avoid being regarded as insensitive to 
national civil service tradition. Differences in organisation values and culture, a mismatch of 
priorities and timing for cooperation, may have reduced collaboration between NADMA and 
international NGOs. The negative collaborative arrangement, often seen as potential 
collaboration, was stopped, which resulted in it either being aborted or stalled.  
Understanding the dynamics of the varying degrees of perception between organisations as a 
result of their respective positions and functioning is crucial to following the subsequent 
analysis in relation to motivation. Acknowledgement of the existence of these different 
perceptions between organisations helps understand the discussion of the second theme 
identified in the analysis: different levels of organisational motivation to collaborate can hinder 
inter-organisational collaboration in a disaster. The following two propositions informed the 






 Levels of trust among actors 
A high degree of trust between collaborating partners is required for effective collaboration. 
Conversely, a low degree of trust between them will discourage joint efforts from taking place. 
However, trust is difficult to build in a short period and a disaster response is time-sensitive 
and a state of uncertainty. In the absence of a trustworthy relationship, mutual positive 
expectations among collaborating partners are difficult to develop although positive 
expectations are imperative to achieve intended common results. If circumstances allow, a 
convener will collaborate only with a partner they trust. Without mutual trust, partners are 
unmotivated to collaborate and, instead, try to resolve challenges in disaster management alone 
or they look for another partner.  
Different levels of trust were evident between NADMA and its collaborating partners. 
NADMA and other government agencies have relatively higher trust towards ASEAN 
organisations but barely trust international NGOs. Stefano Jean-Pierre, a participant from an 
international NGO, admitted there were challenges to overcome in building trust with public 
managers. Georgia, Jean-Pierre’s co-worker, illustrated the level of trust between her 
organisation and the public managers as follows:  
I think this is probably the way to approach the Malaysia is quite different, it is a 
very relationship-base society. To perceive...foreigner or international 
organisations may be more difficult for us to engage, …but it has been a real 
struggle for us. For me, it is probably the most difficult country for me to work 
with. Overall, it is always a nice and good relationship when we meet with them, 
but when you are trying to move something forward a more strategic way that...I 
think we face obstacles. 
Public disaster managers did not reject the idea of forming working relationships with 
specialised UN agencies but these are limited to formal settings and, at times, are inconsistent. 
In general, public disaster managers were unlikely to be motivated to foster in-depth 
relationships with UN agencies because such intentions could be interpreted as aligning to 
foreign assistance; trust towards foreign entities is generally low within the traditional civil 
service system with its high respect for hierarchy. Benedict, from a UN agency, claimed that 
public managers “did not fully utilise the capacity that UN has [provided]… in Malaysia… [the 
working relationship is] not in a proper or organised way. Just go by the wind”. Conversely, 
NADMA, and some of its affiliated government agencies, have fostered a higher trust level 
with ASEAN organisations. NADMA’s Abdul Rahman acknowledged his organisation’s close 
collaboration with ASEAN organisations was attributed to the existing legal agreement 
between Malaysia and ASEAN. NADMA does not regard ASEAN organisations as foreign 
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entities because NADMA’s officials are represented in every decision making on regional 
cooperation. In return, ASEAN brought new perspectives in disaster management to Malaysia 
through NADMA. Rahman’s argument is: 
We are looking at putting a standard, tie it with the capacity of the region through 
the ASEAN organisation …at the ASEAN Summit, the commitment is One ASEAN 
One Response, how do we translate [into NADMA’s strengths]... learning [from 
ASEAN to] more than response. You talk about mitigation, capacity building, 
knowledge [management] and innovation, though it is not coming to ask ASEAN 
organisation to do this ...mitigation but it is about the knowledge. It is about the 
innovation that we can gather. So, we are basically looking at the ASEAN level, we 
are at par and keep abreast, we adjust, able to come in responding in the region as 
one.  
Participants with an operational background appreciated the wide range of disaster 
management training ASEAN organisations provided to them and were committed to advance 
a legally-binding relationship. Iskandar, an operational official from NADMA, described the 
high level of trust between public managers and ASEAN organisations as follows: 
…when something a happened, let's say a major earthquake happened in Sabah 
one day, we might need assistance from ASEAN friends. …It is best for us to know 
how they work. … When we work together with other organisation, we are exposed 
to their mechanism. There are some opportunities for our officials to go working 
or training with them. So, we are learning new things. ….ASEAN organisation is 
especially because we are the focal point, and we are a new agency, so we need to 
engage with ASEAN organisation because most of the staff here is new staff. They 
do not know much about AHA Centre especially because that's our mechanism, 
that's legally-binding, and lots of engagement is also needed to be done with 
ASEAN organisation. 
In this study, expectations of reciprocal positive action did not always happen as anticipated. 
For instance, disaster aid-giving organisations, such as assisting government agencies, and aid 
recipients have a complex, varied trust relationship. In general, disaster aid recipients lacked 
trust in uniformed officers such as Police or NADMA despite their services being genuine as 
judged by public managers. This was common, especially when aid recipients were residents 
where the state government was not from the same party as central government. Disaster aid 
recipients expressed their scepticism towards government officials, regardless of them being 
from the state or central level. For instance, Noh Agus, a disaster aid recipient, stated that he 
did not trust the Police member who requested him to evacuate. Agus also stressed that he did 
not approve the authority’s requirement that applicants for government relief fund to rebuild a 
damaged house was applicable only to those whose spouse was not a foreigner10.   
                                              
10 Many locals have Thai wives because of the proximity of the Malaysia-Thailand border 
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Harumi Mohammad, another aid recipient, when asked if any government agency came to offer 
assistance while she was evacuated, responded “No one. …. We were left alone. We stand on 
our own feet”, and survived the first few days with her own limited food and water. In general, 
disaster aid recipients regard public managers as lacking empathy, incompetent and 
bureaucratic. Other flood aid recipients living in different villages provided detailed accounts 
of their experience dealing with public managers as follows:  
I complained to the Minister about the delay in providing assistance during the 
most difficult time, and have not heard of any solid plan for rebuilding the Manek 
Urai [town]. I told him I have received more assistance from NGOs rather than 
from the government (Noh Agus, aid recipient) 
The village head will decide who will entitle for housing support from the central 
government. Some villagers did not get anything. I did not get anything [from the 
central government]. Not even five cents from the central government. It is all up 
to the village head to decide. …I did not get much help. (Harumi Mohammad, aid 
recipient) 
Conversely, public managers, such as NADMA officials, claimed that aid recipients had 
attitudinal problems. The division between disaster aid givers and aid recipients widened and 
hindered the organisation of dialogue, joint activities and disaster awareness campaigns 
involving both parties. Public managers from NADMA and other assisting government 
agencies saw the people in need as self-pitying victims who failed to help themselves. When 
asked about his perception of rural disaster aid recipients, Fakhrul Mansor, a public manager 
from an assisting government agency, portrayed them as: ”stubborn because they said it [flood] 
is normal and [is an] annual event, like water festival". Safiya Mahmod, a senior operational 
official from NADMA echoed that:  
Victims are not grateful...their attitudes are that everything should be provided by 
the government. If we are late, or cannot meet their expectations, they will get 
angry and they will spread rumours throughout the media; the victims' attitude is 
the biggest challenge...  
Abdul Rahman, NADMA’s strategic official, stated that the take-it-for-granted mentality 
among aid recipients was the major obstacle preventing public agencies delivering a successful 
disaster response. Yusri Salahuddin, a participant with an operational background from other 
assisting government agency, agreed with Rahman’s view. He maintained:  
We are dealing with public who has zero knowledge about disaster, you try to 
convincing people to move from one place to other, they will not listen. When the 
water level raised till the roof top, they asked us to rescue them. That's 2014!  
Though the level of trust between public managers and disaster aid recipients was low, 
evidence suggests that there was a higher level of trust between disaster aid recipients and local 
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NGOs. Aid recipients such as Peter Gooi, Rabbiya Sulong and Megat Rabu, were grateful that 
they received timely relief support provided by the NGOs after days of waiting in vain for 
government aid. Local communities trusted the major local NGOs for their extensive 
interaction with them after the disaster response phase through continuous volunteer training. 
This training can “prepare themselves for future disaster, and help other kampungs” as 
Sivaragam Jaya, a strategic leader from a local NGO described it. Pak Kok, a participant with 
strategic background from another NGO, shared how his organisation gained trust by 
respecting local customs and was committed to rebuild the communities: 
So when we mobilised, those people who are well educated, non-educated, young 
and old, we told them to sit them along railway track, because there is no places 
as empty as railway tracks. …. Because before we start, we have to tell them what 
to do, things like that. They do their ‘doa’ [prayer]. There is an imam to help them 
to do the prayer in their own way... You can see the very well-built and educated 
people, why were they be there? They need help.  
The data show that NGOs, in general, were more keen than public agencies to build trust with 
other stakeholders. For instance, Sivaragam Jaya, from a major local NGO, reiterated that he 
and his organisation were committed to meeting the disaster-affected population frequently to 
build trust, and acknowledged that trust-building is a time-consuming, iterative, complicated 
human psychological process often intertwined with cultural differences as experienced by 
many participants.  
However, this study found that the levels of trust between NGOs were weak; this limitation 
restrains collaboration between them. Not only are organisational values and missions 
dissimilar, but local NGOs had no urgency to work with each other although operating on the 
same disaster field. For instance, Lim Chiang Hock, a participant from a major local NGO, 
claimed that “the idea of having two NGOs to work together for a similar task is difficult” 
because of a lack of trust. Pak Kok and Sivaragam Jaya, from local NGOs, concurred with 
Lim’s view. To some extent, even during the height of a disaster response, some NGOs 
mobilised in the disaster area did not intend to join hands with counterparts to reach out 
collectively to larger disaster-affected communities. At times, these NGOs competed with each 
other for influence and the extent of aid distribution. In addition to a lack of trust, differences 
in organisational values and objectives, specialities, resources and experience as well as 
concern about losing control and discretion, distanced NGOs from collaborating with each 
other. Participants from major local NGOs admitted the challenges of collaboration between 
them. Pak Kok, a strategic leader from a major local NGO, summarised such challenges: 
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…so far we have not tried to collaborate with any organisations. We don't feel 
the need in the sense....we are on the ground to see what is happening, what is to 
be done...who is going to do what, so we never thought about trying to mobilise 
or collaborate with other NGOs. I never thought of collaboration with any parties 
because...shouldn't be a problem to collaborate with them [other NGOs] as long 
as they agree with what we are going to do. 
Notwithstanding the varying levels of trust among NADMA and its collaborating partners and 
the people affected by the floods, all participants agreed that mutual trust is a crucial component 
to developing collaboration. Nonetheless, building trust is time-consuming and positive results 
are not guaranteed. Varying levels of trust of unmotivated stakeholders to collaborate more 
closely hinder inter-organisational collaboration in a disaster. 
 Unclear organisational role and legitimacy 
Of the 30 participants, 80% (n=24) welcomed the official inception and operationalisation of 
NADMA. However, NADMA’s internal partners (i.e., stakeholders at the same jurisdiction 
level) and external partners (i.e., stakeholders across central and state levels, regional and 
international organisations) were unclear about its legitimate authority, organisational role and 
technical capabilities. When these uncertainties were combined, collaboration and mutually 
agreed collective action were affected. The major challenge for NADMA as the central 
coordinating agency is its limitations in exerting its authority clearly and effectively. In 
addition, because NADMA has not yet proven its worth in action, it has a lack of credibility 
among its peers. NADMA competes for resources with other government agencies and 
struggles to gain trust from top government officials. ASEAN organisations and international 
NGOs argue that a more comprehensive legal framework is needed to make NADMA an 
effective central coordinating agency. Advice from a senior participant from an ASEAN 
organisation encapsulated the essence of organisational legitimacy in effective disaster 
management as follows: 
...disaster is not normal, the laws should be strong, less specialist, don't make it 
as a normal law, laws should reflect the crisis management in-depth. Please state 
in the law, the authority, who play what. The clarity of disaster laws is important 
because only the law will provide leadership in crisis management (Daniel 
Rasyid, ASEAN regional organisation) 
International NGOs argue that NADMA needs a comprehensive legal framework such as the 
disaster management laws that have been ratified in Indonesia and the Philippines. Sidek 
Ismail, a participant from a major local NGO, said his organisation had been: “appointed 
formally by NADMA to be the lead coordinator among NGOs in times of disaster. … For that 
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reason, we are honoured… [but] there is something that we need to do”. However, Ismail’s 
senior colleague, Sivaragam Jaya, has many questions about the actual empowerment and 
authority that his organisation is entitled to because: “there is no policy. No act, policy or 
directive. If I go to ask…, I coordinate you. They will ask who are you [to coordinate me]?” 
Georgia, a legal expert from an international NGO, asserted that NADMA is unable to 
“coordinate widely with other government agencies during the response” because of the lack 
of a comprehensive legal framework. As a result, the Malaysian government is unable to 
declare a state of emergency swiftly when a mega disaster strikes, which, in turn, impedes 
NADMA from accessing urgently needed resources as intended by its original design and 
objectives. Currently, only the constitution permits such an emergency declaration but not 
without lengthy executive and bureaucratic approval processes. A participant from an 
international NGO contended that: 
it is very important [to] have a clear process on how you declare emergency, how 
long emergency will be there for, also what other kind of [civil] rights will be 
suspended during an emergency… without those mechanism, [it is] very hard for 
those processes to kick in and [thus the existing procedure] becomes very ad hoc. 
We could see that Malaysia becomes quite ad hoc [nowadays]: personality driven 
rather than systematic response. (Georgia, international NGO) 
In response, NADMA argues that it aimed to learn from best practice and to collaborate with 
experienced international organisations to complement its strengths. NADMA’s Abdul 
Rahman, a strategic leader, asserted: “in making [its] legal framework and governance sector 
more robust…and filled the gap”. However, Georgia, from an international NGO, said it was 
incomprehensible to her why Malaysian public agencies were reluctant to accept her 
organisation’s advice despite it was internationally proven useful. Georgia lamented: 
…[public agencies] seem to really do not want to pick up advices from 
international organisations…it is probably been the most difficult country [and 
public agencies] for [me] to work with.  
In addition to lacking a comprehensive legal framework, understanding the priorities of 
NADMA’s planned resilience (actions taken before a disaster to enhance the probability of an 
effective disaster response) (S. Cutter et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2016; Kahan et al., 2009) was 
not clearly understood by partners. For example, partners were not convinced when NADMA 
emphasised compliance with existing standard operating procedures without first addressing 
the ground work of the disaster management legal framework. As a result, interested partners 
were discouraged from collaborating with NADMA. First, not all relevant agencies are familiar 
with the National Security Council Directive No. 20, including district officials who chair the 
disaster management committees. Second, not all public managers agree with NADMA about 
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the importance and urgency to comply with standard operating procedures. Participants from 
major local NGOs (e.g., Sivaragam Jaya) observed that such standard operating procedures are 
always ignored in a disaster response. Benedict, from a UN agency, agreed with that 
observation.  
Participants from international NGOs, operational staff of NADMA, and senior staff with both 
strategic and operational backgrounds from other assisting government agencies, agree that the 
current National Security Council Directive No. 20 is not strong enough and is difficult to 
enforce and comply with. Participants from an international NGO expressed their concern 
clearly on the importance and urgency on fine-tuning the legal framework and not complying 
with existing standard operating procedures because the framework is crucial for effective 
organisational coordination across different jurisdictions and to strengthen accountability. 
Georgia and her superior, Stefano Jean-Pierre, from an international NGO argue: 
unified framework [that] can affect the implementation of standard operating 
procedures, enable [authority] to coordinate more widely with other government 
agencies during the response …national coordination was generally poor 
horizontally and vertically, also with other stakeholders outside of the government 
(Georgia, international NGO)  
…coordination requires accountability … and [the necessity of] making decision 
based on clear criteria and needs (Stefano Jean-Pierre, international NGO). 
NADMA, as the national disaster management leader, can strengthen its legitimacy only with 
the development of a comprehensive disaster management framework. Because of the lack of 
an essential disaster management framework and disoriented positioning and enforcement of 
existing standard operating procedures, participants (particularly major local NGOs) are 
confused and unmotivated to collaborate with public managers during disasters.  
In general, participants were largely unclear about the authority of the newly established 
NADMA. Even though a legal mandate is in place, NADMA is unable to exercise its authority 
or power effectively because of internal restraining forces (i.e., on-going internal restructuring 
of the organisation and the national disaster response mechanism; key personnel are yet to be 
employed or to become familiar with new roles). Adding to the confusion in exercising power 
are overlapping organisational responsibilities, missions and resources. For example, 
government agencies do not have a clear demarcation of duties about who should do what in 
administering flood evacuation centres and how disaster information should be collected, 
verified, and disseminated. No doubt, in its establishment, NADMA was given an official 
mandate as the central coordinating agency but having official status does not automatically 
allow NADMA to exercise its authority effectively. As a fledgling organisation, NADMA faces 
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several limitations: lack of financial resources and experienced manpower (at least during the 
initial stage), and has yet to establish close working relationships with other agencies (the 
capability of a public agency to work in harmony with its peers is a tradition of Malaysia’s civil 
service). This has obstructed NADMA from exercising its authority.  
Two senior NADMA employees explained how the “liability of newness” (Bruderl & 
Schussler, 1990; Hager, Galaskiewicz, & Larson, 2004) has limited NADMA’s ability to 
exercise its power effectively:  
…With the formation of NADMA, we have to move out from the National Security 
Council framework. So we need a [new] legal framework as our source of 
authority. (Abdul Rahman, NADMA) 
when we start … the first year in operation, we do not have money…sometimes, 
state government wants to be in control in certain things. Based on current 
procedures, federal government is in-charge of disaster management but state 
government wants to control it. So we have to seem 'dancing' [between federal 
and state governments in balancing this power-seeking relationships]. …NADMA 
aims to bridge some of the gaps in other provisions that relates to disaster 
management that is deposited with[in] the various responding agencies. (Zain 
Ahmad, NADMA) 
The ambiguous organisational role compounded by the lack of a comprehensive legal 
framework and an over-emphasis on standard operating procedures compliance are obstacles 
to developing inter-organisational collaboration in a disaster. This is compounded when some 
potential collaborators perceive their role as more important than others. When asked about his 
organisation’s role in disaster management, Fakhrul Mansor, a senior member of an assisting 
government agency with an operational background, explained that his organisation’s service 
is increasingly needed in national disaster management. He observed that his organisation plays 
multiple roles including administrative secretariat, training provider, evacuation centre 
manager, search and rescue services provider, disaster awareness programme advocate, and 
simulation exercise designer, among others. Mansor argues that the trend of too many 
organisations performing similar tasks is an alarming phenomenon. He observed: 
…now in Malaysia, everybody do the rescue [operation]...Civil Defence, Bomba 
[Fire and Rescue Department], Police, SMART...[and] it's difficult to integrate or 
communicate our system to that of international system.  
Similarly, Nordin Kamal, from another assisting government agency, shared his views about 
how he performed multiple roles at the National Disaster Command Centre during the 2014 
Kelantan flood. He recalled how he communicated with the media, made logistical 
arrangements, drafted reports, facilitated international aid receipt, updated the latest 
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information and situation reports to stakeholders and leaders, and countered any 
misinformation appearing in the media.  
Zain Ahmad, a senior NADMA official, acknowledged that, after establishment, it is important 
for NADMA to have a clear role otherwise its credibility will be adversely affected. Ahmad 
warned that failing to outline NADMA’s role clearly will “affect the credibility of NADMA. 
This is the challenge during [NADMA’s] formative stage”. Ahmad’s argument is:  
[NADMA needs] to come up quickly, policy and standard operating procedures, 
so we can have a clear path and understand what NADMA's role, and where it is 
leading to. This should be the first priority... after one year, we still like not having 
clarity of role.  
Collaborative partners are concerned that the direction and intended results of a new 
collaborative way might not be in concert with the respective organisations' values and culture. 
For example, some organisations regarded disaster relief as their most important mission; 
others wished to offer a holistic, comprehensive approach to building community resilience 
against disasters. According to Fakhrul Mansor, a senior participant with both strategic and 
operational experience from another assisting government agency, his daily routine was more 
inclined to prepare for a disaster response in terms of training, organising simulation  exercises, 
strengthening search and rescue capacity, and coordinating a secretariat. Stefano Jean-Pierre, 
from an international NGO, asserted that his organisation emphasised a holistic approach 
covering all phases of disaster management: preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery, 
when offering assistance to disaster-affected communities. Under such circumstances, even if 
both organisations maintain good relationships, they may not be motivated for closer 
collaboration because of dissimilar organisation objectives. Jean-Pierre’s argument is: 
…for us, emergency response is a component of our full package of support that 
we give to the affected community. We want to increase the level of resilience…  
Notwithstanding the lack of common objectives or diverse inter-organisational relationships, 
public managers and their partners intend to remain relevant in disaster management. 
Sofyan Febrita from an ASEAN organisation, argued that, in the face of a disaster, upholding 
certain standards or international humanitarian principles (i.e., humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality and independence) (IFRC, 2015; OCHA, 2012) was meaningless. Febrita was firm 
with his opinion. His argument is: 
 …is it OK to let more people die as long as we apply international principles, [or] 
as long as it is civilian led?  
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Febrita’s colleague, Jerry Ahmad, maintains that, at times, his deployment to Malaysia after 
the flood was not necessarily to save lives or protect property but for a show of good will and 
solidarity. His argument was:  
…more of... offering our support as… an expression of solidarity among ASEAN. 
It is more for the AHA Centre than … facilitating and showing to the affected state 
of the solidarity ...gesture from all other ASEAN Member States. 
The lack of a comprehensive legal framework, a consensus on standard operating procedures 
and unclear organisational roles leave partners unmotivated to coordinate and collaborate 
during normal times and more so in emergencies such as post-disaster relief operations.  
5.5. Third theme: Organisation lacks of ability to collaborate in disasters 
The lack of organisational ability to collaborate in disasters is the third barrier that can obstruct 
the development of inter-organisational collaboration in a disaster. Three factors contribute to 
the inability of an organisation to collaborate in disaster: a) difficulty in managing stakeholder 
relationships; b) an orientation on building organisational capacity; and c) inadequate learning 
from previous experiences.  
 Difficulty in managing stakeholder relationships 
Relationships play an important role in Malaysian public administration. These relationships 
refer not only to normal working relationships in a formal setting but also include informal 
associations with other agencies in a complicated, rich web of human interconnectedness. 
Failing to manage stakeholder relationships in the Malaysian context hinders organisations’ 
ability to collaborate with others in emergencies. Appendix 5A details the various relationships 
among disaster management stakeholders in Malaysia. 
Participants from NADMA and other assisting government agencies agree that maintaining 
good relationships at both organisational and individual levels was critical to accomplish 
organisational goals, deliver results and resolve complicated public problems too difficult for 
organisations acting alone. Zain Ahmad, an NADMA participant with a strategic background, 
summarised the importance of maintaining good relationships as he argued: “uniformed 
agencies are very hierarchical in structure...if you have good relationship with bosses, 80% of 
the job can be done”. Fahruddin Iskandar and Safiya Mahmod, operational staff from 
NADMA, agreed with their superior that maintaining amicable working relationships with 
sister agencies is vital in delivering a coherent disaster response. However, there is a gap to 
convert such positive attitude into practice. Mahmod envisioned the importance of a fraternal 
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relationship in stating:  
…needs to develop a good relationship between federal and state governments 
because district officials will listen to the state government [only]. If we did not 
have...a good relationship with state government, it will be a problem for us to give 
orders to the district office.  
Though positive relationships were deemed a prerequisite for collaboration, collaborating 
partners often found it difficult to develop good relationships with public managers. Time and 
trust are essential in building the good relationships that are crucial for collaboration as 
discussed above. In reality, public managers have limited time to build relationships for they 
are always on rotation or deployment, on-the-job training or further study, and their external 
partners may have a more diverse role than their counterparts in a particular government 
agency. Thus constant personnel turnover, re-deployment and a mismatch of organisation 
objectives and strategies complicate the process of building good relationships among 
collaborators. Participants from both major local and international NGOs shared these views. 
For instance, Stefano Jean-Pierre, from an international NGO, explained that his portfolio was 
much more diversified than most of his counterparts in the government: 
I have 12 officers that report directly to [my office], covering all 38 countries of 
Asia-Pacific. So, I ensure the compliance of accountability, direction that we want 
to achieve. I fulfil both in the development and also humanitarian side.  
The difficulty in reaching the ‘right person’ within government departments is another barrier 
to developing good relationships with public managers. The difficulty in developing a good 
working relationship with public managers and accessing the right decision makers, 
discouraged interested partners from promoting collaboration. Participants from international 
NGOs based in Malaysia observe that Malaysian society has a unique culture where interacting 
or collaborating with foreign experts was deemed inappropriate. According to Georgia, a 
foreign national and senior participant who works for an international NGO, public managers 
in Malaysia seemed reserved about interacting and sharing information with non-nationals. 
Georgia observed:  
… it is also a cultural thing, I think also... the way to approach the Malaysia 
[senior officials] is quite different, it is a very relationship-based society….  I 
think a lot here depends on relationship that you might have with the person, how 
you can have the access to certain decision-makers. It doesn't seem to follow a 
system that is clear on how you can engage. 
Not only NGOs were unclear about the attitude of public managers toward collaboration, other 
assisting government agencies expressed similar concerns. Jamal Syukur, a participant from an 
assisting government agency, stressed that special connections and the ability to be resourceful 
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were necessary. Syukur claimed that: “the right person for the right job. If you do not know the 
process [to resolve operational challenges]...you must know two ways, the normal procedures 
and the special way. They must know how to do coordination on that”. The special way that 
Syukur highlighted refers to a personal, strategic network or guanxi (Barbalet, 2015; Luo, 
Huang, & Wang, 2012) with influential or prominent people. However, an innovative, 
resourceful approach through a strategic powerful networking as demonstrated by Syukur 
proved effective in a particular circumstance but is far from a systemic holistic solution.  
At times, participants from different backgrounds who desire to build inter-organisational 
relationships were reluctant to sacrifice their respective organisation’s goals for the sake of 
common goals. Participants from major local NGOs, in particular, had concerns that closer 
collaboration with public agencies might mean that that the organisation’s discretion and 
control would be compromised. Lim Chiang Hock, a participant with an operation background 
from a major local NGO, explained that his organisation was dedicated to continue supporting 
the livelihood of aid recipients even after the official disaster relief operation concluded. It was 
his concern that such a plan would be adversely affected if closer collaboration between his 
NGO and public agencies took place because it is not common for government to provide extra 
livelihood support after a disaster relief operation. Lim argues: 
…we always hope to remain an office, a group of volunteers at the disaster-affected 
areas, so they are able to self-help. Why we stay after response phase? Because we 
compliant to [the] Master's 11  guidance. Master always say we will continue 
support till victims can, again, lead a good life. Ultimately, to continue support 
people in poverty. The office is more meant for local people to stay connected.  
Apart from aid recipients, most participants had over 10 years disaster management experience 
with some having over 30 years. The long service period not only demonstrated participants’ 
professionalism and experience but also highlighted their dedication to and ethos for disaster 
management. According to the participants, there were times when they put results before 
relationships. The deliberate act of putting results before relationships was evident from 
participants from UN bodies and aid recipients who had experienced mega floods. For instance, 
Aminah Ishak, an UN employee with years of experience in responding to various disasters in 
Malaysia and overseas, opted to quickly deliver relief items to geographically-challenged areas 
rather than maintain friendly relationships with important people: 
 
                                              




I run out of battery. They told me this one belong to politicians so and so...I was, I 
don't care. I want the torch light, batteries...one religion man told me I cannot take 
this. Hello, this is a disaster, you have lots of this....we are running of battery 
cells....while they are discussing, I took the things and gone.  
Participants from an ASEAN organisation with strategic and operational backgrounds shared 
similar views to NADMA staff and other public managers on the importance of building good 
relationships with a wide range of collaborative partners. Daniel Rasyid, from an ASEAN 
organisation, recalled that there were cases when a self-sufficient country accepted external 
assistance after a disaster, such as Japan after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, “because this 
is to maintain foreign policy [by offering assistance to a much well-to-do disaster-affected 
country]... That's the DNA of the disaster relief, we cannot control everything”. Rasyid’s view 
reflected that servicing a country’s higher interests not necessarily directly related to a disaster 
may be a reason for collaboration with other partners though not many understood that 
situation. On merging humanitarian action and diplomacy, Sofyan Fabrieta, Rasyid’s colleague 
from another ASEAN organisation, argues: 
Each organisation must have authority, that's principle. We talked about authority, 
capacity. …. Without creditability, this organisation cannot command. You need 
the mandate. …Effective collaboration is about exercising authority mix with 
diplomacy. That's how to balance meeting objective and process. 
In summary, participants demonstrated their interest in collaborating with each other but the 
investment of time and resources to build relationships among organisations varied 
significantly. In particular, government agencies had different strategies and resources in 
investing in building or maintaining a relationship. Their approaches were not necessarily in 
concert with the bigger picture of collaboration other organisations aimed to develop. The 
following quotes detail participants’ varying attitudes, often paradoxical, toward collaboration 
involving government agencies:  
…the District Officer offered us somethings... The District Officer of Kuala 
Krai…asked us to clean specified area. The work becomes easier if the government 
officials made requests for they will assign officers to facilitate our work. …We 
always work with penghulu [village head] in terms of identifying routes to access 
to kampungs; I asked penghulu, how much money do you need us to distribute, but 
first, I need to verify the fact. ….If there is a [nationwide] disaster management 
committee that consists of many stakeholders, I hope we are not instructed to do 
this and not allowed to do that. That's my fear (Lim Chiang Hock, operational 




Government is doing their job, to send ...their mobile team to various evacuation 
centres, but they also need our support. So, most of the NGOs have their own 
medical teams but it has to be....support the Government's 24 hours service …We 
have attending the coordination meeting with ….. This is a good means that is 
happening after NADMA is formed. It's good. The only thing is still many things 
need to be improved. What are the terms of reference for that coordination role 
[involved government agencies]? (Senin Awang, operational participant from a 
major local NGO) 
Figure 5.1 shows the interconnectedness between key partners and illustrates the relationships 
between the investment of time and resources by organisations in building or sustaining a 
relationship and the actual level of collaboration during a disaster response. The figure 
illustrates that the relationship investment between partners is mismatched with the 
collaboration or effectiveness anticipated in a disaster response. For instance, NADMA and 
ASEAN organisations have invested in a strong relationship between them but their 
collaboration is not conducive to a disaster response. Conversely, NADMA and major local 
NGOs have a moderately strong relationship; the support and relief operations of the NGOs 
can critically complement the strengths of NADMA in a disaster response. As a result, the 
attitude of organisations or their leaders towards managing stakeholder relationships influences 
decision making and the ability of an organisation to decide who to collaborate with, and how 
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 Orientation on building organisational capacity  
Leaders of disaster management organisations have differing beliefs, expectations and 
preferences on what tasks they should focus on and whom to collaborate with, to strengthen 
organisational capacity in preparing for future disasters. The training and development 
programme, including preparatory measures that were deemed critical to one organisation may 
be regarded as trivial by other organisations. The gaps in understanding, prioritisation and 
practices of what constitutes important training and programme development, complicate the 
identification of appropriate like-minded collaborative partners to achieve collective goals in 
capacity building, at least during the pre-disaster phase. As a result, variations in the design 
and practice of important capacity building programmes distanced organisations from 
collaborating with each other before the onset of a disaster. In failing to develop collaboration 
before disasters, a relatively stable situation, organisations may miss the opportunity to build 
relationships critical in disasters.  
In general, public organisations’ capacity building programmes comprise both technical (i.e., 
drill and inter-agency coordination meetings) and non-technical (i.e., awareness and 
volunteerism campaigns) components. The current trend in capacity building among public 
organisations dealing with disasters is technical-driven rather than non-technical. Participants 
argue that understanding the reasons, priorities and focus of the key training programmes of 
individual organisations is important because the reasons resemble the attitudes and capacity 
of the organisations to develop collaboration in an emergency.  
Unbalanced capacity building towards the technical or non-technical, strategic or operational 
aspects will affect organisations’ collaborative options, according to the participants from 
NADMA, assisting government agencies and NGOs. For instance, Georgia, from an 
international NGO, said her organisation’s preparatory work is more inclined to disaster 
management law and policy as she claims: 
we started programme [by] looking at legal preparedness for international disaster 
assistance. … More recently, we started to look at risk reduction law, and how to 
strengthen law and policy for disaster risk reduction. We also looking at legal and 
policy issues related to housing, land, property right in disaster. We have technical 
expertise in these three main areas.  
On the other hand, Zain Ahmad, a strategic participant from NADMA, explained that early 
coordination among key government actors, stockpiling necessary relief items and equipment 
within the budget are major preparatory work from the government’s perceptive. The 
disparities in training and capacity development programmes left little room for international 
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NGOs and NADMA to forge meaningful relationships not only during the pre-disaster phase 
but also post-disaster when inter-organisational collaboration is urgently needed. Most 
participants agree on the importance of having continuous non-specific training for staff, and 
early talks on cooperation and proactive engagement in relation to training with other 
stakeholders who may add value to the capacity building. For instance, NADMA’s strategic 
officials, Abdul Rahman and Zain Ahmad, stressed the drills or disaster response simulation 
exercises, and intra-government agency coordination. They claim that such work is critical to 
forge an early proactive engagement among partners.  
Fahruddin Iskandar, an operational participant from NADMA, welcomed the initiative to 
strengthen organisational capacity building through joint-efforts with other organisations. 
Iskandar contended that: “work together with other organisations [as the event of joint-
training] exposed [them] to their mechanism…. it opens lots of window opportunities …to 
increase their capacity”. Operational participants from NADMA and assisting government 
agencies agree on the importance of capacity building and emphasise the availability of a 
backup plan, assigning the right people to the right job, coherent intra- and inter-organisational 
communication systems for near real-time information sharing, and avoiding a culture of 
working in silos. Similarly, Che Singh, a strategic and operational staff member from an 
assisting government agency, stressed the importance of cultivating public awareness of 
disaster preparedness and a focus on building the capability of rural communities against 
disasters.  
From the UN perspective, capacity building is its strength. As suggested by Benedict, a senior 
participant from a UN specialised agency, programme design, efficient implementation and 
best practice sharing are key training contributions that UN can share with the public 
authorities. Benedict maintained that a capacity building programme under the auspices of 
NADMA has the potential to become part of regional initiatives, particularly in disaster 
logistics. However, Benedict lamented that so far, “...NADMA is very limited in training 
[overall]”.  
Contrary to NADMA, which emphasises operational and tactical training, local NGOs 
emphasise the importance of training volunteers and local communities. Again, like the gap 
between NADMA and international NGOs as discussed earlier, the disparities between major 
local NGOs and NADMA in terms of training and development programmes, demotivated 
these organisations from collaboration in the pre-disaster phase and during the response phase 
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to a disaster. Thus those organisations’ ability to collaborate in a disaster is adversely affected.  
Although volunteer training is not a major priority of most public organisations, NADMA’s 
strategic participant, Zain Ahmad, asserts that continued capacity building is the direction for 
Malaysian public agencies to achieve effective disaster management. Reflecting on his 
organisation’s commitment to advance organisational capacity building, Ahmad contends:  
… looking at putting our standard, tie it with the capacity of the region, through 
the [ASEAN regional organisation]. … You talk about mitigation, capacity 
building, knowledge [management] and innovation, though it is not coming to ask 
[ASEAN regional organisation] to do this ...mitigation but it is about the 
knowledge. It is about the innovation that we can gather. 
Interestingly, the disaster affected population also welcomed some sort of capacity building; 
the people claim they can help themselves if government is willing to pre-stock equipment, 
such as rescue boats in a disaster-prone community. However, NADMA and other government 
agencies do not agree with this idea and suggest promoting flood risk awareness among rural 
communities. The differing views on capacity building among disaster stakeholders further 
complicates post-disaster collaboration. 
 Learning from previous experience 
Organisations and individuals can best experience mutual learning through interactions in a 
volatile operating environment such as a post-disaster aftermath (Thompson, 2012). This study 
reveals that lessons learned could include a post-action review or retrospective on the 
approaches to handling an event; learning refers to the intentional practice of acquiring 
information, reflecting on it and sharing the new findings within an organisation to improve 
the organisation’s performance (Milway & Saxton, 2011). However, the capability gap of 
learning from previous experience between organisations and transferring new knowledge into 
actions is wide, particularly between public managers and international organisations but also 
between disaster aid givers and recipients.  
The study’s findings show that participants were exposed to multiple opportunities for mutual 
learning through different levels of interaction and collaboration. Some participants were 
proactive learners and others were passive learners. A major local NGO is an example of a 
proactive learner in preparing for a future disaster response. Haron Addin, an experienced 




We have score card, we have detailed assessment. Upon finishing all programmes, 
we usually comes out with a local disaster action plan, like a small blueprint to 
help local communities in terms of evacuating, what to prepare, etc...So, not to say 
it is good thing but when a disaster hit the same area again, there is an opportunity 
to bring us to deeper re-assessing on what have been done, create new knowledge. 
Public disaster management organisations, on the other hand, show examples of passive 
learning, e.g., Fakhrul Mansor, a senior operational staff member from an assisting government 
agency, claims that although he had learned from an ASEAN organisation a post-disaster 
damage assessment technique deemed critical in disaster response and recovery, there was no 
sign that the Malaysian disaster management authorities would put the measure into practice. 
Similarly, NADMA demonstrated a passive attitude in not addressing a known deficiency in 
coordinating a disaster response. NADMA’s predecessor experienced an ineffective disaster 
response during the 2014 mega-flooding that saw an influx of uncoordinated local NGOs and 
weak coordination among responding government agencies. NADMA has yet to resolve this 
limitation through a long-term, system-wide solution according to major local NGOs. In 
response, NADMA’s Abdul Rahman, a senior strategic leader in disaster management, 
contended that the 2014 uncoordinated official disaster response was a result of the 
complacency of key stakeholders: 
…[the state] complacency, that is something normal ...they did not expect that 
magnitude, but the whole nation saw for the first time the devastation that 
happened in Kelantan and how it impacted the society on the economic, people, 
until the whole society... they are willing now to ...more receptive.  
Rahman and his colleague, Zain Ahmad, affirm that NADMA has taken measures to assign 
personnel and resources to coordinate with NGOs before disasters and has strengthened 
engagement with key stakeholders. In addition, to improved disaster response technical 
capacity, NADMA engaged international organisations to strengthen its skills in search and 
rescue. Malaysia has become a member of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group 
(INSARAG) with NADMA as its national focal point. However, the major local NGOs 
believed that weak coordination persists in responding to disasters. For instance, Sivaragam 
Jaya, a senior strategic leader from a major local NGO, argued that: “same thing [referring to 
the overwhelmed disaster response occurred in 2014] will repeat, there is no change. …Though 
we have a captain”, and the captain that Sivaragam mentions is NADMA. His view resonated 
with Yusri Salahuddin, a strategic and operational official from another assisting government 
agency, who is far from optimistic that public managers, in general, are prepared for and 




One area of agreement among most stakeholders was the desire to learn best practice from 
other countries. Fahruddin Iskandar, a member of an assisting government agency, suggests 
learning from Philippine and Indonesian NGOs on “disaster risk reduction (DRR), community-
based disaster management programme, … because we can learn a lots from them especially 
in preparing the …society”. Che Singh, a strategic leader from an assisting government agency, 
suggests the need to learn from Japan on how “to educate general public” and study the “good 
alert system” in Singapore. However, no evidence was found that overseas best practice had 
been internalised into the local action plan. 
When asked what were the major lessons learned in previous flood response experience, only 
one of 10 participants interviewed from assisting government agencies stressed the importance 
of a comprehensive disaster law; the other nine participants emphasised the urgent need for 
effective coordination and operational execution. On the other hand, five of six participants 
from a UN agency, international NGOs and ASEAN organisations emphasised strategic 
measures to improve the existing disaster management legal framework over operational 
concerns as a means to prepare for an effective disaster response. They urge the national 
disaster management organisation to be more open to learning from global best practice. Unlike 
the public managers who focussed on lessons learned in coordination and response efficiency, 
participants from these international organisations focus on matters related to established 
disaster management law, the disaster management organisation’s legitimate authority, 
strategic planning and innovation in disaster response. Daniel Rasyid, from an ASEAN 
organisation, suggests NADMA learn from its in-country disaster management experience with 
a focus on strengthening the mandate and authority. He argues that: “the clarity of disaster laws 
is important because only the law will provide leadership in crisis management”. 
Aid recipients and aid givers had different perceptions of the lessons learned. Learning from 
the previous flood evacuation, aid recipients emphasise community preparedness and the 
effectiveness of public managers in responding to a disaster. Conversely, learning from the 
previous flood response, aid givers and public authorities such as NADMA had since 2016 
focused on compliance with standard operating procedures, drills, simulation exercises and 
coordination with other line agencies for the benefit of overall function and coordination.   
Aid recipients believe it is the sole responsibility of the government to respond to a natural 
disaster whereas public managers perceived aid recipients hardly developed an awareness to 
self-help before the arrival of government aid. Gaps remain between how well public managers 
believe what they learned from experience and aid recipients’ perception of the role public 
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managers should play in disasters. These gaps hinder mutual learning for both parties to prepare 
for an effective disaster response. 
Notwithstanding the differing perceptions and preferences on learning from experience, the 
vast majority of participants generally accept conducting simulation exercises or drills to test 
or improve the existing guidelines. For example, participants from NADMA, another assisting 
government agency, and an international NGO, emphasised the importance of thorough 
learning from events that had happened, through learning seminars, inter-disciplinary learning 
teams, conducting simulation exercises, enhancing capacity, and learning from others’ 
experience, including foreign countries with relevant experience in responding to a mega-scale 
disaster. In so doing, NADMA may accelerate its learning through active participation in the 
ASEAN disaster management mechanism, not only to sharpen its current technical capability 
but also to expose NADMA to advanced disaster management in accordance with international 
standards. Fahruddin Iskandar, an NADMA operational staff member, appreciated the 
opportunity to work together with other organisations as a form of mutual-learning especially 
when: “no single agency can single-handedly respond to the disasters”.  
However, in practice, as I observed, not all information collected after a disaster response is 
transformed into new knowledge aimed at sharing individually or collectively, within or across 
organisations, to improve the organisation’s performance. Learning and the attitude toward 
learning are varied among the organisations and there are gaps in transforming lessons learnt 
into practice. The inability of the leading public agencies to integrate mutual learning as an 
organisational culture, and internalising lessons learnt into a practical plan, hinder 
organisations from collaborating in a disaster. 
5.6. A summary of the three themes 
Detailed analysis of data led to the discovery of three themes that pose barriers to cross-sector 
collaboration in disasters. Table 5.3 summarises the findings presented on the three themes: a) 
perceived organisational status and hierarchy; b) different levels of motivation to collaborate; 
and c) organisation lacks of ability to collaborate in disasters. These three themes shed light on 
the barriers to cross-sector collaboration in a disaster. Organisations that overlook, lack 
knowledge of, or are unable to address these themes or challenges are unlikely to be able to 
undertake meaningful cross-sector collaboration as a strategy to resolve the problems of a 




Table 5-3: A summary of the themes identified from the focused codes  
 Focused Codes Overview of  
Focused Codes 
Themes 
 Attitude to disaster 
leadership 
 
Analysis of different levels of open and 
focused codes delineates how an organisation 
positions itself in a volatile environment; 
how other collaborating partners evaluate an 
organisation based on respective beliefs, 
values, and expectations in terms of 
leadership, mandate, and planning for 
preparatory actions; how conflicting demands 











Tensions between central 
and state stakeholders 
 Level of trust among 
actors 
Analysis of different levels of open and 
focused codes illustrates how general 
perceptions between organisations, 
expectations of mutual reciprocity, actions 
(or inactions) of stakeholders, cultural 
differences, attitudes toward achieving 
organisation goals, unclear organisational 
roles and legitimacy were interpreted 








roles and legitimacy 
 Attitude to managing 
stakeholder relationships   
Analysis of different levels of open and 
focused codes outlines how organisations’ 
different strategies, priorities and objectives 
in relationship management, attitude towards 
organisational capacity building, lessons 
learnt and learning from past experience 





lacks of ability 
to collaborate in 
disasters  
  
Orientation on building 
organisational capacity 
  
Leaning from experience 
and lessons learned 
 
The first theme, “perceived organisational status and hierarchy’, refers to the role status and 
hierarchy play in hindering collaboration. How collaborating partners evaluate an organisation 
based on respective beliefs, values and attitudes are critical to the promotion and development 
of collaboration. The conflicting demands and opposing perspectives of major stakeholders 
particularly on leadership, mandate and political influence, may be reconciled to a common 
objective to prepare for future disaster responses.  
The second theme, “different levels of motivation to collaborate”, demonstrates how the 
perceptions between organisations, the expectations of mutual reciprocity, the actions (or 
inactions) of stakeholders, cultural differences, attitudes toward achieving organisation goals, 
unclear organisational roles and legitimacy that are interpreted differently by stakeholders, can 
hinder cross-sector collaboration in a disaster. The third theme, “organisation lacks of ability 
to collaborate” outlines how organisations’ different strategies, priorities and objectives for 
relationship management, attitudes toward organisational capacity building, and learning from 
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experience may adversely influence the ability of an organisation to collaborate in a disaster. 









Our ignorance is not as vast as our failure to use what we know 
  
--- Marion King Hubbert, geologist and geophysicist, USA (1903-1989) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The preceding data analysis chapters unpacked the findings of this study. First, I found three 
themes that explain the barriers to building cross-sector collaboration following natural 
disasters: a) perceived organisational status and hierarchy; b) different levels of motivation to 
collaborate; and c) organisation lacks of ability to collaborate in disasters. Despite these 
barriers, collaboration does occur between various stakeholders. Based on the findings, I 
identify four collaboration scenarios: (1) enthusiastic, (2) mandate-driven, (3) reluctant and (4) 
non collaboration.  
This chapter first discusses the three barriers to collaboration in disaster situations. Then, four 
types of collaboration are identified from the partnerships, interactions or joint-activities 
between disaster actors which also informed the three barriers to collaboration in disasters. The 
disaster actors played varying roles to address the three barriers to different degrees to achieve 
the desired outcomes by cross-sector collaboration in disasters. The concluding chapter, 
Chapter 7, will present the theoretical contributions and implications of this study, and practical 
contributions for policy makers, academics and practitioners on cross-sector collaboration  
following a disaster. Chapter 7 also includes a discussion of this study’s limitations, and future 
research.  
6.2. The three barriers to cross-sector collaboration in disasters  
Substantiated by data analysis in the previous two chapters, this chapter discusses the three 
barriers that hinder cross-sector collaboration in disasters, particularly during the disaster 
response phase. These barriers are: a) perceived organisational status and hierarchy, b) different 
levels of motivation to collaborate, and c) the organisation lacks the ability to collaborate. 
Stakeholders and organisations that lack knowledge of or overlook these barriers will 
undermine the development of joint action among disaster actors in responding to a disaster 






 First barrier: Perceived organisational status and hierarchy 
The first barrier to cross-sector collaboration in disasters is perceived organisational status and 
hierarchy. Varying perceptions of organisational status, including organisation’s perception of 
their own status and that of their collaborative partners hinder collaboration in disasters. In 
general, public agencies regard their own status highly. They claim that international and 
regional organisations are keen to establish or maintain contact with them. Their status attracts 
the general public to donate aid generously to disaster-affected communities through 
government agencies that are responding to recent floods. In terms of hierarchy, government 
disaster responding agencies generally operate in a centrally-controlled, narrow goal context 
in their daily activities with minimum coordination and collaboration with other organisations 
(Scholtens, 2008). For example, an assisting government agency with a focus on search and 
rescue and another agency with a focus on management of an evacuation centre have minimal 
coordination and collaboration between them before a disaster. Conversely, NGOs offering 
disaster relief and assistance generally operate in a decentralised, cross-functional context with 
extra efforts to reach more volunteers, donors, media or resources. This illustrates dissimilar 
governmental and NGOs’ perceptions on status and hierarchy leading to different collaborative 
directions and focus. 
The perceptions of public agencies’ status and hierarchy influences the level of engagement 
between major local NGOs, international NGOs and UN agencies, and public organisations. 
The varying perceptions are not conducive to the collaboration needed for an effective disaster 
response. For example, UN agencies argued that it is important to have a designated, 
institutionalised national agency with a focus on disaster management. However, UN agencies 
claim that national public organisations with strong sense of ‘protectionism’ are less 
incentivised to collaborate with ‘foreign entities’. Any forms of collaboration involves this kind 
of hierarchical national agency may only lead to inconsistent, unpredictable and relationship-
driven interaction and not meaningful collaboration.  
Some scholars argue that hierarchical organisations with centralised command and control are 
more efficient in a disaster response (D. A. Alexander, 2008; Guo & Kapucu, 2015a). Other 
scholars refute the authoritative and strict command and control model and suggest a flexible 
collaborative approach as an alternative, without creating additional structures other than the 
pre-existing emergency authority (Dynes, 1994; Quarantelli, 1988). Some suggest a 
combination of both the hierarchical command and control and collaborative models is more 
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useful in emergencies (Moynihan, 2009; Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006). This study showed that 
there is an on-going tension between the command and control model and the need for 
collaboration in disaster situations.  Not surprisingly, the barrier of organisational status and 
hierarchy persists as was seen in the tensions between stakeholders and the varied attitudes to 
disaster leadership, makes collaboration in disasters challenging.   
Powerful actors may influence planned and actual networks under both the command and 
control and collaborative models (Demiroz & Kapucu, 2012; Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 
2010). This study found that participants with strategic backgrounds from government 
organisations are powerful actors in disaster collaboration. Powerful actors always play a 
dominant role in deciding an operation’s direction and with whom to collaborate. The strategic 
participants suggested that the command and control model is more effective but most 
collaborative partners, especially those with operational backgrounds, whether from 
government or NGOs, were sceptical about the effectiveness of the command and control 
model in disaster collaboration. They regarded the command and control model as a barrier to 
effective communication, coordination and coherent action.  
Stinchcombe’s (1965) term ‘liability of newness’, or a liability of inertia, contends that a young 
organisation, such as NADMA in this study, has a relatively higher fail risk than more 
established organisations. The newness of NADMA affected its perceived status as the nodal 
agency in national disaster management. Commonly, new organisations are perceived as 
lacking the ability to act or compete because they are not embedded appropriately compare 
with older organisations (Hager et al., 2004). To some extent, NADMA, as a nascent public 
agency with untested mandate and structural configuration, is reluctant to collaborate with 
external partners at least initially. Moreover, the focus of a nascent organisation is not to initiate 
collaboration but to stabilise its internal administration. Research on the ‘liability of newness’ 
argues that other reasons are at play to influence organisations to perform the intended tasks 
through collaboration. For example, political turnover and executive ambition detected in the 
transition of public organisations may influence collaborative arrangements (Kuipers, 
Yesilkagit, & Carroll, 2018). Some authors refute the ‘liability of newness’ and argue that the 
‘liability of adolescence’, as uncovered in quantitative research on business organisations, 
plays a bigger role in giving rise to the mortality risk of new organisations (Bruderl & 
Schussler, 1990). Organisations' preferences for disaster management models are different and 
this difference in preferred working models hinders collaboration since organisations operate 
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according to their preferred model. There is a mismatch in operating models and though 
organisations might consider themselves powerful, others may not agree.  
Actors who fail to understand the dynamics of organisation status and hierarchy create tensions 
with potential partners. The struggle to balance power between central and state stakeholders 
are examples of the divide between central-hierarchical and decentred-horizontal 
organisational status (Kenis & Provan, 2009). For instance, NADMA is concerned that its 
central directive is clear or that relief support to a state is adequate through communications 
with state officials, but the state government perceives this interaction rather differently. Its 
aim is to strengthen self-control of the situation and the subsequent relief operation. The notion 
that should be accepted is that a coordination network involving any public authorities will 
always have some degree of hierarchy (Hovik & Hanssen, 2015). 
This study’s findings suggest that the lead government disaster management agency should not 
necessarily limit itself with a central, hierarchical approach matching its mandated status and 
organisational hierarchy when exploring collaboration with external partners. During the 
transition to a collaborative arrangement, varying degrees of organisational status and 
hierarchy can be used to build, renew and maintain wide collaboration, especially during a 
disaster response. Only a basic level of agreement between disaster actors needs to be arranged 
before the onset of a disaster.  
 Second barrier: Different levels of motivation to collaborate  
The second barrier to collaboration in disasters is that there are different levels of motivation 
to collaborate. Chapter 5 discussed the varying perceptions (positive, neutral and negative) 
between one organisation and another. A positive perception towards a potential collaborative 
partner motivates the partners to collaborate voluntarily whereas a negative perception of the 
other discourages them from collaborating.  
The forces constraining an organisation from collaborating are a lack of trust towards partners 
(Bachmann, Gillespie, & Priem, 2015; Saab, Tapia, Maitland, Maldonado, & Tchouakeu, 2013) 
and challenges of striking a balance between governance capacity and governance legitimacy 
(T. Christensen, Andreas Danielsen, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2016). Trust plays a pivotal role in 
cross-sector and inter-organisational collaboration as evidenced by extensive research 
(Bachmann & Zaheer, 2008; Dodgson, 1993; Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996; Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994; Saab et al., 2013; Samaddar, Choi, Misra, & Tatano, 2014). Trust has a strong 
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exchange relationship, driven by the principle of reciprocity, such that there are mutual 
expectations between individuals to return a favour after one has been offered something of 
value by the other (Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Putnam, 2002). When organisations have a low 
level of trust toward potential partners, they are unlikely to be motivated to collaborate because 
experience in dealing with organisations may influence their decisions about collaboration.  
In addition to trust, the match or mismatch between governance capacity and governance 
legitimacy is critical to understand disaster management performance (Rothstein, 1998). 
Governance capacity includes the availability of formal structure, procedures, ability in 
coordination, and exercising power to handling disasters but also informal elements, that is, 
how to practise all these features effectively (T. Christensen, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2016; Lodge 
& Wegrich, 2014). Legitimacy, is a complex concept, and it affects how people respond toward 
government agencies in disasters but also how they perceive the authorities (T. Christensen, 
Lægreid, et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the perceptions or relationship between government 
authorities and citizens are linked to how a disaster response is handled. Citizen’s perceptions 
of whether the authorities’ action in a disaster response are desirable, appropriate in accordance 
to certain socially accepted norms and beliefs (Jann, 2016; Suchman, 1995) matter in disaster 
management. When public disaster agencies’ preparedness in disaster management matches 
the citizen’s perceptions, the response process implements smoothly and governmental 
performance is regarded as good. When there is a mismatch between disaster response capacity 
and perceptions, the governmental disaster response process become problematic (T. 
Christensen, Lægreid, et al., 2016). The varying perceptions between disaster collaborators 
identified in this findings, in part, explains the importance to close the gap between the ability 
for governmental response and citizen’s expectations for successful disaster response. 
Inter-organisational trust building needs time and is unlikely to develop in disasters. The 
study’s findings show that frequent face-to-face interactions are conducive to building trust. 
For example, unlike government officials who often withdraw immediately from a disaster-
affected community once the official response has concluded, major local NGOs and their 
volunteers continued communicating, interacting and supporting disaster aid recipients for an 
extended period. Such frequent interactions contributed to a high level of trust between the 
major local NGOs, volunteers and aid recipients. This explains why, among aid recipients,  
uniformed national government officials were subjected to lower level of trust than the major 
local NGOs.  
134 
 
However, frequent face-to-face interaction alone is not sufficient to motivate desired 
collaboration. Other factors could have contributed to the outcome. In this regard, examining 
trust from the macro-level provides an important perspective.  Institutional-based trust 
(Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011) deserves more attention because public agencies are the leading 
agencies responsible for responding to disaster aftermath problems. Contrary to interaction-
based trust developed on the premise of constant face-to-face interactions between two 
individuals, institutional-based trust emphasises collective action building on formal and 
reciprocal relationships embedded in a structured and systematised environment (Bachmann & 
Inkpen, 2011). The first example of institutional-based trust, between NADMA and other 
assisting government agencies, shows signs of high-level motivation to collaborate with each 
other. As a member of a structured environment (i.e., the national civil service), NADMA 
acknowledged its limitations with a secretariat and staff present only at a central level and 
reliance on other public agencies and district officers to complement its role at state and district 
levels when a disaster strikes. The assisting government agencies rely on NADMA for central 
directives and additional resources. The institutional trust between them motivates inter-
organisational collaboration in disasters. The second example, between NADMA and UN 
agencies, showed limited signs of motivation to collaborate with each other. Again, as members 
of a structured environment (i.e., member state and the UN system), NADMA and UN agencies 
are connected by a formal framework. However, the institutional trust did not effect or motivate 
their desirable collaboration. As a result, the UN agencies maintained that Malaysian 
authorities did not fully use the humanitarian emergency logistics service provided by the UN 
agency. Not surprisingly, NADMA is more interested in maintaining a minimal formal 
relationship with the UN agencies. 
This study found that NADMA has a positive, stable and good reciprocal relationship with 
ASEAN organisations. In part, this positive relationship is built on the basis of an agreement 
between them but the findings suggest that it is a high level of trust that motivates both parties 
to collaborate in disasters. Such a high level of trust does not exist between NADMA and UN 
agencies or international NGOs because NADMA regards them as ‘foreign’ entities lacking 
the homogeneity of collaborative partners in terms of values and cultural perspectives, 
important conditions for collaboration. Conversely, disaster aid recipients may have no cultural 
differences with public managers, such as NADMA officials, but they still failed to develop 
the desired level of trust important for collaboration in disasters. It is perhaps dissimilar values 
that discouraged aid recipients from collaborating with NADMA. Aid recipients generally 
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ignore the authority’s advice and prefer to take on the risk of continuing to live in flood-prone 
villages; NADMA claimed its pre-disaster preparation and post-disaster relief efforts were 
negatively affected by the different mindset and attitude of aid recipients. 
The findings revealed that most disaster stakeholders practised a cluster approach (Altay & Pal, 
2014; OCHA, 2019) in disaster management and did not abide by a comprehensive model with 
emphasis on all the phases of disaster management beginning with preparedness (prevention), 
mitigation to the response and recovery phases (Khan, Khan, & Vasilescu, 2008). When 
disaster actors (e.g., other assisting government agencies) focus only on saving lives, protecting 
property, and disseminating relief items during the disaster response phase and pay little 
attention to the preparedness or mitigation phases, it implies that they are practising cluster 
approach in disaster management. A relatively small number of disaster stakeholders (e.g., 
major local NGOs) pay attention to the disaster response phase as well as the other phases of 
disaster management. Major local NGOs who practise the comprehensive or integrated disaster 
management model, or total disaster management, as they claimed, are less motivated to 
collaborate with other organisations that prefer the cluster approach and see disaster response 
as a one-off activity in managing disasters.  
Hermansson’s (2016) study in Turkey shows that politics and bureaucracies strongly influence 
cross-sector and inter-organisational collaboration in disaster management. In general, 
different political ideologies influenced decision makers (Heywood, 2017) within government 
and NGOs. This study showed that political and bureaucratic factors exist between 
organisations and they influenced organisations’ motivation to collaborate. For instance, the 
visit of an important politician to a disaster area was arranged at the expense of suspending 
relief work temporarily, meaning potential collaboration between government agencies and 
other partners might have been disrupted. Decision-makers who followed a particular political 
ideology declined to collaborate or accept the assistance offered by partners from another 
political camp.  
Bureaucracy’s influence was detected in the study; it discouraged collaboration in disasters. 
For example, several study participants recollected the lack of a legal framework such as the 
absence of disaster management law that would allow the Malaysian government to declare a 
state of emergency in the event of major natural disasters. As a result, disaster management 
agencies found it difficult to mobilise resources from other ministries, agencies or the private 
sector, for the urgent use in rescue, relief and response. Formal authority has little influence in 
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motivating collaboration between organisations to achieve the desired outcomes because 
political and bureaucratic factors are at play. This study found that, for government agencies, 
motivation to collaborate was driven by their respective commitment to and understanding of 
disaster management and political practice. For NGOs, additional motivational factors to 
collaborate with other parties during disasters were driven by the respective organisation’s 
thoughts, beliefs and intended outcomes.  
 Third barrier: Lack of ability to collaborate  
The third barrier is the lack of organisational ability to collaborate in disasters. An organisation 
may be capable of collaborating with other partners during routine, non-emergency phases but 
this does not imply that it is equally capable of collaborating in a disaster. It is widely 
recognised that outside relationships help organisations become innovative and learn new 
competencies (Chesbrough, 2006; Nooteboom, 2008), which are instrumental for knowledge 
transfer (Cropper & Palmer, 2008; Lewin, Weigely, & Emery, 2004). This study found that 
learning, more than a desire for innovation, is the key motivation bringing organisations into 
collaboration. Organisational learning theory is relevant here. Learning theory explains “how 
individuals and their organisations acquire, process, distribute, integrate, and dissipate 
information associated with the functions of the firm” (Lewin et al., 2004, p. 114). Nooteboom 
(2008) studied all possible factors influencing learning and innovation through cross-sector and 
inter-organisational relationships and summarised competence and governance as two central 
loci. Competence is the ability to develop new competencies or skills and governance is about 
the art of managing relational risks (Nooteboom, 2004, 2008). Compared with government 
organisations, private organisations (e.g., high-technology firms) are driven by increasingly 
competitive business environments, are more motivated to acquire new knowledge or skills 
outside their sphere of expertise by means of collaboration with other partners (Chesbrough, 
2006; Powell et al., 1996; Yami & Nemeh, 2014). However, it is not clear if public 
organisations responsible for disaster management have a similar attitude towards learning as 
seen in private organisations.  
The study’s findings show that relational learning is not the sole driver in two organisations 
collaborating. For instance, participants from an international NGO claimed that NADMA was 
not as keen as it was to explore technical cooperation for the development of a national disaster 
management law that they believed critical for an integrated disaster response. NADMA 
understands that collaboration between them is for mutual learning benefit but the expected 
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collaboration still did not happen. This situation resembles Nooteboom’s (2008) argument that 
learning relationships change when a partner sets boundaries to shared knowledge within the 
collaborative engagement. In this case, NADMA decided to minimise allegiance with the 
international NGO it deemed as a foreign entity to uphold organisational governance and 
balance the political distance. The trade-off was the opportunity to learn the technicalities of 
disaster management law. When collaboration is deemed desirable in disasters but it does not 
happen signifies certain degrees of an organisation’s incompetency to collaborate with others.  
Some learning opportunities benefit only an individual partner whereas other learning benefits 
all collaborative partners collectively (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 2000). Learning 
opportunities that benefit both the individual and organisation, particularly during disasters, are 
not common. To acquire knowledge or innovation, outside relationships are needed. The 
density of ties favours the functioning of social norms and control, networking and reputation 
mechanisms that are conducive to good governance (Coleman, 1988). However, an increase of 
tie density may open up more avenues for spill-over risks (Nooteboom, 2004, 2008), and 
constraints on network ties may curb the variety of information and innovation sources 
(Nooteboom, 2004). The findings showed that partners find it challenging to maintain a balance 
between flexibility of expanding relations (i.e., increase tie density) and exclusiveness of 
membership (i.e., limited tie density). 
This study shows three reasons why it is challenging for a public organisation like NADMA to 
initiate a cross-sector collaboration in disasters. First, the organisation is newly established and 
has to attend to other pressing issues including acquiring resources to ensure its survival. 
Second, government officials claimed that foreign partners are inept at handling civil service 
bureaucracy, local customs and cultural sensitivities. Third, the concepts of change, dynamics 
and temporality in cross-sector and inter-organisational relationships are not yet fully 
understood and established (Cropper & Palmer, 2008; Harvey, Griffith, & Novicevic, 2000). 
Change refers to variations over time in continued survival, memberships and the constitution 
of cross-sector collaboration. Dynamics refers to the pattern of change over time and the forces 
that create that change (Cropper & Palmer, 2008). Temporality is refers to the timing, 
timeframe and time patterns in cross-sector and inter-organisational relationships (Cropper & 
Palmer, 2008; Harvey et al., 2000). If nascent organisations are unable to convene an intended 
collaboration involving new partners in the pre-disaster phase, such as a jointly designed 
simulation exercise or technical workshop, it is even more challenging for them to promote 
cross-sector collaboration in disasters where the ‘unpredictability’ level is even higher. 
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To some extent, participants with similar backgrounds (i.e., both are from the government 
domain), and cognitive proximity (i.e., both organisations largely share the same interpretation, 
perceptions, sense making and value judgements) are beneficial for collaboration (Biermann, 
2008; Nooteboom, 2008). Evans et al. (2011) in their collaborative study, found that 
homophily, the norm to work with partners of similar specialties, social status or geographic 
proximity, have become pertinent features in cross-sector collaboration. That study also found 
that homophily plays an important role in promoting collaboration in disaster settings as seen 
in the partnership between NADMA and other assisting government agencies. A certain degree 
of homogeneity among collaborative partners is conducive to maintaining stability, building 
trust and advancing the intended interactive learning experience (Nooteboom, 2008). However, 
organisations have to make trade-offs; too much homogeneity in membership can decrease the 
variety of sources needed for innovation and learning, whereas too much heterogeneity can 
create mistrust and tension or a conflict of interest. Hence, collaborative partners who have 
learned the lessons about managing stakeholder relationships will look for optimal instead of 
maximum flexibility in choosing membership. A lack of explicit processes to do so in learning 
between organisations and managers has led to the third barrier that hinders organisations’ 
overall ability to collaborate in disasters. 
In summary, this study showed that stakeholders who have forged a high degree of trust in past 
joint-experiences in pre-disaster technical training or in responding to disasters can collaborate 
in new disaster situation. However, if without the high degree of trust built in the past joint-up 
activities, despite how objective or apt a leader may be to deliberately design a coordination 
structure or invested in managing formal relationship among partners, public agencies may not 
necessarily capable to promote desired disaster collaboration. Scholtens’s (2008) study of 
centrally controlled collaboration during an acute phase in the Netherlands uncovered the 
importance that multi-stakeholder collaboration in a disaster is not underestimated, but is in 
fact overestimated. Instead, more attention should be paid during the preparatory phase where 
controlled collaboration is practised. What organisations did and with whom they interacted 
during the preparatory phase is instrumental in promoting cross-sector collaboration when a 
disaster strikes. This study’s findings discovered that overestimation of an organisation’s 
ability and the belief that cross-sector collaboration in disaster settings can be attained naturally 
or eventually by means of organisation status and hierarchy (e.g., presence of a ‘focal’ 
organisation, legitimate position and formal authority of other organisations), a high level of 
motivation (e.g., exercise a deliberately designed coordination among partners), and ability to 
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learn (e.g., practise what the organisation learned in previous disaster responses) in the acute 
phase of a disaster, may actually hinder collaboration.  
6.3. The four types of collaboration  
The previous sections focused on the barriers to collaboration but there were various forms of 
collaboration that took place among the stakeholders. Four types of collaborative activity were 
uncovered from the findings based on two factors: (a) motivations to collaborate in disasters; 
and (b) perceptions of the one’s own or other’s ability to collaborate. 
Figure 6.1 summarises collaboration typology and this is followed by a detailed discussion of 
each type of collaboration. Appendix 6A shows examples of practical collaboration or non-




Motivation to   
collaborate in 
disasters
Perceptions of the one’s 











Figure 6-1: The four types of cross-sector collaboration in disasters 
Enthusiastic collaboration 
This study showed that this type of collaboration happened between NADMA and other 
assisting government agencies as well as between NADMA and ASEAN organisations. This 
kind of collaboration is high level and occurs when an organisation’s desire to develop a new 
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or advance an existing inter-organisational collaboration is high, and collaborative partners 
have positive perceptions of the collaborating partner’s ability to deliver the desired result. To 
some extent, a binding agreement may function as a major driving force to advance 
collaboration but still the desired collaboration did not always happen because of the existence 
of a pre-agreed regulatory framework. This study shows that a high desire for collaboration 
and a positive perception of the collaborating partner’s ability are precursors in the 
development of collaboration in a disaster.  
Nine of the 30 interviewed participants are categorised as participants who are keen to promote 
enthusiastic collaboration. The common characteristics of this group include being open to 
sharing both positive and negative experiences, acknowledging current organisational 
limitations, expressing interest in learning from or working with partners or countries that have 
more experience or are better equipped, and taking initiatives to suggest countermeasures to 
improve current mechanisms or procedures. The nine made further suggestions, reflecting on 
their experiences and being willing to elaborate their insights into a particular collaboration. In 
this group, the driving factors for one individual to collaborate with another is that it is highly 
voluntarily, interdependent, without the pressure of rules or agreements (although honouring 
institutional arrangements are instrumental to initiating and deepening collaboration) and, in 
good faith, aim to achieve both individual and common objectives.  
NADMA and other assisting government agencies provide an example of enthusiastic 
collaboration. NADMA is committed to take responsibility for building trust and a network 
with other assisting government agencies, including the first responding agencies (e.g., Police, 
Fire Department). However, it is not committed to international NGOs and aid recipients. 
NADMA extended an invitation to other assisting government agencies it deemed important 
in disaster response to participate in disaster relief simulation exercises, familiarisation 
workshops and informal dialogue to strengthen inter-agency communication and espirit de 
corps. NADMA acknowledged that without full cooperation from these peer agencies, it is 
almost impossible for the relatively resource-limited NADMA to perform its task as the 
national coordinating focal point of disaster management. On the other hand, as informed by 
the study’s findings, most assisting government agencies have a positive perception of 
NADMA’s ability to perform its mandated role through collaboration. Such positive opinions 




NADMA and ASEAN organisations demonstrated another example of enthusiastic 
collaboration. For example, NADMA voluntarily despatched its staff to participate in a 
capacity building programme initiated by ASEAN bodies despite a high employee shortage 
and turnover rate. On the other hand, ASEAN organisations highly commended the efforts of 
NADMA and involved NADMA in all major decision making processes related to regional 
disaster management. There were times when representatives from the ASEAN organisations 
were allowed by NADMA’s strategic participants to jointly respond to major local flood relief 
operations while no other regional or international organisations were permitted. This reflected 
the high degree of trust by NADMA towards the ASEAN organisations. Operational 
participants from NADMA and other assisting government agencies were also highly 
motivated to learn ‘best practice’ in disaster management through participating in training 
programmes conducted by the ASEAN organisations and the ASEAN organisations welcomed 
it with open arms. Malaysian government disaster management agencies and ASEAN 
organisations may be connected by an agreement on disaster management, but mandated 
compliance alone is not the driver of collaboration between them; it is the high level of mutual 
reciprocity not detected between other participants. To some extent, it is the commitment to 
attain a common goal that goes beyond individual and group self-interest that Hickman (2004) 
termed “invisible leadership” (p.751) that counts. 
Mandate-driven collaboration 
Mandate-driven collaboration was identified when a leading collaborating partner has a low 
desire to volunteer for collaboration in disasters whereas other collaborating partners are 
positive about their respective abilities to collaborate. Mandate-driven collaboration can only 
lead to a moderate level of collaboration. Examples of mandate-driven collaboration happened 
between NADMA and UN agencies and between NADMA and international NGOs.  
Data analysis found that the nine participants categorised as a group interested in promoting 
mandate-driven collaboration. Like the enthusiastic collaborators, these participants were 
determined to work voluntarily with other social entities. However, the prevalent desire for 
collaboration is driven, shaped and governed by conforming to existing legal frameworks, rules 
or specific norms that are inherent in participating organisations. This group of participants 
placed developing and maintaining formal collaboration above flexibility and innovation in 
responding to disasters. Other common characteristics included setting priorities to fulfil the 
spirit of an agreement or mechanism, and advancing planned collaborative activities that 
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sometimes were politically driven, are seen as exercising authority to stay relevant. Such 
collaboration is less flexible and is governed by shared rules and structure.  
Mandate-driven collaboration has one distinctive difference from enthusiastic collaboration in 
terms of partners. Partners in an enthusiastic collaboration are generally willing to work with 
any competent, interested actors for mutual good. However, participants in mandate-driven 
collaboration are comparatively selective and much less flexible in their choice of partners. 
They prefer to work with formal, familiar organisations with their background officially vetted, 
and operate in a highly regulated environment. Constrained by such limitations, mandate-
driven collaborators attract a moderate level of collaboration since only entities sharing the 
same ideals about a particular framework are likely to collaborate.  
An example of mandate-driven collaboration is in the partnerships between NADMA and UN 
agencies based in Malaysia. Even though Malaysia hosted several UN agencies with physical 
offices in Malaysia, under the auspices of the UN and Member State framework, the 
partnerships between NADMA and the UN agencies are emphasised in protocols and formal 
settings. NADMA, as the focal point of national disaster management, showed a low desire to 
forge a partnership with the UN agencies. Conversely, the UN agencies believed that they have 
policy and technical best practice to share with NADMA. Another example is in the 
collaboration of NADMA and international NGOs. NADMA showed less desire to forge 
collaboration with international NGOs, which it regards as foreign entities. NADMA is highly 
selective and cautious in membership selection, collaborative design and protocols when 
attempting to work with foreign organisations. Conversely, international NGOs argued that 
their technical knowledge and hands-on experience in disaster management and humanitarian 
assistance are useful to NADMA, which was new. If participation of a non-familiar member is 
required in a mandate-driven collaboration based on technical, governance or funding 
considerations, the blessing of political leaders is important, and often on a case-by-case basis. 
Reluctant collaboration 
The collaborative arrangement between NADMA and major local NGOs and between 
government authorities represented by NADMA and disaster aid recipients, are examples of 
reluctant collaboration. Reluctant collaboration happened unwillingly when one party (e.g., 
NADMA) may have high desire to advance cross-sector collaboration in a disaster but another 
party (e.g., a major local NGO) rather negatively perceived the collaborative partner’s ability 
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to develop significant collaboration in particular timeframe. This means that reluctant 
collaboration leads to only a low-level of collaboration.  
Another nine participants fit the group that leading to reluctant collaboration. Collaborators in 
this category shared some characteristics with the mandate-driven collaborators in terms of 
careful selection of membership and awareness of their strengths and limitations. Often, if any 
form of reluctant collaboration occurs, the partnership is unwillingly rather than fervently 
welcoming. The availability of other partners capable of augmenting strengths impacts little to 
facilitate a new collaboration between reluctant collaborators. At times, participants in a 
reluctant collaboration are passive and are inclined to focus on self-defined, emergent 
coordination activities (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009), or they may primarily emphasise the 
process of collaborative arrangements rather than achieving intended collective outcomes in a 
rapidly changing environment (Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Kellogg, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2006; 
Majchrzak et al., 2012). At no time, do members of reluctant collaboration exert power and 
control; they show little tolerance of others’ sub-standard performance and are very unlikely to 
become a cooperative and committed member in any collaborative initiatives. These reluctant 
collaborators declined to collaborate when conditions were not favourable to them and did not 
accept collaboration when the situation was inevitable. 
The collaboration between NADMA and major local NGOs is an example of reluctant 
collaboration. On the one hand, NADMA counted on major local NGOs to provide extended 
relief support to disaster-affected communities (e.g., building temporary housing and 
supporting the livelihood of aid recipients for over a year). On the other hand, it also intended 
to regulate and monitor the movement of NGOs as part of a command and control model. Major 
local NGOs are interested in collaborating with government agencies or local government 
officials who can provide them with local information or facilitate interactions with local 
communities but always consciously remained distant from government bureaucracy for fear 
of losing control and coordination of their own relief operations. Major local NGOs often 
negatively perceived the ability of NADMA and other assisting government agencies to 
collaborate effectively in a disaster.  
Another example of reluctant collaboration was evident between the authorities represented by 
NADMA and disaster aid recipients. NADMA has a high desire to provide necessary relief to 
aid recipients by collaborating with multiple disaster actors from within and without 
government systems. However, aid recipients have negative perceptions about the ability of 
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NADMA to deliver the intended relief. Instead of working alongside the authority in building 
a resilient local community against frequent floods, the aid recipients believed it is chiefly the 
government’s responsibility to continue providing pre- and post-disaster assistance. The 
authority claimed that they have an attitude problem. The expected cooperation between the 
authority and aid recipients did not happen before, during or after disasters. Although the 
authorities stand ready to save lives and protect property, collaboration between the authorities 
and aid recipients, particularly the rural population that lives in flood-prone areas, remained 
low level. If reluctant collaboration occurs, albeit involuntarily, one partner will seek more 
power than the other to influence important decisions can be made in favour of the 
organisation’s interest rather than the collective one. 
Non- collaboration  
Non-collaboration happens when an organisation has a low desire to advance collaboration and, 
at the same time, the potential collaborating organisation perceives that the other party lacks 
the ability to collaborate. As a result, the potential for collaboration is missed and, if 
collaboration has already commenced, it will likely be thwarted and not be sustained. This 
study uncovered non-collaboration between two major local NGOs. Local NGOs already aware 
of the many advantages they may gain through collaboration between them. For examples, an 
oversupplied volunteers of a NGO can be re-mobilised to complement the relief distribution 
work of another NGO that has a relatively smaller number of volunteers. By working together, 
both local NGOs can jointly distributing reliefs to more geographically-challenged 
communities. However, any potential collaboration is missed.  
Three of the 30 participants, from major local NGOs, explicitly expressed that they did not see 
the value and advantage of working with other partners in disasters. These participants avoided 
all forms of collaboration and preferred to act alone with their own resources. The participants 
who preferred to avoid collaboration were the fewest compared with the other three types of 
collaboration. These non-collaborators may be small in number, but an effective, coordinated 
disaster response operation counts on the inclusive participation of all possible stakeholders. If 
an avoiding partner is a resource-rich, experienced actor in disaster management, the absence 
of such collaborator compromises the effectiveness of the overall effort.  
The small number of the non-collaborators is consistent with the data analysis that the vast 
majority of participants preferred to resolve complex public problems by collaboration. Non-
collaborators share the common characteristics of avoiding the loss of autonomy, minimising 
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influence or control by other organisations that are inherently dominating institutions by law 
or norms, or those who are more established and experienced than itself. Non-collaboration is 
commonly detected among established faith-based NGOs  with particular beliefs, values and 
norms that potential collaborative partners find difficult to comprehend be compliant with or 
practise in tandem.  
The findings show that non-collaboration was detected between resource-rich major local 
NGOs. They saw no reason to collaborate among themselves voluntarily because they claimed 
that the other parties were either short-term, inexperienced, or of different technical specialities, 
organisational values and principles. Disparities of perception, capacity and trust between 
organisations hindered these local NGOs from collaborating with each other. Non-
collaboration mainly happened among resource-rich organisations but was also detected among 
NGOs with limited resources, expertise or spontaneously formed to support the people in 
disasters. These non-collaborators tried to work alone in the field with their own resources as 
guided by their beliefs. For them, operating in a larger social system and in the shadow of a 
dominant partner either from the government or non-government domains, or being a 
collaborative partner in an unknown social system is the last resort. If a participant who 
preferred non-collaboration teams up with any specific social actor in a disaster, it is only 
because “the law said so”; the collaboration is hardly voluntary.   
6.4. Why collaboration is important in disaster management  
The three barriers to cross-sector collaboration and four types of collaboration in disasters 
identified in the findings affirm the complexity of collaboration in disasters. Collaborative 
processes are of a multi-complex nature (Thomson & Perry, 2006) akin to a “black box” (Wood 
& Gray, 1991) because they are intertwined with dimensions of governance, administration, 
organisational autonomy, mutuality, and norms (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Wood & Gray, 
1991). This study presents the potential consequences if leading Malaysian government 
agencies responsible for disaster management fail to take appropriate measures to promote 
collaboration in disasters. The consequences are twofold: First, the organisations failed to yield 
the desired outcomes that ensue in a disaster. Second, organisations failed to use collaboration 





 Failure to achieve the desired outcomes through cross-sector collaboration 
The findings show that NADMA and its partners agreed that, apart from meeting individual 
organisational goals, there are some desired outcomes in responding to a disaster that are 
achievable only through collaboration. However, disaster actors will not be able to deliver the 
desired outcomes if they are not aware of, have knowledge about, and have the skills to address 
the collaboration barriers: perceived organisational status and hierarchy, different motivation 
levels and lack of ability to collaborate in disasters, and the four collaboration types.  
NADMA, from the perspective of the organisation, aims to achieve strategic and operational 
purposes. From the perspective of collective action, NADMA has other desirable goals that can 
be achieved only through collaboration with other actors. NADMA’s strategic purpose is to 
perform as the mandated authority, effectively the nodal central agency in disaster management 
and its operational purpose is to provide clear directives and facilitate coordination across 
policies and jurisdictions. NADMA has additional desired goals, inter alia, to address the 
challenges of existing technical shortcomings, anticipate gaps in pre-disaster preparedness and 
actual disaster response, accelerate disaster relief operations, and reduce tensions between 
stakeholders, policies and across jurisdictions. For instance, to achieve the desired goal of 
accelerating a disaster relief operation, NADMA is motivated to collaborate with major local 
NGOs. NADMA welcomes these NGOs to complement its disaster relief operation or even to 
coordinate other unregistered NGOs on behalf of the authority. However, major local NGOs 
are concerned about losing organisational discretion and there is no legal mandate for them to 
coordinate the activities of counterparts. The findings showed that, between NADMA and 
major local NGOs, there is only reluctant collaboration because of the three barriers identified 
in the study. Without knowledge of the barriers to cross-sector collaboration and the four types 
of collaboration, NADMA faces challenges in achieving organisational strategic and 
operational purposes. The effort to achieve the desired goals through collaboration becomes 
more challenging in a disrupted environment.   
Skill in managing the dynamics of commensal and symbiotic relationships (Bouncken & 
Fredrich, 2016; Bouncken & Kraus, 2013; Buuren, Buijs, & Teisman, 2010; Tsai, 2002) 
influenced organisations to align between their strategic and operational purposes and the 
desired collective goals. Aldrich and Ruef (2006) explained that commensalism is about intra-
organisational competition and cooperation. Symbiosis is about balancing mutual 
interdependence between different organisations. For example, the strategic organisational 
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purpose of UN humanitarian assistance and disaster management agencies is building the 
capacity of member states to meet extreme events and disasters. Among the operational 
purposes of UN agencies are coordinating aid support within the UN system, providing 
technical training and assistance through sharing best practice by cluster approach (Altay & 
Pal, 2014; OCHA, 2019). In addition, UN agencies demonstrated desired goals that can be 
achieved only by collaboration, inter alia, building the overall capacity of member states’ 
emergency logistics, creating synergy and promoting innovativeness by linking existing 
networks, supporting member states to attain national goals as regional champion of 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Without knowledge of the barriers to cross-sector 
collaboration and the four types of disaster collaboration, UN agencies face challenges to 
accomplish the agencies’ strategic and operational purposes as well as the desired goals, 
particularly during a disaster.   
One may surmise that, with a responsible disaster actor present, e.g., a central government 
agency like NADMA, problems that arose from a disaster will be resolved eventually with or 
without collaboration with other partners. However, in practice, public managers, as well as 
other committed disaster management organisations, were aware that there are desirable 
outcomes that can be attained only through collaboration in responding to a disaster.  
 Failure to use collaboration to manage disaster response 
In general, collaboration is regarded useful in tackling post-disaster problems but it does not 
always happen effectively, or sustainably. At times it was completely avoided as found in this 
study. Although most organisations prefer collaborating with other organisations to resolve 
problems that are too big to resolve if they acted alone, collaborative partners such as assisting 
government agencies, international NGOs and major local NGOs, prefer to retain their 
autonomy, discretion and control. This is an obstacle to collaboration. The barriers are 
perceived organisational status and hierarchy, varying levels of motivation to collaborate and 
the ability of the organisation to collaborate in a disaster. Failing to address these barriers and 
a lack of understanding of the four types of collaboration, public managers in Southeast Asian 
countries may find it difficult to apply collaboration for effective, coordinated disaster 
response.  
Different perceptions towards collaboration adversely affected decisions by stakeholders to use 
collaboration in a disaster response. For example, commonly in the literature on collaboration 
it is suggested that collaboration begins after the initial conditions (Bryson et al., 2006) or 
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starting conditions (Ansell & Gash, 2008) or when some ‘wicked’ problems are in place 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). However, disaster collaboration 
can take place earlier, before the onset of a disaster, given the availability of common ground, 
bridging actors or protagonists (Spekkink & Boons, 2016) and knowledge of the three 
identified barriers and the four types of collaboration. For instance, a convening organisation 
may make an early investment, prior to disasters, to address current limitations related to 
organisation status and hierarchy, motivation or the ability to collaborate in a disaster.  
In addition, the varying conceptualisations of collaboration may lead to different emphases on 
or dimensions of the joint effort. This could hinder organisations from using collaboration to 
address severe public problems. For example, organisations that promote the ‘process model’ 
emphasis the sequential phases of problem-setting, direction-setting and structuring (McCann, 
1983) showing a lack of flexibility and agility to work towards common outcomes with 
multiple stakeholders in disaster settings. The main purpose of problem-setting is to identify 
stakeholders and allow them to communicate explicitly on situation. In the direction-setting 
phase, stakeholders communicate their intended values which they believed useful for mutually 
desired objectives. ‘Structuring’ happens when stakeholders began to strengthening the 
appreciative process between them in an interdependent environment (McCann, 1983). These 
three phases are important processes for effective collaboration to deliver desired results (Gray, 
1989). However, the process of identification of stakeholders, articulation on common values 
and development of collective appreciation process is difficult to achieve without negotiations, 
and time consuming, and after all, seemingly difficult to meet when collaborating in disasters.  
In addition, ‘domain-level collaboration’, as Gray (1985, 1989) synthesised from the previous 
work of organisational theory, policy analysis and organisation development is another  
collaborative perspective commonly practised. Domain-level collaboration values interactions 
of actors within existing inter-organisational system, underorganised systems or 
underdeveloped potential networks, problem sphere that demand collective actions, as well as 
process-driven instead of cross-sectorial approach that oriented toward influential individual 
actors at the expense of entire system dynamic (Gray, 1985, 1989). Organisations promote 
domain-level collaboration compete for resources in an interdependent and changing 
environment, and believe in adversarial methods to resolve problem where organisations take 
into account the actions of opponents (e.g., businesses anticipate competitors’ strategies) (Gray, 
1985, 1989; Thagard, 1992). While emphases on relationships of inter-organisational in 
contextual environment is important in collaboration but competing for resources and 
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adversarial problem solving method are unwanted focus to partners who want to collaborate in 
disasters. 
What suggested by Ansell and Gash (2008) as ‘collaborative governance’ is a formal strategy 
of engaging state and non-state stakeholders to implement public policy or manage public 
assets through consensus-driven decision-making process. Expanding from this definition, 
‘contingency model of collaborative governance’ was developed base on four major building 
blocks: “starting conditions, institutional design, facilitative leadership and collaborative 
process” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 550). Stakeholders who incline to collaborative governance 
will likely ended up with formal activity such as a disaster simulation exercise characterised 
by joint structures and shared resources (Walter & Petr, 2000). Collaborative governance is 
useful to manage surprise, uncertainty and emergencies as evidenced in responding to rare 
floods in Germany’s Dresden region  (Hutter, 2016), Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods 
(Kapucu, 2015). However, disasters collaboration can happen earlier before the ‘start 
condition’. Moreover, compliance to basic ground rules critical for procedural legitimacy, 
availability of leaders who have experience in dealing with trade-offs and dilemmas (Ansell & 
Gash, 2012; Provan & Kenis, 2008) and the ideals to develop trust and commitment through 
the iterative interactions among actors are deemed challenging conditions to disaster 
collaboration. 
Organisations that promote ‘bona fide network perspective’ (K. Cooper & Shumate, 2012) 
place more value on building memberships within a network than on designing network 
boundaries. It is a kind of collaboration building on multiplex relationships, and pays attention 
to external factors that influence inter-organisational networks and within the network (K. 
Cooper & Shumate, 2012). Building a cohesive membership network and managing 
environmental exigencies are critical to successful collaboration. However, developing 
collaboration in disasters are time sensitive, and while organisations may be attempted to 
manage or contain external factors of collaboration, they may have little resource or choice in 
building a desired membership network in disasters.  
Narrowly defined, ‘networked governance’ happens when three or more legally autonomous 
organisations work together to achieve both individual and a collective objective (Provan & 
Kenis, 2008). The key characteristics of networked governance are goal-directed, limited 
formal accountability and voluntary compliance to rules and procedures (Provan & Kenis, 
2008). Later, some applied the concept of networked governance to study how inter-
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organisational relationships spanning across a timeframe including both pre- and post-disaster 
phases can be maintained amidst network complexity and increased utilisation of information 
and communication technologies in disaster management (Kapucu & Garayev, 2013, 2014). 
Kapucu and Garayev’s (2013, 2014) study on networked governance is built on the early work 
of Klijn and Koppenjan (2006) where they envisioned networked governance loosely as efforts 
of shared goals and responsibilities and coordinated actions to achieve common results.  
Understanding the characteristics and application of networked governance, it seems a practical 
perspective for collaboration in disasters. However, effective collaboration in disasters is not 
limited to legitimate organisations but including individuals who may be affected as a result of 
the disaster or experts who may shape the design of how a disaster should be responded to 
towards collective goals.    
Pending the preferences of an organisation on collaboration, and knowledge of the three 
barriers to cross-sector collaboration and four types of collaboration in disasters, different 
collaborations occur. As a result, organisations find it challenging to assert collaboration as a 
means to manage disaster problems. Designing optimum conditions for cross-sector 
collaboration in disasters depends on the preferences of an organisation on collaboration, and 
the presence of knowledge of the three barriers to cross-sector collaboration and four types of 
collaboration in disasters,  
6.5. Chapter summary 
This chapter describes and explains the importance of two findings. The detailed discussions 
on the findings provide insights for addressing the research question: “What hinders cross-
sector collaboration in disasters?”  First, that there are three barriers to cross-sector and inter-
organisational collaboration in disasters: a) perceived organisational status and hierarchy; b) 
different levels of motivation to collaborate; and c) organisational lack of ability to collaborate. 
Second, there are four types of collaboration: 1) enthusiastic, 2) mandate-driven, 3) reluctant 
and 4) non-collaboration. Organisations that overlook or with little knowledge of the barriers 
will face challenges to accomplish desired goals that can be achieved only by collaboration, or 
will find it difficult to support collaboration to manage a disaster response. The next chapter 










There can be no real freedom in rebirth without conscious severance from the past, without 
either the ability to bring the whole past to a significant and harmonious conclusion, or the 
courage to say ‘finished’, and to dismiss the memory of what one must leave unfinished, 
unassimilated, unresolved if one is to enter the new life, the new cycle of experience  
--- Dane Rudhyar, author,  
modernist composer and humanistic astrologer 
USA (1895-1985) 
7.1 Introduction  
This final chapter discusses the novel contributions of this study of the barriers to cross-sector 
collaboration and the types of collaboration identified. The study’s findings are embedded in 
the broader context of emergency management. This research has both scholarly and practical 
implications in using cross-sector collaboration as a strategy to tackle the complex problems 
following natural disasters. In addition to discussing these contributions, the chapter presents 
the study’s limitations and makes recommendations for future research.  
7.2 Approaches to disaster management  
This section discusses two models of disaster management: the command and control and 
collaborative approaches. While aspects of both approaches are used in current practice, the 
command and control remains the dominant model in Malaysia. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, this model has its challenges.  By increasing collaboration in disaster management, 
it is suggested here that some of the issues with the prevailing command and control model 
could be addressed.  
Aligned with this proposition, China’s response to two different earthquakes illustrates the 
recent move towards a more collaborative approach to disaster management. During the 2008 
Wenchuan earthquake, China applied the traditional top-down approach in emergency rescue 
and response. The rescue operation involved mainly public-actors without NGOs during the 
initial stage. The deployment of 50,000 troops and armed police on the same day demonstrated 
the presence of military and that the military was in charge (E. Chan, 2013; Lu & Xu, 2014; Q. 
Zhang, Lu, Hu, & Lau, 2015). The overall rescue and recovery operation was generally 
successful (E. Chan, 2013) but disaster scholars claim that the top-down institutional 
framework impeded the development of community-based disaster management and overall 
township resilience capability; local government and communities were deprived of the 
opportunity to collaborate with civil society organisations, to put local disaster management 
policies into practice, learn to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters (Q. Zhang et 
al., 2015; X. Zhang, Yi, & Zhao, 2013). From the lessons in Wenchuan, China responded to 
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the Lushan earthquake in 2013 with a more flexible, collaborative approach (Lu & Xu, 2014). 
In addition to the military and armed police being deployed, NGOs and volunteers were also 
involved in the emergency rescue and relief (Lu & Xu, 2014; Wu, Ma, Jiang, & Jiang, 2013; 
Q. Zhang et al., 2015). The government’s response to the Lushan earthquake demonstrated 
significant progress with faster action and integrated, coordinated rescue and relief work (Lu 
& Xu, 2014; Wu et al., 2013; Q. Zhang et al., 2015), illustrating the value of increasing 
collaboration in disaster management.  
In the context of this Chinese case, researchers have proposed that integrating a more 
collaborative approach to disaster management, including increased participation of local 
communities and volunteers, improves the emergency management system, particularly in 
rescue and relief (E. Chan, 2013; Lu & Xu, 2014).  Past research from Australasia suggests that 
including communities in the post-disaster work is not only useful in building communities' 
adaptive capacity but also builds their capacity to respond to  future disasters (Paton, Johnston, 
Mamula-Seadon, & Kenney, 2014). Hence, a culture of preparedness particularly at community 
level is essential for effective disaster management (Johnston et al., 2013). Despite these known 
benefits of collaboration, public disaster agencies continue to mainly use the command and 
control model in responding to disasters because this model is a product of classical 
management thinking (Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006; Guo & Kapucu, 2015a). It allows for 
the insertion of legal authority and accountability (Adams et al., 2017), disseminate directives 
from higher echelon officials to lower rank officials (Drabek & McEntire, 2003) and 
emphasises on efficiency and effectiveness to deliver result (D. A. Alexander, 2008).  
A review of the disaster management literature (Chapter 2) argues that the command and 
control model is not fully effective by itself (Chong & Kamarudin, 2018; Fjeldstad, Snow, 
Miles, & Lettl, 2012). This model is inspired by military experience (Malešič, 2015; Pigeau, 
2002), and is commonly practised in hierarchical, bureaucratic organisations (Hill & Lynn, 
2005; Hodgson, 2004). It is noteworthy that governments commonly prefer and encourage the 
hierarchical approach when responding to mega disasters (D. S. Miller et al., 2008; Unlu et al., 
2010; Zaw & Lim, 2017; Q. Zhang et al., 2015). However, bureaucracies are designed to 
respond to predictable societal needs and appear to be unsuitable for tackling a disaster’s 
consequences, which are highly contextual (Lyden, 1974; Stark, 2014). Public disaster agencies 
need to be adaptive in an emergency (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010; Comfort, Boin, & Demchak, 
2010). Seeking a balance between a bureaucratic structure and adaptive behaviour is a 
prevalent problem for organisational theory and a constant challenge for disaster management 
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policy makers and practitioners (Comfort et al., 2010; Hill & Lynn, 2005; O'Toole, Meier, & 
Nicholson-Crotty, 2005). Increasing collaboration has been suggested to be one way to 
overcome the limitations of bureaucracy (Moynihan, 2009; Stark, 2014).  
In practice, even military organisations are moving away from a hierarchical structure to win 
in warfare (McChrystal, Fussell, Collins, & Silverman, 2015). General McChrystal won the 
war against terrorists in Iraq with an improved model that broke down authority silos and 
strengthened decision making toward achieving common goal. A flexible, flatter ‘team of 
teams’ concept, i.e.: combining centralised communication with decentralised managerial 
authority, was a contributing factor (McChrystal et al., 2015). This more contemporary 
approach to handling extreme events in high-stakes and time-sensitive situations, could also be 
suitable in disaster management.  
The present finding suggest that public disaster agencies are challenged in their search for an 
appropriate approach to deliver collaborative disaster management. Public disaster agencies 
experience an organisational paradox in handling disasters because, on one hand, a disaster 
response requires detailed planning, clear communication and effective organisation skills but, 
on the other hand, it is spontaneous and unpredictable (Stark, 2014; Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006). 
Some disaster scholars argue that when a civilian-led government agency is not present, and 
only when such agency is not in charge, the command and control model is deemed an effective 
approach to disaster management (D. S. Miller et al., 2008; Uhr, 2017; Zaw & Lim, 2017). 
Building trust with collaborative partners while maintaining a level of control can be 
challenging, as a high level of control can lead to a low levels of trust (Bachmann, Knights, & 
Sydow, 2001; Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005). Though a high level of situational control 
enhances operational efficiency, it limits the opportunities to build trust with others (Bijlsma-
Frankema & Costa, 2005). Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa (2005) suggest that a complementary 
perspective is possible where control and trust may co-exist and reinforce each other. Both 
‘substitutional’ (e.g., high level of control but low level of trust) and ‘complementary’ (e.g., 
balancing between levels of control and trust) approaches were evident in the present study; 
the former was more prevalent than the latter. The key message here is that finding a balance 
between control and trust is challenging but that a more collaborative approach could help 
facilitate this balance. A more collaborative approach has strengths in building trust and 
enabling mutual learning experiences, is conducive to enhancing public service accountability 
and promoting good governance. 
155 
 
This study suggests new insights for public disaster agencies to manage disasters effectively 
within the existing disaster management model without altering organisational structure, 
overhauling current collective networks or additional investment in infrastructure. I propose 
that using a more collaborative approach within the existing command and control framework 
can increase the effectiveness of disaster management. Indeed, this study's participants 
recollected their experience from a disaster response where a more collaborative approach had 
resulted in a positive outcome. That is, participants with an operational background from 
assisting government agencies and major local NGOs recollected that the authoritative model 
led to an uncoordinated disaster response as they had experienced in previous official relief 
responses. Instead, they posited that the collaborative approach that they adopted in a separate, 
recent relief response brought positive outcomes, such as enhanced two-way learning, 
strengthened situational awareness, enabled a common operating picture, and enhanced inter-
agency networking. To these operational participants, less formal organisation control and 
rigidity stimulated higher levels of trust with collaborating partners. While there appears to be 
support for adopting a more collaborative approach, this study identified three key barriers to 
cross-sector collaboration that can impede disaster actors in using collaborative approach 
within the more dominant command and control framework. 
In addition to research suggesting benefits of the collaborative approach (Moshtari & 
Gonçalves, 2017; Reitan, 1998), this research also identified that public disaster agencies will 
face challenges if continuing to use the command and control model in disaster management. 
First, it creates friction between central and state public disaster agencies that may remain 
unresolved; second, there is a low level of trust between disaster aid recipients and public 
disaster agencies, and third, a fragmented network is created within the national disaster 
management sphere.  
As found in this research, in order for NADMA to adopt a more collaborative approach, 
NADMA’s roles need to be clearer to its collaborative partners (i.e., barrier 1: perceived 
organisational status and hierarchy). In addition, disaster stakeholders need to see the urgency 
and importance of collaborating with non-public actors to build trust and mobilise resources to 
achieve intended outcomes (barrier 2: different level of motivation to collaborate). And finally, 
resource limitations, including lack of funding, experienced employees and necessary 
relationships, need to be managed before disasters strike (barrier 3: organisation lacks of ability 
to collaborate in disasters). It is suggested that addressing these three barriers can move agents 
from reluctant to more enthusiastic collaborators. 
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Integrating a collaborative perspective into the existing command and control framework is 
likely to have many benefits as discussed above. A collaborative approach can help build trust 
between central and state public disaster agencies, promote a closer relationship between public 
disaster agencies and aid recipients through a longer term community-based disaster 
management programme, and strengthen the network among national disaster management 
actors through joint activities throughout the different phases of disaster management. It is 
noteworthy that relationship alignment between government and non-government entities is 
instrumental in developing collaborative disaster management but requires coordinated, 
cohesive action, and that is guided by shared responsibility and authority (Kapucu, Arslan, & 
Demiroz, 2010; Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006). Using a collaborative approach to strengthen 
disaster management within a hierarchical bureaucracy, collaborative inter-personal skills 
(Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006) and an appropriate mix between hierarchy and collaboration are 
needed (Moynihan, 2009). De Meuse (2009) reveals that the success of team effectiveness is 
building on the desire for collaboration and learning to work together towards collective actions 
and a common objective. While some of this study’s participants expressed a desire for 
increased cross-sector collaboration, this research suggests that such a change requires to build 
upon the knowledge of three key barriers and interactions between the four types of 
collaborators identified in the findings. Such knowledge is not found between public disaster 
agencies and collaborative partners in the Malaysia context. 
7.3 Contributions and implications 
This study contributes to both the theory and practice of disaster management. The study’s 
findings present two key theoretical contributions: key barriers to cross-sector collaboration 
and types of collaboration in disasters.  
The findings contribute to the current literature on collaboration in disasters. For example, 
collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organisations is believed capable 
of improving service delivery and strengthening relationships with the local community 
(Snavely & Tracy, 2000). However, this study found that, in practice, governmental and non-
governmental organisations have a low level of trust for each other which leads to reluctant 
collaboration, one of the four types of collaboration identified in this study. Literature also 
suggests that ad hoc collaboration can be developed quickly (Goldstein & Butler, 2009; 
Margerum, 2002; O’Leary & Vij, 2012) while longer-term collaboration is more challenging 
(Connelly et al., 2008; Huxham, 1996; Uhr, 2017). Nevertheless, this study found that because 
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of the three barriers to cross-sector collaboration, ad hoc collaboration can be problematic too. 
For example, perceived different organisational values and capacities hindered two NGOs from 
collaborating even on an ad hoc basis, resulting in non-collaboration (another type of 
collaboration identified in this research). In addition, literature suggests that public 
administration encourages public agencies to collaborate with external partners (Jensen et al., 
2015; S. Patrick, 2014; Sørensen, 2012). This is due to collaboration being seen as an effective 
strategy to respond to disruptive situations, to diffuse risk, offer learning opportunities and 
strengthen legitimacy (M. K. Foster & Meinhard, 2002; Gazley & Brudney, 2007; Provan et 
al., 2015; Provan & Milward, 1995). However, in practice, public actors who intend to use 
collaboration but are unaware of the three barriers as discussed in Chapter 6, will find initiating 
collaboration difficult. 
The study’s findings suggest various challenges to collaboration in disasters in Malaysia; the 
lack of awareness or knowledge of collaborative disaster management is likely to cause similar 
challenges to cross-sector collaboration in disasters in other parts of the world as well. This 
study shows that a clear relationship exists between the perceptions of collaborating partners’ 
ability and the desire to develop collaboration with partners in disaster management. For 
example, a positive perception towards collaborating partners developed during the pre-
disaster phase increases motivation to collaborate in disasters. Conversely, failing to address 
the barriers to collaboration appropriately prior to a disaster may result in two outcomes: the 
desirable outcomes for disaster relief that the leading agency intends to achieve through cross-
sector collaboration will be compromised; and the lead agency will face difficulties in using 
collaboration to manage disaster aftermath problems. To be effective, cross-sector 
collaboration has to start from pre-disaster and continue to the post-disaster stage.  
Formal collaboration could take place before a disaster given a shared setting and with the 
availability of bridging actors who facilitate subsequent actions (Brunner, 2002; Bushouse et 
al., 2011; Coetzee, Van Niekerk, & Raju, 2016; Spekkink & Boons, 2016). Therefore, more 
attention should be focused on collaboration in the pre-disaster preparatory phase if 
organisations aim to promote multi-stakeholder collaboration during the post-disaster phase 
(Scholtens, 2008). Knowledge of the types of collaboration and the barriers to cross-sector 
collaboration in disasters might enable organisations to work better in the preparatory phase, 
which, in turn, can lead to more effective disaster management. That is, what organisational 
leaders and organisations do during the pre-disaster preparatory phase influences cross-sector 
collaboration in the post-disaster phase.  
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Natural disasters strike frequently and responses to disasters are increasingly complicated with 
the influx of diverse stakeholders. Thus, responding to a disaster aftermath using the command 
and control model is increasingly difficult because it involves multi-level coordination (Hovik 
& Hanssen, 2015; McGuire, 2006). Given the limitations of the command and control model 
as discussed, the collaborative approach is useful to address some of those limitations but the 
three barriers to collaboration identified in this study need to be acknowledged and addressed. 
The next step public managers can make is to reach out to potential collaborative partners and 
introduce their roles and mandates. For example, public managers can contact a more 
established local major NGO who can complement public disaster agencies’ operations during 
response, recovery and reconstruction phases through both formal and informal arrangements 
(ASEAN, 2016; ASEAN Secretariat, 2009, 2014, 2016; Bae, Joo, & Won, 2016; Bano, 2019; 
Gupta, 2010; Provan & Kenis, 2008).  
7.4  Research limitations and future research recommendations 
The current study has a number of potential limitations that provide opportunities for future 
research in disaster management. First, although I applied and adhered to all qualitative 
research process tools such as coding, memoing, constant comparisons and theoretical 
saturation, it is acknowledged that another researcher coming from a different perspective of 
background may interpret the data differently and perhaps draw conclusions from the data that 
vary from those here.  
Secondly, a potential limitation of this study was the access to and interviewing of the ‘right’ 
participants. The findings might be different if a researcher interviewed different key decision 
makers of the Malaysian public disaster agencies and their collaborating partners. Eighty per 
cent (n=24) of the research participants interviewed were strategic or operational decision 
makers of various specialisations in disaster management. The need to interview both strategic 
and operational leaders has been discussed in earlier chapters because of their hands-on 
experience and knowledge of disaster management. However, the limitations in interviewing 
only key decision makers must be acknowledged here. These decision makers may have shared 
selective, formal information that was deemed positive and showed their organisation in a 
favourable light. There is no reason to suspect any participants withheld important information, 
but social desirability played a part in the information shared; one cannot be certain that 
participants’ actual experiences were reflected unreservedly in what they shared in the 
interviews. In addressing this limitation, future research may include participants from other 
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organisational levels, such as more junior first responders. Doing so would increase the variety 
of information sources.   
Thirdly, focusing on one type of natural disaster, flooding, may not be able to capture the 
intended rigour of events following a disaster. Flooding is generally predictable and likely to 
cause predictable outcomes compared with other unpredictable and sudden onset disasters such 
as earthquakes, tsunamis and landslides, which require the participation of different technical 
agencies, though relief support is generally the same. This study mainly included participants 
who have experienced severe floods, though some had previously responded to earthquakes, 
tsunamis and landslides. Including a sudden onset disaster such as an earthquake or landslide 
into the study, in addition to floods, could strengthen the rigour of the data.  
Finally, my constructive rapport with the key informants and familiarity with the research 
context had both strengths and potential limitations. Since I knew these participants, they 
treated me as an insider, which allowed me a degree of freedom to ask questions and to attain, 
perhaps, favourable data. However, addressing the potential bias, and to minimise such an 
unintended risk, only 10 of the total 30 research participants interviewed were acquaintances 
through a previous working relationship. The other 20 interviewees were non-acquaintances 
developed through a snowball technique from interviewing the key informants, or through 
recommendations from subject matter experts who were not research participants. Prior 
acquaintance with some participants enabled the researcher to access the ‘right’ people to 
interview, especially during the hectic, stressful end phase of a recent disaster flood response. 
Although these limitations were considered, efforts were made to maximise the credibility and 
reliability by meeting the tests of construct validity, internal validity, and external validity from 
the initial case study design plan as discussed in Chapter 3 (Yin, 2014).  
The current findings may contribute to future research in other areas, or motivate other 
researchers and practitioners to tackle problems of disaster aftermath through collaborative 
disaster management by: 
• continuing to look for a way how collaboration can be strengthened in disasters; 
• investigating the mechanism through which reluctant but critical collaborators can be 
moved towards enthusiastic collaborators in disasters; 
• examining how strategic decision-makers are capable of managing the relationship of 
a new alliance through oscillating between command and control and collaborative 
leadership styles in disasters; and 
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• advancing the knowledge about how the command and control and collaborative 
models can be combined to form a hybrid network approach for effective disaster 
management. 
 
7.5  Concluding remarks 
The increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters globally (UNESCAP, 2016; 
UNISDR, 2004), combined with the rapidly changing geo-political, economic and 
sociocultural contexts, have increased the complexity of disaster management (McEntire, 2004) 
and demand new ways of working. Relying on a single disaster management perspective is 
inadequate and impede disaster actors to adopt other practice including collaborative approach 
in responding to disasters (Hermansson, 2016; McEntire, 2004; Raikes & McBean, 2016; 
Wankhade & Patnaik, 2019b). Increasing collaboration between disaster actors can increase 
the effectiveness of disaster management; however, collaboration between multiple partners in 
a complex, uncertain environment is challenging.  
This study addressed the difficulties of organisations, networks and individuals working 
together in the disruptive and uncertain context of a disaster aftermath. The findings suggest 
four types of collaboration and the interactions between them informed three key barriers to 
cross-sector collaboration in disasters. By acknowledging and addressing these barriers, cross-
sector collaboration can become more effective. Furthermore, some of the limitations of the 
command and control model can be addressed through the knowledge of key barriers and types 
of collaboration obtained prior to disasters. Policy makers and practitioners with this 
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Appendix 3B: Interview protocol and interview questions 
 
Interview Date  
Interview time  From: To: 
Venue  
Voice Recorder  
Recorder Folder Name  
Recorder Filename  
Note  
Interviewee Description 
  Pseudonym 
Name   
Organisation   
Position  
Sex (M/F)  
Year(s) in the organisation  
Type of disaster experienced  
Year of disaster occurrence  
Collaborative partners, if any  
Interview questions for key strategic and operational decision-makers: 
1. Could you please tell me briefly about your career history? How long have you been 
with this organisation? Where were you before this? 
2. Could you please tell me about your role in one of the recent disaster responses that 
happened in Malaysia? What was the specific disaster? 
3. To what extent does your organisation working together with other organisations? 
What were these organisations? 
4. What are the reasons for working together?  
5. To what extent are you satisfied with the level and quality of collaboration? Why or 
Why not? 
6. Are there any operational challenges in implementing collaboration with other 
partners? What are they? Why? 
7. Please tell me more about your work on the ground during the collaboration stage (or 
work in the command or operations centre)? What were you doing during the disaster 
response phase (in an actual disaster response that happened in Malaysia)? 
8. How did this collaboration occur? Was it spontaneous? Was it part of a system or 
policy that had been created earlier? 
9. What aspects of working together were positive for you? Why? Could you please give 
examples? What aspects were less positive? Why? Could you please give examples? 
10. What benefits did your organisation obtain by working together with many other 
organisations? How did it help your organisation? 
11. Looking back, what would you have done differently? Why?  
12. Anything else that you may share with me about the challenges of ‘emergency 
collaboration’ in Malaysia? 
 
Interview questions for disaster aid recipients: 
1. What were you doing when floods were unfolding? 
2. What happened after the floods receded? 








Description Dates Number of 
Participants 
(Total 30) 
Pilot interviews Audiovisual-aided semi-
structured interviews with 
participants to assess the design 
and relevance of interview 
questions.  












structured interviews with other 
strategic and operational 
decision-makers, including two 
pilot interviews conducted 
earlier. 
November 2016-




Follow up with key informants 
through email and audiovisual 
means as and when new 





Field interviews  Face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews with disaster aid 
recipients.  









Khiam Jin Lee, PhD Researcher 
Department of Management, Marketing and Entrepreneurship 
University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
Telephone: +64 27 3336010     Malaysia Cell:+6014-9154037 
Email: khiam.lee@pg.canterbury.ac.nz  
Information Sheet for research participation on “The Dynamics of Interorganisational 
Collaboration in Disaster Management” 
You are invited to participate in a research project: The dynamics of interorganisational 
collaboration in disaster management. This research is undertaken as part of my PhD 
research at the University of Canterbury. For your information, my PhD study is funded by 
the New Zealand-ASEAN Scholarships.   
This project will investigate the varied forms of collaboration, how collaboration evolves 
during disasters, and the barriers to and enablers of interorganisational collaboration during 
disasters. The contributions of this research are twofold: to build a theory of 
interorganisational collaboration in disaster situations, and to provide guiding principles 
and practical recommendations for the policymakers and disaster management practitioners 
on the intricacy and nuances of interorganisational collaboration during disasters. 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. An interview is to be arranged at your preferred 
location and time. Each interview is expected to take around 60 minutes and will be audio 
recorded with your consent. In case a face-to-face interview is not possible or owing to last 
minute changes, interviews can be conducted via Skype, video-conferencing or telephone, 
if you find this more convenient. The interview data or any organisational documentation 
provided are strictly confidential and its uses are for academic purpose only.  
You have the right to withdraw from this project at any time. You may ask for your raw 
data to be returned to you or destroyed at any point. If you withdraw, I will remove all 
information relating to you. Further to this, you have the right to withdraw any given 
information you have provided without penalty prior to any publication of the resulting 
thesis, either partial or full thesis or journal publications. After the interview data is 
transcribed, you will be given an opportunity to review the transcript of each interview. 
However, once you have reviewed and provided feedback to the interview transcript, it will 
become increasingly difficult to remove the influence of your data on the results. You will 
also be offered an opportunity to receive a written report summarising the overall findings 




The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation. To ensure anonymity and 
confidentiality, participants and organisations will be assigned a code and only the 
researcher and members of the supervisory team will know which code relates to which 
individual and each organisation. Extra care will be taken to ensure no information is 
provided in published reports that would reveal identification of any individual or 
organisations. All data collected for this project will be stored in locked and secure facilities 
at the University of Canterbury for ten years, after which the data will be destroyed. 
A thesis is a public document and will be available through the UC Library. 
Please indicate to the researcher on the consent form if you would like to receive a copy of 
the summary of results of the project.  
The project is being carried out as a requirement for a degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
by Khiam Jin Lee under the supervision of Dr. Sanna Malinen and Assoc. Prof. 
Venkataraman Nilakant, who can be contacted by email and telephone as listed below. They 
will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.  
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human 
Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).  
If you agree to participate in the study, you are asked to complete the consent form and 
return the completed form to the researcher Khiam Lee.  
Researcher: 
Khiam Jin, Lee, PhD Researcher  
Email: khiam.lee@pg.canterbury.ac.nz, or leekhiamjin@gmail.com  
New Zealand Mobile Phone: +64-27 3336010 
 
Supervisory Team: 
Dr. Sanna Malinen, Primary Supervisor  
Email: sanna.malinen@canterbury.ac.nz Office Phone: +64-33642987 x 93787 
 
Assoc. Prof. Venkataraman Nilakant, Associate Supervisor  








Khiam Jin Lee, PhD Researcher 
Department of Management, Marketing and Entrepreneurship 
University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
Telephone: +64 27 3336010 Malaysia cell: +6014-9154037 
Email: khiam.lee@pg.canterbury.ac.nz  
Consent Form in the Research of “The Dynamics of Interorganisational Collaboration 
in Disaster Management” 
□ I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
□ I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. 
□ I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time without 
penalty. Withdrawal of participation will also include the withdrawal of any 
information I have provided should this remain practically achievable. 
□ I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the 
researcher and his supervisors and that any published or reported results will not identify the 
participants. I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the 
UC Library. 
□ I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities 
and/or in password protected electronic form and will be destroyed after ten years. 
□ I understand the risks associated with taking part and how they will be managed. 
□ I understand that I am able to receive a report on the findings of the study by contacting the 
researcher at the conclusion of the project. 
□ I understand that I can contact the researcher Khiam Lee via 
khiam.lee@pg.canterbury.ac.nz or NZ mobile phone +64 273336010, supervisor Dr. Sanna 
Malinen, email: sanna.malinen@canterbury.ac.nz, office phone: +64-33642987 x 9787, for 
further information. If I have any complaints, I can contact the Chair of the University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) 
□ I would like a summary of the results of the project.  
□ I give consent to the researcher to use voice recorder to record the interview.  






























Note (1): The members of the National Disaster Management and Relief Committee are 
referred as ‘assisting government agencies’ in this study.  
Note (2): *Shows the new names of some ministries or departments after the transition of 
Malaysian government in May, 2018. 
 
  
National Disaster Management and Relief Committee*(1) 
Comprises of public agencies from national, state and district levels: 
Chairman: A minister appointed by the Prime Minister 
All members of public disaster agencies includes NADMA and Civil Defence Force, 
and 
Minister of Finance 
*(2) Minister of National Unity and Community Development (renamed and oversee 
by the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development and Prime 
Minister’s Department, 2018) 
Chief Secretary of State 
Commander of the Armed Forces 
Director General of the Royal Malaysia Police 
Director General of Health 
*Director General of National Security Division, National Security Council (absorbed 
into NADMA in 2015) 
Director General of Fire and Rescue Malaysia 
Director General of Atomic Energy Licensing Board 
*Director General of Information Ministry (renamed as Ministry of Communications 
and Multimedia, 2018) 
Director General of Transportation Ministry (renamed as Ministry of Transport, 2018) 
*Director General of Public Works Ministry (renamed as Ministry of Works, 2018) 
*Director General of Environment Ministry (renamed and under the auspice of the 
Ministry of Energy, Technology, Science, Climate Change and Environment, 2018) 
Director General of Social Welfare Ministry (renamed and under the auspice of the 
Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development, 2018) 
Director General of Working and Health Security Ministry (renamed and under the 
auspice of Ministry of Health, 2018) 
Director General of Meteorology Service Department 
Director General of Civil Aviation Department 
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Appendix 4A: Two excerpts from reflective field memos 
 
The first memo was written on 10 January 2017 and the second was written the next day 
immediately after the interview. This excerpt summarises a more detailed reflective memo with 
the following indicators: 
• What were your personal feelings and reflections as you were interviewing? How did 
you personally relate to your participant? 
• What questions were useful?  
• Were there any other questions that you should have asked?  
• How satisfied are you with the interview? 
• What codes/ concepts stand out for you from the interview? 
 
The first example of a reflective field memo: 
Interview 
date 
Analytic and reflective field memo 
10 January 
2017 
It was my second time meeting Mr Ahmad (not his real name). The first time was in 
September 2016 where we both presented in the conference of disaster management in 
overseas. The interview with Mr Ahmad is the longest so far, probably about 90 
minutes, and he is passionate to share his insights with mind mappings and drawing on 
white board. He acknowledges there are coordination and operational challenges since 
the operationalisation of NADMA. Among other are developing template on report to 
be issued by National Disaster Command Centre, collecting and collating information 
from multiple agencies, and providing a synchronised and timely report to the leaders 
for further decision makings. Mr Ahmad’s 20-year experience in his former positions 
(the details of job descriptions and names of organisation are omitted to keep his 
identity anonymous) made him always prefer to look at bigger picture and yet 
meticulous in implementation. 
 
The interview with Ahmad was among the early batch after the two pilot interviews and a 
second face-to-face interview was conducted. This reflective memo was drafted almost 
immediately after the interview. In the memo, pressing operational, coordinating and 
collaboration issues confronting Ahmad’s organisation were highlighted as the participant 
uttered, analysed and illustrated on a whiteboard during the interview. I listened to his stories 
and deliberately not to take notes so he has no pressure to express himself freely. Nonetheless, 
Ahmad is a senior civil servant who prefer to analyse problems from micro and strategic 
perspective with relatively lesser experience in disaster response operation. At time, I am 
reserved if his concern are valid and realistic as disaster management is dynamic and volatile, 
different from his previous experience in economic planning. This reflective field memo 
technique is particularly useful for novice qualitative researchers because the drafting of such 
a memo helped reorganise the interviewer’s thoughts, review interview technique and 
questions, and better manage the time of future interviews.  
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The second example of a reflective field memo: 
Interview 
date 
Analytic and reflective field memo 
11 January 
2017 
Mr Fakhrul’s (not his real name) views from the other assisting government agency’s 
perspective on disaster management is important. His organisation is officially part 
of the Malaysian National Disaster Management Organisation in September 2015 
after a new mechanism was adopted by the government of Malaysia. His organisation 
and NADMA are currently under the supervision of the Prime Minister Department, 
and report to the same Minister. Fakhrul’s current role is to coordinate with other 
NGOs and provide training to more than one million of volunteers nationwide. 
Fakhrul's analysis on his organisation’s new role in the areas of rescue and 
mobilisation of relief items is informative and useful. Fakhrul is very generous with 
his time and sharing of his 3-week long disaster response in Kelantan, from 
December 2014 to January 2015. I am very glad to have his support.   
 
The second interview, the next day, with another participant from a different organisation was 
better conducted. Fakhrul is an experience officer in disaster response operation. His stories of 
the three-week long disaster response to the major flooding in 2014-2015, which he 
volunteered, was full of rigour and information. I made comparison his stories in response 
operation to Ahmad’s stories of disaster management strategic planning, and attempted to give 
myself a more realistic perspective of the barriers in responding to floods in Malaysia. A more 
satisfactory insight was attained as a result of learning from the previous field memo where 






Appendix 5A: The detailed categorisation of the relationship dynamics among disaster management stakeholders 
 
















NADMA  --- Strong  Weak Strong  Weak Strong Strong Weak 
NDMO Strong   --- Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Strong  
Armed Forces Weak Weak  --- Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak 
NGOs (major local) Strong  Strong  Weak --- Weak Weak Weak Strong 
NGOs (international) Weak Weak Weak Weak --- Weak Weak Weak 
UN specialised agencies Strong weak Weak Weak Weak --- Strong  Weak 
ASEAN organisations  Strong  Weak Weak Weak Weak Strong --- Weak 
Disaster-affected population Weak  Strong Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak --- 
 
Note: Strong tie: Positive engagement between two organisations in which each other strongly feels the need to collaborate for mutual benefit. 




Appendix 6A: Four types of collaboration 
 Willing collaboration Unwilling collaboration 
Types of collaboration Enthusiastic Mandate-driven Reluctant  Non-collaboration 
Stakeholders (non-
exhaustive) 
NADMA & other assisting 
government agencies; NADMA & 
ASEAN organisations   
NADMA & UN agencies NADMA & disaster aid recipients Between major local NGOs 
Purpose of 
collaboration 
To augment the strength of an 
individual organisation, achieving 
an integrated disaster response 
To benchmark on international best 
practice, fulfil legitimate roles as 
required by agreement or international 
framework 
To search and rescue lives, and protect 
property, provide swift relief support 
to alleviate the suffering of disaster-
affected people 
To pre-arrange a mechanism to ensure no 
duplication or waste of relief items 
distribution, deploy volunteers to 
complement limitations on disaster 
ground, joint force to negotiate with the 
authorities for a coordinated disaster 
response and recovery 
Practical examples of 
existing collaboration (or 
non-collaboration)  
NADMA counts on other 
government assisting agencies for 
manpower, resource, secretariat 
service at state and district levels; 
other assisting government agencies 
rely on NADMA for official 
instruction to achieve integrated 
national disaster response. NADMA 
and ASEAN organisation are 
enthusiastic partners not only driven 
by agreement, but also ASEAN 
solidarity spirit and high-level of 
trust between them.  
NADMA only interacts and 
collaborates with UN agencies 
through formal channels after cautious 
membership selection and protocol 
design. NADMA  regards them as 
foreign entities per se. Collaboration is 
deemed a manifestation of conforming 
to the agreement or framework, 
although  both entities have genuine 
intention to  contribute to the success 
of mutually beneficial outcomes  
Disaster aid recipients claimed the 
authorities are inefficient, not 
transparent and indifferent in relief 
and compensation, at times, refused to 
be evacuated even when requested by 
the authorities. Though public 
managers are genuine in rendering 
support, both entities have a low level 
of trust for each other, government 
officials label them as uncooperative 
in general, public disaster agencies 
lack of time or motivation to build 
trust with communities  
Major local NGOs avoid collaborating 
between themselves by claiming others 
have less experience or are under-
equipped, of different organisation values, 
specialties, and mission objectives. Both 
parties are concerned about losing 
discretion and control if they team up with 
other partners who are more dominant in a 
dynamic social system. However, they 
may collaborate involuntarily if require by 
law.   
Importance in disaster 
response 
Highly critical: Pool necessary 
resources for swift operation to save 
lives, particularly in event of cross-
border disaster 
Moderately critical: Accentuate 
accountability, good governance and 
transparency in action   
Highly critical: Relevant to close the 
gap of perceptions between 
government aid givers and aid 
recipients on what to prepare for 
evacuation in rural areas. 
Highly critical: Capable of 
complementing public agencies’ strengths 
in disaster response and recovery phases. 
Level of collaboration 
occurred 
High-level  Moderate-level Low-level Not occur 
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